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Abstract 
Micro-life insurance provides protection against small premiums to low-income people 
in developing countries. Demand, however, is very moderate. The aim of this empirical 
work is to explain how social capital and religion affect life insurance demand in 
developing countries by the example of Sri Lanka. Social networks allow for access to 
information, money, or innovation in an environment where infrastructure is not well 
functioning or less developed. Thus, social networks shape both, the consumption and 
the risk management behavior of individuals. In addition, cross-country studies show 
that the religion of Islam has a negative impact on life insurance consumption. This 
research follows a mixed-method research approach to study the role of social capital 
and religion on micro life insurance demand. The qualitative focus group discussions 
and the quantitative household surveys were conducted in the Eastern province of Sri 
Lanka in 2013. 
This work identifies three mechanisms through which social capital influences the 
demand for micro-life insurance: imitation, information exchange, informal risk 
sharing. People buy a micro-life insurance if they know an insured person. Informal risk 
management practices crowd out formal micro-life insurance, and the exchange 
between friends, family members or neighbors can reduce consumption if prior negative 
experiences weaken the confidence in the insurance promise. Regarding religion, the 
qualitative study shows that Muslims are reluctant to buy conventional insurance as 
they perceived it as a financial product contradicting with their religion. This study 
confirms that the financial situation contributes significantly to the purchase decision. It 
further found that people are motivated to sign-up for micro life insurance by the 
perception to support other people in need with their purchase. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Mikrolebensversicherungen bieten einkommensschwachen Menschen in Entwicklungs-
ländern einen privaten Versicherungsschutz gegen kleine Prämien. Die Nachfrage nach 
diesen Produkten ist jedoch verhalten. Daher ist es Ziel dieser empirischen Arbeit, am 
Beispiel Sri Lankas zu erklären, wie Sozialkapital und Religion den Konsum von 
Mikrolebensversicherungen beeinflussen. Bei einer nicht gut funktionierenden oder 
wenig ausgebauten Infrastruktur ermöglichen soziale Netzwerke den Zugang zu 
Informationen, Geld oder Innovationen und prägen damit das Konsumverhalten 
genauso wie den Umgang mit Risiken. Ländervergleichende Studien belegen außerdem, 
dass die Religion des Islam den Lebensversicherungskonsum hemmt. Zur Untersuchung 
der beiden Nachfragefaktoren, Sozialkapital und Religion, wendet diese Arbeit einen 
Mixed-Methods Forschungsansatz an. Die qualitativen Fokusgruppendiskussionen und 
die quantitativen Haushaltsbefragungen wurden 2013 in der Ostprovinz Sri Lankas 
durchgeführt. 
Die Arbeit identifiziert drei Wirkungsmechanismen, wie Sozialkapital die Nachfrage 
nach Mikrolebensversicherungen beeinflussen kann: Konsumnachahmung, informelle 
Risikoteilung, Informationsaustausch. Menschen kaufen eine Mikrolebensversicherung, 
wenn sie eine versicherte Person kennen. Informelle Risikomanagementansätze 
verdrängen formale Versicherungsprodukte und auch der Austausch zwischen 
Freunden, Familienmitgliedern oder Nachbarn kann mit negativen Effekten verbunden 
sein, wenn vorherige negative Erfahrungen das Vertrauen in das Leistungsversprechen 
schwächen. In Bezug auf Religion weist die qualitative Studie nach, dass Muslime 
konventionellen Versicherungspraktiken ablehnend gegenüberstehen, da diese nicht mit 
den Normen ihrer Religion vereinbar scheinen. Die Arbeit bestätigt zudem, dass die 
Vermögenssituation wesentlich zur Kaufentscheidung beiträgt, ebenso sowie die 
Wahrnehmung, mit dem Kauf einer Mikrolebensversicherung andere Menschen in Not 
zu unterstützen.  
Schlagwörter: Mikroversicherung, Lebensversicherung, Nachfrage, Entwicklungs-
länder, Sri Lanka   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation: Problem Statement and Relevance 
When insurance coverage is offered at small premiums to low-income people in 
developing countries through so-called micro insurance, uptake of such products is 
often very low, leaving large populations in developing countries without formal 
insurance protection (Cole et al., 2013; Ito and Kono, 2010; Giné and Yang, 2007). 
About 170.4 million people are covered by micro insurance in Asia, 61.8 million in 
Africa, and 48.6 million in Latin America (Mukherjee et al., 2014; McCord and Biese, 
2016 and 2015). This leads to an estimated micro insurance penetration of less than 5 
percent in Africa and up to 7.8 percent in Latin America, whereby most people are 
covered by the low value products of credit-life insurance or personal accident. The 
reasons for this low uptake of micro insurance are not yet fully understood, neither by 
practitioners nor by academia.  
This research aims to understand why low-income household purchase or do not 
purchase micro life insurance. Micro insurance, in general, is understood as insurance 
for low-income households provided by the insurance industry based on risk-adequate 
premiums paid by the insured (IAIS, 2012:11). The author decided to focus on micro 
life insurance as people named life risks as their most severe risk when asked during 
focus group discussions or surveys and have a preference to transfer these risks as 
losses arising from life risks often exceed their personal or their social networks’ 
financial capacity. However, academic research on the demand of micro life insurance 
is still nascent (Eling et al., 2014). Existing micro insurance demand studies focus on 
agricultural index insurance and health coverage. The author identified seven peer 
reviewed studies on the demand of micro life insurance, along with three additional 
reviews on micro insurance demand literature which incorporate some of these studies. 
So far, existing research unarguably provides first insights into the demand drivers and 
barriers of micro life insurance, however it cannot fully explain their underlying cause-
effect mechanisms. Empirical studies on micro life insurance demand are solely based 
on two distinct populations; one from Ghana and the other from Sri Lanka, focusing on 
term life cover. The quantitative research based on these samples investigates the socio-
economic determinants of demand, the interplay of insurance and other financial 
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services, risk aversion, and adverse selection (Giesbert et al., 2011; Bendig and Arun, 
2011; Arun et al., 2012). These studies identify wealth (Giesbert et al., 2011; Bendig 
and Arun, 2011), education (Giesbert et al., 2011; Arun et al., 2012), risk aversion 
(Giesbert et al., 2011), and the usage of other financial or insurance services (Giesbert et 
al., 2011; Bendig and Arun, 2011; Bendig and Arun, 2016) as main explanatory factors 
for micro life insurance demand. Moreover, indicative evidence is provided for a life-
cycle effect (Giesbert et al., 2011) and a bequest motive (Arun et al., 2012). 
Additionally, in their qualitative research, Giesbert and Steiner (2015) focus on the 
value of micro life insurance as perceived by customers and non-customers. By 
identifying basic demand factors, these studies lay the foundation for a more in-depth 
research that tries to understand why and through which mechanisms these factors 
influence micro life insurance uptake. They also raise additional questions about the 
demand behavior of low-income households. The target group seems to differ from 
traditional retail market segments and their behavior is not fully explainable by standard 
expected utility theory. For example, contrary to predictions by standard expected utility 
theory, it seems that risk averse households are less likely to purchase insurance (Cole 
et al., 2013; Ito and Kono, 2010; Gine and Yang, 2009). In addition, the role of trust 
seems to be more relevant than predicted (Morsink, 2012).  
The development of micro life insurance serves the interests of various actors. On the 
supply side, micro insurance allows commercial insurers to enter a new retail market 
segment in growth-market environments, to increase their business portfolios, to 
experiment with innovations, and to strengthen their reputation (Swiss Re, 2010; 
Lloyds, 2009). On the demand side, micro insurance reduces the vulnerability of low-
income households and increases their economic performance. These demand and 
supply side opportunities are further explained in Section 1.4.3. Because of the value-
addition that micro insurance offers for low-income households, its development is also 
part of the agenda of policymakers and regulators in developing countries, aiming to 
increase micro insurance penetration as a complementary instrument to social security 
measures. Their efforts are usually subsumed under the headline of financial inclusion 
which in general seeks to improve access to and usage of market-based financial 
services to every adult and is anchored in international development agendas as well. 
The rationale for a micro insurance market development is further discussed in Section 
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1.4.3. To allow micro insurance to fulfill its promise of economic and social 
development, it is crucial to understand the barriers to its demand. A sound 
understanding of the demand of micro life insurance enables relevant stakeholders to 
support the development of this market segment. The author is aware of a strong 
dependency between micro life insurance demand and supply as a low uptake could also 
be caused by a limited outreach of existing micro life insurance services. However, the 
demand side challenges are currently much more complex and less well-understood 
than supply side reservations, which are partly related to demand constraints and 
presented in Section 1.4.4. Therefore, the goal of this research is to contribute towards 
the creation of an in-depth understanding of micro life insurance demand. 
A detailed literature review to be presented in Chapter 2 identifies the following six 
demand factors which have not been studied extensively, although they might have a 
significant effect on micro life insurance consumption as explained in the following. In 
the context of this study, micro life insurance usually refers to term life micro insurance. 
As presented in section 1.6.3., around 80% of the participants are insured with Amana 
Takaful or Ceylinco which offer term life insurance but no endowment products. Hence, 
results are comparable to previous micro life insurance demand studies.  
1. Peers, social networks and the different mechanisms through which they influence 
demand: So far, only the research on agricultural and health micro insurance has 
tested for an effect of peers and social networks quantitatively (e.g. Cole et al., 
2014; Giné et al., 2008; Jowett, 2003). However, the results are not conclusive. In 
the context of weather index insurance for small-scale farmers in India, Giné et al. 
(2008) find that the effect of membership in an informal or formal organization as 
well as a peer’s insurance status is positively significant. Cai et al. (2015) further 
analyze three possible roles of social networks: (i) diffusion of information which 
leads to an increased awareness of insurance, (ii) imitation of consumption 
behavior, and (iii) learning from a peer’s insurance experience which also creates 
trust. In their field experiments on weather index insurance uptake, they find that 
among small-scale farmers in China a social network effect is driven by the 
diffusion of insurance information, rather than by a peer’s purchase decisions. It is 
questionable if the results from these two studies are applicable to micro life 
insurance as life insurance products are much less complex than index insurance 
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products. Uptake of micro life insurance could be significantly influenced by 
information sharing among peers, which might be a major source for creating 
awareness, understanding, and trust because of the very low micro life insurance 
penetration and familiarity with insurance in developing countries. In general, 
research on social networks proved their relative importance in developing 
countries. Social networks are both more necessary and frequently used because 
infrastructure providing information, financial services or social protection is less 
well developed. It is evidenced that social networks provide access to information 
and to financial resources (Chuang and Schechter, 2015:1-2). A sub-topic 
concerning social networks is the question how informal insurance mechanisms 
interact with the decision to formally insure.  
2. Interdependence of formal and informal insurance mechanisms: Jowett (2013) 
has investigated the relationship in the context of health micro insurance, whereas 
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) studied this area for weather index insurance in 
the agricultural sector in India. Similarly, Landmann et al. (2012) explored this 
topic in the abstract setting of a laboratory experiment in the Philippines. Overall, 
their results are not conclusive and are not transferable to micro life insurance. For 
example, in the case of agricultural insurance, results are based on the assumption 
of covariate shocks and basis risks. In micro life insurance demand research 
Giesbert et al. (2011) provide first evidence that informal Rotating and Savings 
Associations and formal micro life insurance coverage complement each other as 
households face multiple risks which are not covered by life insurance.   
3. Effect of religion: In Muslim-majority countries a comparably low insurance 
penetration can be observed. For example, existing cross-country studies on life 
insurance demand indicate that the relationship between a country’s share of 
Muslim population and life insurance penetration is significantly negative (Beck 
and Webb, 2003; Outreville, 1996; Browne and Kim, 1993). The authors of these 
studies hypothesize that Muslims abstain from purchasing life insurance because of 
their religious norms and fatalistic beliefs (Zelizer, 1979; Beck and Webb, 2003; 
Park et al., 2002). Further, they suggest that people in predominantly Islamic 
countries might have a different risk attitude or level of risk aversion (Wasaw, 
1986; Browne and Kim, 1993; Beck and Webb, 2003). However, these hypotheses 
have not been tested at a household-level and an understanding of the effects of 
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religious denomination on micro life insurance demand is still lacking. Therefore, 
this area has also been identified as a potential topic for research, especially the 
“effects of religion on risk attitudes and insurance demand” (Eling et al., 2014: 
242). An understanding about the relationship between religion and micro life 
insurance demand seems necessary as one third of developing countries are 
majority Muslim.  
4. Role of contract non-performance: Previous research shows an effect of contract 
non-performance on insurance demand among low-income households in low-
income to lower-middle income countries, using theoretical modelling (Liu and 
Myers, 2014) and experimental testing in the field (Biener et al., 2014). However, 
these results have not been applied to micro life insurance or tested in a field study. 
5. Effect of pricing on micro life insurance demand (Eling et al., 2014).  
6. Risk-aversion and understanding its inverse effect (Eling et al., 2014).   
Overall, the literature on micro life insurance demand shows significant gaps, and first 
studies indicate that key demand determinants of traditional life insurance, such as risk 
aversion, are not applicable to micro insurance. Very few empirical research studies 
have specifically addressed potential variables that influence micro life insurance 
demand in developing countries. Main factors identified as the demand drivers for 
agricultural and health products have not been tested for their applicability to micro life 
insurance, even though the limited product complexity of life insurance allows for 
testing basic demand barriers. If the problem of low uptake for micro insurance demand 
under these rather simple circumstances cannot be solved, it might be even more 
challenging to develop a market for more complex products, such as agricultural or 
health micro insurance. Understanding the demand for micro life insurance could lay 
the foundations for further investigations on complex products and their product 
specific barriers, such as basis risk. At last, micro life insurance demand research has 
not yet provided adequate answers to the question: how or why do the identified factors 
influence life insurance consumption among low-income households in developing 
countries? If micro insurance is to fulfill its growth potential and developmental impact 
as further elaborated in Section 1.4.3, more research on this topic is needed to improve 
uptake and outreach. 
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1.2 Research Objective and Development of Research Questions  
The objective of this thesis is to generate an in-depth understanding about two out of the 
six identified potential demand factors: social capital and religion. Using household-
level data from Sri Lanka, this study focuses on the following two research questions:  
• RQ 1: What is the effect of social capital on micro life insurance demand and 
which mechanisms explain this effect?  
• RQ 2: What is the effect of religious denomination on micro life insurance uptake 
and what are the sources of this effect? 
The author decided to focus on the social and religious dimension explaining for micro 
life insurance uptake because both factors are found to be of relative importance in 
developing countries. In an environment with a poor infrastructure social networks are a 
main source of information, e.g. on the benefits of insurance, and a mean to access 
financial resources in times of need. In this context, the researcher further decided to 
apply the broader sociological concept of social capital, instead of referring to the 
concept of peers and social networks separately. This approach also enables the author 
to include an analysis of the interdependencies between formal and informal risk 
sharing strategies. The applied definition of social capital follows the work of Putnam 
(1993) and Coleman (1990) which allows to differentiate between an effect of formal 
organizations, for example a village association, generalized trust and various functions 
of social capital. On the role of religion, one third of all developing countries are 
majority Muslim while life insurance penetration in these countries is less than in non-
majority ones (Swiss Re, 2016). Overall, the two research questions allow for testing so 
far untested hypotheses and for applying previous academic results to a new field of 
research which opens new explanatory approaches for the demand of micro life 
insurance.  
To answer her research questions, the author uses a mixed method research approach 
(Creswell, 2013). She collected quantitative data using a household survey and a risk 
aversion lottery with 464 participants. At the same time, the demand for micro life 
insurance is explored using qualitative data from focus group discussions, involving 71 
participants living in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. This research location was 
particularly suitable because of its religious diversity and the supply of conventional 
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and Takaful micro life insurance products, the latter being a form of insurance in 
accordance with Islamic principles1. The reason for combining both quantitative and 
qualitative data is to gain a deeper understanding of the research problem and results. 
By the mixed method approach, the author converges reliable and generalizable findings 
from numerical analysis (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 657) and explorative, detailed views 
from focus group discussions. The latter facilitates the interpretation and understanding 
of relationships between the variables (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 653). Moreover, as 
current research is still in a nascent stage and applicability of theoretical results is in 
question, the qualitative research places the results of the statistical analysis in context 
and taps below the numerical surface. 
This work differs from previous studies in three principle aspects. First, it explains the 
different channels through which social capital influences micro life insurance uptake. 
Second, it tests and explains for an effect of religion on micro life insurance 
consumption on a household level instead of using cross-country datasets. Third, it 
combines findings from qualitative and quantitative research and uses the methodology 
of a lottery to measure for risk aversion. 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
The aim of this empirical study is to explain the limited micro life insurance 
consumption in developing countries. Within this context, it investigates the impact of 
social capital and religion by using empirical evidence from the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka. The empirical study is mainly of explanatory nature, testing for the hypotheses 
deduced from a theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 2. The study collects and 
analyzes primary data from the field: qualitative data from focus group discussions in 
Chapter 3 and quantitative data from a household survey and risk aversion lottery in 
Chapter 4. As the current research status on the topic of micro life insurance demand is 
nascent, the author chose a mixed method approach as explained in the previous section. 
                                                
 
1 The concept of Takaful is further explained in section 2.6.2. 
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Chapter 5 integrates the main findings of the qualitative and quantitative study, presents 
the conclusions of this work, and its implications for future research and for 
practitioners. 
The remaining part of Chapter 1 presents introductory information on the topic of micro 
life insurance, provides background information on the country-specific context of the 
empirical study and introduces the mixed method approach of this research. 
In detail, Chapter 2 maps the research topic and research questions into the current state 
of academic literature and develops the research model. It first reviews theoretical 
models of life insurance consumption and provides an overview of the findings from 
previous empirical work on life insurance demand. The results from these two well-
established arms of literature are complemented by the findings from peer reviewed 
studies on micro life insurance consumption. The author decided to base her field study 
on all three arms of literature, as academic research on micro life insurance alone is 
limited to seven studies by two groups of researchers using two main quantitative data 
sets. Also, the empirical literature on life insurance consumption provides an 
academically well-established analytical framework for structuring life insurance 
demand factors. The research model of this study is an extension of the analytical 
framework established by Outreville (2013). It summarizes potential demand factors 
and points out current research gaps in the micro life insurance literature. The analytical 
framework and the identified research gaps further encourage the author’s interest to 
study the two demand determinants of social capital and religion from an academic 
point of view. The author considered academic literature on social capital and religion 
while developing her nine hypotheses, possibly explaining for effects of social capital 
and religion on micro life insurance consumption. The hypotheses are the foundation of 
the following qualitative and quantitative studies.  
The qualitative study of Chapter 3 confirms the relevance of the two demand 
determinants of social capital and religion and the previously developed hypotheses. It 
provides first evidence for a relation between social capital, religion and micro life 
insurance consumption and creates a basic understanding of the relationships. To this 
end, the author uses the methodologies of focus group discussions for data collection 
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and a structured content analysis for the data evaluation. Both qualitative methodologies 
and their application are described in detail in Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 4, the theoretically deduced hypotheses are tested in a quantitative study and 
the qualitative findings are subsequently validated. The design and implementation of 
the household survey and risk aversion lottery is described in detail, before presenting 
the statistical analysis.  
The findings from Chapter 3 and 4 allow the author to draw a conclusion on the 
importance of the two demand factors of social capital and religion on the consumption 
of micro life insurance in Chapter 5. 
1.4 Introduction to Micro Insurance   
1.4.1 Definition of Micro Insurance    
Across all product lines, micro insurance is most commonly defined as the “protection 
of low-income people against specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments 
proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk involved” (Churchill, 2006: 12). The 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) explains it more broadly 
“insurance that is accessed by low-income populations, provided by a variety of 
different entities but run in accordance with the generally accepted insurance practices” 
(IAIS, 2012: 11). Thus, micro insurance is a form of retail insurance where risks are 
systematically transferred and transformed from an individual to a collective for a risk-
based fee or premium payment based on laws and methods in stochastics. Compared to 
general retail insurance, the distinctive characteristic of micro insurance is its target 
group: the low-income people. These are characterized as people living above the 
poverty line, usually working in the informal or agricultural sector (Wiedmaier-Pfister 
et al., 2009) in emerging or developing countries. Due to their employment status, they 
are usually not part of the social security system and have not been recognized as 
insurable by market-based insurance companies until the beginning of the nineteen-
nineties (Churchill, 2006; IAIS and CGAP Working Group on Microinsurance, 2007: 
11). Risk carriers of micro insurance vary in their size and legal status. They range from 
pure mutual insurers to public insurers or private (multinational) insurance companies 
as well as from conventional insurers to Takaful operators, that offer insurance services 
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based on Islamic principles. Major risks covered by micro insurance policies are 
comparable to the traditional retail-sector insurance: There is micro insurance for health, 
death, accident, education, housing, or agricultural risks (crop and livestock). In most 
cases, however, micro insurance customers have term life insurance which is linked to 
their credit or personal accident coverage (see Section 1.4.2 for further details). In 
contrast to traditional retail insurance, benefit packages are small to keep premiums 
affordable. Premium amounts and payments should be adapted to the irregular cash-
flows of the customers. To keep the product affordable group pricing is usually applied. 
Policy application and claims processes are reduced to a minimum in terms of 
documentation, eligibility requirements and processing time. If there are screening 
requirements, they are many times limited to a statement of good health. The time of 
premium payment ideally corresponds with a period when a household receives 
(surplus) income. Premium collection is often linked to an existing financial service, 
such as microcredit or savings, to create efficiency and to minimize costs . Claim 
processes require simple and easy to handle documentation. Claims are to be settled 
promptly. Like in traditional retail insurance, micro insurance is distributed by financial 
institutions. Generally, distributors, are very close to the target group, have a good 
reputation and enjoy the trust of the target group. In addition, the promotion and 
servicing of micro insurance via mobile phones is gaining importance, especially in 
Africa (McCord and Biese, 2016). Insurers monitor their agents and support them by 
trainings. In micro insurance, there is limited control for adverse selection, moral hazard 
and fraud as traditional control measures are too cost-intensive. Usually these risks are 
included in the premiums, or minimized by either linking the insurance product to 
another transaction or offering group policies (Erlbeck, 2010; Churchill, 2006; McCord, 
2006; Wipf et al., 2006). A summary of the characteristics of traditional retail insurance 
and micro insurance is presented in Table 1. More specific product details on micro life 
insurance available in Sri Lanka are presented in Section 1.6.3.  
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Table 1: Main characteristics of traditional retail insurance and micro insurance  
 Traditional retail insurance Micro insurance 
Target group Wealthy to middle class people  
Established insurance culture 
 
Financial literate 
Low-income people  
Weak or no insurance culture and 
awareness 
Financial illiterate  
Product design Large sums insured and extensive 
benefit packages 
 
Small sums insured and benefit 
package covering major insurable 
risks; short-term insurance without 
savings component 
 Complex policy conditions with 
many exclusions  
Simple, comprehensible policy 
conditions; few or no exclusions 
 Individual policies  (Mandatory) group policies 
 Limited eligibility, risk assessment Few eligibility criteria   
Premium Monthly to yearly payments 
 
 
Collection in cash but mostly from 
deductions in bank account   
Relatively small and frequent 
premium payments adapted to the 
irregular cash-flows of policyholders 
Collection in cash or linked to 
existing (financial) products 
Pricing Based on individual risk as reliable 
statistical data available 
Group pricing 
Processing Complex policy and claim 
documentation; extensive 
verification documents 
Simple documentation 
Prompt claims processing 
Distribution Sold directly or by licensed 
intermediaries of the financial 
sector 
Sold by partners close to the target 
market, who have good reputation 
and enjoy trust of target group  
Source: Adapted from Erlbeck (2010: 42) 
 
1.4.2 Global Outreach of Micro Insurance 
The product spectrum of micro life insurance usually covers the following product 
types: term life, savings, endowment, pensions, credit life and funeral. The product 
types are usually aggregated into two categories: credit life and life insurance 
(Mukherjee et al., 2014: 23). Globally, micro life and credit life insurance are the most 
sold micro insurance product categories as presented in Table 2. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean nearly 32.9 million people are covered by life insurance and an additional 
16.4 million by credit life insurance (McCord and Biese, 2015). In Africa, almost 46.4 
million people are protected by micro life and another 16.4 million people by credit-life 
(McCord and Biese, 2016). In Asian and Oceania, about 83.9 million people are micro 
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life and credit life insured (Mukherjee et al., 2014). In terms of number of people 
insured, accident insurance is the second largest product category purchased: 20.8 
million people in Latin America and the Caribbean (McCord and Biese, 2015), 13.1 
million in Africa (McCord and Biese, 2016) and 77.8 million in Asia and Oceania 
(Mukherjee et al., 2014).   
Table 2: People covered by micro insurance worldwide  
 
Asia and  
Oceania 
(2013) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
(2014) 
Africa 
 
(2015) 
Percentage of the population 
covered 4.3% 7.9% 5.4% 
People insured (total)   170.4 million 48.6 million 61.8 million 
Life  83.9 million 32.9 million 46.4 million 
Credit Life n/a 19.7 million 16.4 million 
Accident 77.8 million 20.8 million 13.1 million 
Health 29.2 million 7.6 million 8.4 million 
Agriculture 23.8 million 2.2 million 1.1 million 
Property 7.7 million 2.7 million 4.5 million 
Source: McCord and Biese (2016, 2015), Mukherjee et al. (2014) 
Even though the growth rates of 30 percent for Asia and Oceania between 2010 and 
2012 (Mukherjee et al., 2014), 14 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean between 
2005 and 2011, and 31 percent for Africa between 2012 and 2014 are impressive large 
shares of the population still remain uninsured. As micro life insurance “products are 
comparatively easy to introduce, price and manage, remain easy for clients to 
understand”, demanded by the target group and can be combined with other services or 
products (Mukherjee et al., 2014: 21), life insurance is the most promising product to 
increase insurance penetration for low-income households in developing countries. 
The next section provides the rationale why it is desirable to further develop inclusive 
insurance markets. These are insurance markets that are effectively accessible to all 
working age adults where products and services are affordable, sustainable, convenient, 
and delivered by licensed and supervised insurers and intermediaries (IAIS, 2012: 7). 
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1.4.3 Objective of Micro Insurance 
Due to their economic situation, risk exposure of low-income households is 
comparatively high and above a countries’ population average. Low-income earners are 
more frequently affected by risks like illness, accidents or natural disasters (Eling et al., 
2014: 224). For example, diseases are more likely because of the quality and availability 
of drinking water, and disabilities are more frequent due to work-related accidents. 
Recent studies suggest that micro insurance enables poor households to reduce their 
vulnerability, to manage shocks effectively, to secure and to build up their wealth (Beck 
et al., 2007; Cohen and Sebstad, 2006: 26; Wiedmaier-Pfister et al., 2009: 4). The 
studies agree that micro insurance first allows for a transfer of individual risks. This ex-
ante risk transfer increases planning security and provides financial stability in case the 
insured event occurs. In the absence of insurance services, low-income people must rely 
on ex-post risk management strategies, like out-of-pocket payments, lending, dissaving 
or selling of assets. These reactive strategies are less efficient and effective and heavily 
affect the possession and accumulation of assets as well as future income flows. 
Savings, if any, are often not sufficient to cover the financial consequences of these 
risks, access to credits is limited or comes at high costs, and compensation from social 
protection schemes is not available. In most cases, people rely on their social network, 
their extended family members, friends or neighbors. These informal risk management 
strategies can partly smooth financial shocks with the consequence of people remaining 
in poverty or slipping into it (Townsend, 1994; Murdoch, 1993). With the help of 
insurance, these risks can be efficiently transferred and transformed (Townsend, 1983). 
First, people can overcome the adverse consequences of unexpected life events, health 
shocks or natural catastrophes, which are considered the main hindrance for many low-
income people to escape the cycle of poverty. Second, micro insurance, might lead to a 
decreasing risk exposure of the individual if she becomes aware of her risk exposure 
and takes risk mitigation actions. Third, insurance protection enables economic 
activities and investments: savings for a rainy day can be reduced and additional funds 
are available for investments or economic transactions. In addition, micro life insurance 
supports access to credit. In the agricultural sector, it is evidenced that crop insurance 
allows the cultivation of more profitable crops at higher risk of crop failure (Dercon and 
Christiansen, 2011; Morduch, 1995). These microeconomic effects accumulate to 
increased economic performance on the macro-level (Arena, 2008). Despite these 
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positive effects, uptake of micro life insurance is still low. This low demand is also 
related to the commercial insurers reluctance to enter this market segment which is 
elaborated in more detail in the next section.   
1.4.4 Challenges and Opportunities for Commercial Insurers   
The business case for microinsurance is often a medium to long-term prospect for 
commercial insurers and associated opportunity costs of investments are often high in 
growth markets. As the overall insurance penetration is still low in developing countries 
compared to the industrialized part of the world, the market potential for commercial 
insurance in terms of premium growth and profitability remains very lucrative in the 
traditional retail and corporate market segments. However, most commercial insurers’ 
lack of knowledge or familiarity with the low-income populations, expectations of 
relatively low premium volume per policy against comparatively high fixed operational 
costs (if traditional business models are applied), make upper management ignore this 
business line.  
To successfully serve the low-income market segment, commercial insurers need to find 
innovative ways to (i) reduce operational costs, (ii) optimize claim settlement processes, 
(iii) cooperate with adequate distribution channels and (iv) design appropriate 
commission systems. Further, they need to (v) engage with the target group to 
understand their needs and (vi) gain access to information about their customer’s risk 
exposure. At last, insurers need to (vii) invest in marketing or financial education 
activities as too often the low-income population is not familiar with the idea of 
insurance. In sum, commercial insurers are challenged to engage in new cooperation 
and develop process which are faster, more cost-efficient and slim-lined. 
Microinsurance customers often are not part of the formal banking system which 
inhibits a cost-efficient premium collection or payouts by bank transfers (i). However, 
claims need to be paid as soon as possible for the insurance to be of value (ii), because 
of the financial situation of the target group. Selling products through conventional 
agents or direct sales systems serving individual households usually does not work (iii). 
Commissions for microinsurance are too low to sufficiently incentivize agents (iv). 
Microinsurance usually succeeds if it strengthens the core business of its distribution 
partner. For example, credit life insurance is of interest to micro finance institutions 
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because it reduces their number of non-performing loans. Mobile phone operators view 
micro insurance as customer loyalty instrument. To choose on appropriate distribution 
channels that are not only familiar to and trusted by the target group, but also able to 
reach out to the clients in rural areas, commercial insurers need to be informed about the 
socio-economic background, living conditions and needs of the low-income households 
(v). Unfortunately, this information is often lacking. More importantly historical and 
current statistical data on the target segments is insufficient to reliably estimate risk 
profiles (vi). For example, life insurers use mortality table from South Africa for Ghana 
as no such information is available for the country. Product development is also 
challenged by the irregular income flows of the low-income households which means 
that traditional products cannot simply be downscaled. Another difficulty for 
commercial insurers is the unfamiliarity of the low-income population with the idea of 
insurance (vii). For many of them, insurance is a new concept. This circumstance 
usually requires establishment of a trustful relationship and an in-depth but easy to 
understand explanation of the idea of insurance. These educational or marketing 
activities imply additional costs to be covered by the insurer.  
Next to these supply side inherent challenges, regulatory rules (such as 
unproportionable large capital requirements and taxes) do not support the provision of 
microinsurance in many countries. In other cases, requirements set out for the 
assignment of distribution partners are not in line with the specific circumstances of 
microinsurance. Under some regulatory frameworks, for example, microfinance 
institutions that in many countries are the main delivery channel are not allowed to sell 
or service microinsurance policies. (e.g. IAIS, 2007: 31-34; German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2009: 10-12) 
As a benefit to commercial insurers, micro insurance supports in building a strong 
reputation, widening the companies’ customer base, and in increasing sales of today and 
tomorrow. In a growth environment, micro insurance is an opportunity to tap early into 
emerging markets and to establish a strong brand name with emerging customers. 
Commercial insurers can gain in-depth experiences with the local markets at relatively 
low risk exposure. They can experiment with new products and delivery channels in 
different settings and transfer successes to their traditional retail business sectors. At 
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last, micro insurance can help to improve the relationship between the insurer and the 
national regulator (Erlbeck, 2010; Lloyd's, 2009). 
1.5 Methodological Approach: Mixed Methods     
1.5.1 Introduction to Mixed Methods Research  
The objective of this section is to explain the mixed methods approach and why this 
methodology and research design suits this study best.    
The mixed methods approach is one of the three methods distinguished between in the 
philosophy of science, next to quantitative and qualitative research. It combines the 
qualitative and quantitative methods and its instruments for data collection and analysis. 
Quantitative research aims at the deductive definition and measurement of theoretical 
constructs. Theoretically derived hypotheses are tested in a structured manner by 
collecting data from sufficiently large samples. The collected data is analyzed and 
interpreted statistically. In contrast, the objective of qualitative research is the inductive 
formation of theoretical concepts or the further development of methods. Open research 
questions are examined in detail based on a relatively small number of cases by means 
of unstructured or semi-structured data collection methods like interviews, observations 
or documents. The rich and non-numerical data is analyzed by qualitative instruments 
such as content analysis to identify reoccurring themes and patterns (Döring and Bortz, 
2016: 223; Creswell, 2009: 15).     
Mixed methods research originates from 1959, from the psychological research of 
Campbell and Fisk. It further developed in the late seventies and is frequently applied in 
social sciences and business research, but also in the field of medicine or psychology 
(Creswell et al., 2006: 14, 17). It is rooted in both the quantitative and qualitative 
method and “focuses on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or series of studies” (Creswell et al., 2006: 5). In 
combining quantitative and qualitative approaches, mixed methods research “provides 
strengths that offset the weaknesses of both quantitative and qualitative research” 
(Creswell et al., 2006: 9) and “is useful when either the quantitative or qualitative 
approach by itself is inadequate to understand a research problem” (Creswell, 2009: 18). 
In combining both approaches and their methods, a research study can, for example, 
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explore a new phenomenon and generalize its findings to a large population, or it can 
provide a detailed understanding of underlying mechanisms in large sample analyses 
(Creswell, 2009: 18-19). In a mixed methods approach, knowledge, understanding and 
insights are more comprehensive, multi-perspective and therewith complete (Kuckartz, 
2014: 54).  
In this study, the deductive, quantitative research design dominates. Based on a 
theoretical framework, hypotheses are developed and tested. However, in the process of 
data collection, analysis and interpretation, the quantitative and qualitative approaches 
are of equal importance. Considering the research problem and current state of micro 
life insurance demand research, the author opted for the mixed methods research design 
of triangulation which is further explained in the following. The next paragraphs 
describe the different mixed method research designs and explain why the triangulation 
design is most appropriate for this study.   
The mixed methods approach can be clustered into four main categories of designs even 
though the number of designs is increasing with the continued application of the 
methods. Usually three criteria are applied to distinguish between the different mixed 
methods research designs (Creswell et al., 2006: 80):  
i. Timing or implementation of the quantitative and qualitative study,  
ii. Weighting of the quantitative and qualitative methods in the research,  
iii. Mix of methods or integration of the quantitative and qualitative methods   
The criterion of timing refers to the sequencing of implementation of the quantitative 
and qualitative study. Overall, there are three options: a. the quantitative study is 
conducted first, b. the qualitative study is implemented first, c. both the qualitative and 
quantitative research are done at the same time.  
The second criterion of weighting implies the importance of the two research methods. 
Again, there are three choices: a. the quantitative study outweighs the qualitative study, 
b. the qualitative study is prioritized over the quantitative study, c. both studies are of 
equal importance.  
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The third criterion, ‘mix of methods’ or integration, clarifies when the quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches are combined: a. in the research design, b. during data 
collection, c. during data analysis, or d. in the interpretation of results (Creswell et al., 
2006).   
Applying these three criteria, four main design categories are discussed in literature as 
presented in the following Table 3 and further explained below.  
Table 3: Classification of mixed method designs 
Criteria Triangulation Embedded  Explanatory Exploratory 
Timing Parallel X X   
Sequential   Quan ® Qual Qual ® Quan 
Weighting Equal X    
Priority  X Quan Qual 
Mix of  
methods  
(Integration) 
Design X X X X 
Data 
collection 
 Qual ® 
Quan 
or 
Quan ®  
Qual 
Quan ® Qual Qual ® Quan Data analysis  
Interpretation X 
Source: Adapted from Creswell et al. (2006: 85) 
Within a mixed method triangulation design, two separate studies, a quantitative and a 
qualitative study, are carried out in parallel whereby both methods are of equal 
importance. Both studies are driven by and based on a common research design 
whereby data collection and analysis is conducted separately. Data is merged during the 
data interpretation process when results are compared, contrasted and interpreted 
jointly. If findings of the quantitative and qualitative studies are consistent, external 
validity of results is improved (Creswell et al., 2006: 62).  
In an embedded design, quantitative research either supports qualitative research or vice 
versa. Quantitative and qualitative methods are mixed at the design and data collection 
level. In most applications, qualitative and quantitative data is collected simultaneously 
with one method clearly dominating the other in data collection, analysis and 
interpretation (Creswell et al., 2006: 67).   
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In an explanatory mixed method design, qualitative data helps to explain or build upon 
quantitative research finding. Quantitative data is superior and collected first. Then, 
qualitative research improves the quantitative results by generating an in-depth 
understanding of statistical correlations. They put statistical results into context and can 
explain for underlying reasons of correlations (Creswell et al., 2006: 71).  
An exploratory design either aims at further developing data collection instruments, or 
serves for the identification of new hypotheses to be tested quantitatively. Starting with 
qualitative methods of data collection, analysis and interpretation, an exploratory design 
allows for the investigation of a new phenomenon, if a guiding theory or framework 
does not exist. Quantitative methods can then be used to generalize the qualitative 
findings to a larger population. The qualitative method and its instruments dominate the 
quantitative ones (Creswell et al., 2006: 75; Bryman, 2001: 449-50).   
Overall, this study follows the triangulation design. While in its research design, the 
quantitative method dominates the qualitative approach, both methods are of equal 
importance in data collection, analyses and interpretation. The research design is mainly 
of an explanatory nature testing for theoretically deduced hypotheses. Contrary to 
previous micro life insurance demand research, the author decided to supplement the 
quantitative study – the main research method in economics and business administration 
– with a qualitative study, as theoretical and practical knowledge on the demand of 
micro life insurance is nascent. In addition, previous research shows that existing 
theories are not always applicable to the target group. The qualitative approach allows 
to identify key demand determinants in an open, exploratory manner and to confirm the 
relevance of the hypotheses. It further provides an in-depth understanding and puts the 
quantitative results into context. Still, the parallel sequencing, equal weighting and mix 
of qualitative focus group discussions with a quantitative household survey and risk 
aversion lottery as well as their joint interpretation, justify a triangulation design. 
1.5.2 Quality Criteria in Mixed Methods Research    
This section sets out the quality criteria of mixed methods research, which guide the 
design and implementation of the present study. These quality criteria draw from the 
quantitative and qualitative methodology. 
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In most quantitative research, the validity typology of Campbell (1957) is applied, 
which is concerned with the methodological rigor of scientific work, supplemented by 
test theoretical quality criteria (Döring and Bortz, 2016: 109-110). Overall, three main 
criteria and three sub-categories can be defined:   
i. internal validity (credibility) and its sub-categories of:  
a. statistical inference validity,  
b. external validity (transferability),  
c. construct validity,  
ii. reliability (dependability), and  
iii. objectivity (confirmability).  
Qualitative research frequently uses a set of quality criteria developed by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985). They established four quality criteria: (i) credibility and (ii) 
transferability, (iii) dependability, and (iv) confirmability. As indicated by the previous 
list of quality criteria, the four criteria are closely linked to the above described 
quantitative criteria (Döring and Bortz, 2016: 109-110; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 
296). Due to the identity of the quality criteria in quantitative and qualitative research, 
and the primary application of the quantitative research paradigm in this work, this 
study uses the terminology of the quantitative quality criteria. It further applies two 
quality criteria specific to the mixed methods approach:  
iv. design quality, and  
v. interpretative rigor.  
The following paragraphs describe each quality criterion and explain their relevance for 
this research.  
(i) Internal validity (credibility) refers to the fact that results and interpretations are 
credible. It relates first to the validity of a causal relationship of an observed covariation 
between two variables, and second to the degree to which alternative explanations of the 
results can be ruled out. Internal validity mainly relates to the research design. For 
example, (quasi-)experimental studies are internally valid because their findings on the 
examined relationships can be interpreted as cause-effect relations. On the contrary, 
non-experimental studies can only show correlations between variables, without 
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clarifying the underlying causalities. Accordingly, the internal validity of causal 
interpretations is lower (Döring and Bortz, 2016: 94-95).   
A special case of internal validity is statistical (inference) validity. A quantitative study 
can claim a high degree of statistical validity if descriptive and inferential analysis are 
performed correctly and appropriate statistical methods are used. In addition, statistical 
validity is limited if the inferential data analysis is not based on hypothesis, but 
statistical significances are searched for without a theoretical background (Döring and 
Bortz, 2016: 96). In this study, statistical inference validity is considered in the 
deductive development of hypotheses from previous research and in the process of data 
analysis.  
External validity (transferability) captures the degree to which the inference made from 
the results are consistent across variations in settings, timing, measurements, or persons. 
External validity is high if the results and conclusions are transferable or generalizable 
to other contexts. It largely depends on the research design and on the sampling 
procedure. For example, results of a field study are more generalizable than from a 
laboratory study, and a longitudinal study performs better in terms of external validity 
than cross-sectional studies. In addition, probabilistic samples are superior to the non-
probabilistic ones because of their higher degree of representativeness (Döring and 
Bortz: 2016: 95, 102; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 296). The degree of external 
validity is a weakness of this research. To be able to answer her research questions, the 
author decided for non-probabilistic sampling strategies and her resources allowed for a 
cross-sectional but not a longitudinal study. However, she could conduct her research in 
the field and adapted her sample by statistical weighting to the population under study.   
A third aspect of external validity is construct validity, which refers to the ability of the 
respective measurements to capture the theoretical constructs of interest. To achieve 
construct validity, theoretical concepts are defined precisely and based on the current 
state of research. In the process of operationalization, it must be specified through 
which observable characteristics (indicators) the respective theoretical concepts are 
measured, and which standardized measurement instruments are used (Döring and 
Bortz: 2016: 95; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 296). In this study, the author defined 
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concepts in a clear and transparent manner and used academic standards in their 
operationalization.  
(ii) Reliability (dependability) refers to the consistency of results and accuracy of 
measurement instruments. Reliability is high if findings are replicable and instruments 
return the same results in a repeated measurement activity with the same (or similar 
participants) in the same (or similar) context (Döring and Bortz: 2016: 109, 442-445). 
Reliability is a precondition for construct validity, and was considered in the design of 
the measurement instruments and in undergoing a transparent data collection, analysis 
and interpretation process.  
(iii) Objectivity (confirmability) is present if subjective elements or influences are 
eliminated. Results are independent of the researchers participating and their 
motivation, interests and perspectives (Döring and Bortz: 2016: 109, 442). In the 
processes of data collection, analysis and interpretation the author took measures to 
exclude subjective influences. Details are presented in the respective chapters.  
(iv) Design quality is achieved if the stated research question necessitates a mixed 
methods research approach. The rationale for a mixed methods study is discussed and 
clearly expressed (Döring and Bortz: 2016: 114-115). In this study, the introductory 
chapter states the research questions and rationale of the research design as well as the 
previous section.  
(vi) Interpretative rigor refers to the need for integrating mixed methods findings. 
Results of the quantitative and qualitative studies are integrated and discussed in an 
overall interpretation to ensure the additional value of pursuing both methods (Döring 
and Bortz: 2016: 115; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 301; Bryman et al. 2008: 269-275, 
284). Interpretative rigor is best reflected in the conclusive chapter of the study, Chapter 
5. 
In its mixed method approach, this study applies six quality criteria to ensure 
methodological rigor, validity and reliability of results. The six quality criteria are 
discussed in the respective chapters and the quality of this research is evaluated against 
the defined criteria in the concluding Chapter 5. 
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1.6 Empirical Setting: Sri Lanka’s Country Profile and Micro 
Insurance Market  
This section introduces the general Sri Lankan context in which micro insurance 
operates and it describes the current micro insurance market. The data used in the first 
part to summarize the political, economic and socio-economic conditions is mainly 
from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) under the National 
Household Survey Programme conducted between June 2012 and July 2013 by the Sri 
Lankan Department of Census and Statistics. The survey takes place every three years 
and lasts 12 months to capture seasonal variations in income and expenditure. It further 
provides detailed data on provincial and district-level and differentiates between urban 
and rural environments. As the field research took place in August and September 2013 
in the Eastern province the data are from about the same time. Additional information is 
collected from the Socio-Economic Data of Sri Lanka (2013) published by the Sri 
Lankan Central Bank in 2014. For the reason of interpreting the statistics, the author 
makes references to other member states of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) if necessary. This regional intergovernmental organization and 
geopolitical union of nations includes the member states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It was founded in 1985 to 
promote economic development and regional integration. 
The second part describes the current state of the micro insurance market, and is mainly 
drawn from the recent report “The Landscape of Microinsurance in Sri Lanka in 2016” 
published by the Microinsurance Network and the Munich Re Foundation. The 
landscape study provides the most comprehensive and recent overview of the micro 
insurance sector and was prepared for the 12th International Microinsurance Conference 
that took place in the capital of Sri Lanka in November 2016.  
1.6.1 Sri Lankan Political System and Economic Context 
Sri Lanka was founded in February 1948 after its independence from the United 
Kingdom under the name of Ceylon, and later named the Democratic Socialist Republic 
of Sri Lanka. With its capital, Colombo, the country is divided into nine administrative 
provinces. Sri Lanka is a presidential republic. The current president, Maithripal 
Sirisena, was elected in January 2015 for a six-year term. He is both chief of state and 
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head of government. For 26 years, the political and economic situation of Sri Lanka was 
influenced by the armed conflict between the Tamil separatists and the Sinhalese 
majority which ended in 2009. Since the end of the armed conflict the government has 
invested in economic development projects, especially in the country’s infrastructure. 
Investments are mainly financed by foreign loans from China and the Asian 
Development Bank. Further, Sri Lanka was heavily affected by the Tsunami in 2004, 
most severely the coastal areas in the Northern, Eastern and Southern Province. 
In 2013 gross domestic product (GDP) amounted to 67.2 billion USD. Since the end of 
the armed-conflict in 2009 GDP is constantly growing with real GDP growth rates 
between 8.2 percent in 2011 and 6.3 percent in 2012. Majority of GDP is generated 
from the service sector with 58.1 percent, 31.1 percent from the industry and 10.8 
percent from agriculture. The service sector is driven by the tourist industry and its 
related businesses. Main industries in Sri Lanka are food, beverage, tobacco and 
textiles. The agricultural sector benefits from exports of tea and rubber and in addition 
produces rice and coconut as major crops. Over the last 15 years, the share of 
agriculture has been declining to the benefits of the industry sector, a trend representing 
the ongoing structural transformation of the economy (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
2014).    
As presented in Table 4 monthly household income was LKR 45,878 (approx. EUR 
255.74 EUR) in 2012/2013 in Sri Lanka and LKR 30,676 (approx. EUR 170.82) for the 
Eastern Province as per the HIES. Average monthly income consists of monetary and 
non-monetary income sources whereby 86 percent of the total household income is 
from monetary sources. The latter is income from wages or salaries (35 percent), 
agricultural (11 percent) and nonagricultural activities (17 percent), other cash income 
(11 percent) and windfall income, e.g. from lotteries (10 percent). In the Eastern 
province, relatively more people receive income from wages or salaries and less from 
agricultural activities.   
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Table 4: Average monthly household income in Sri Lanka by main source 
 Sri Lanka Eastern Province 
 Mean 
in LKR 
Share of 
income 
Mean 
in LKR 
Share of 
income 
Total Income 45,878 100% 30,676 100% 
Monetary Income 39,300 85.7% 27,477 89.6% 
Wages / Salaries 16,134 35.2% 12,851 41.9% 
Agricultural activities 5,213 11.4% 1,602 5.2% 
Nonagricultural activities 7,990 17.4% 4,325 14.1% 
Other cash income 5,230 11.4% 4,141 13.5% 
Income by chance  4,733 10.3% 4,557 14.9% 
Non-monetary Income 6,578 14.3% 3,199 10.4% 
Income in kind 2,381 5.2% 1,236 4.0% 
Estimated rent value of 
own house 4,197 9.1% 1,963 6.4% 
Source: Adapted from Department of Census and Statistics (2015) 
Unemployment of labor force is rather low with 4.4 percent. Most of the 8.4 million 
formally employment people work in the service sector (42.9 percent) where the tourist 
sector largely contributes to, followed by the agricultural sector (31.0 percent) and 
industry (16.1 percent). Public employment is modest at 1.5 percent of total 
employment and the financial sector still small with 1.8 percent of total employment. 
However, these figures do not include the informal sector2 which represents almost 60 
percent of employment in Sri Lanka. Out of the five million informally employed 2.2 
million work in the agricultural sector and 2.8 million in the non-agricultural sector 
(Department of Census and Statistics, 2015; 2014).    
                                                
 
2 Per the Department of Census and Statistics, the informal sector is defined as an institution that is (i) not 
registered in Employment Provident Fund or in Department of Inland Revenue, or (ii) not keeping 
formal accounts, or (iii) the number of regular employers is less than 10 (Department of Census and 
Statistics 2014: 30).  
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To better understand the living standard, income per capita is an appropriate measure, 
whereby average household size is 3.9 nationwide and 4.0 for the Eastern Province. In 
2012/2013, the average per capita income was LKR 7,622 per month (approx. EUR 
42.44) in Eastern Sri Lanka compared to the national average of LKR 11,819 (approx. 
EUR 65.81); the median per capita income in the area under study amounts to LKR 
5,385 (approx. EUR 29.99) compared to LKR 7,881 (approx. EUR 43.89) on the 
national level. In comparison to the rest of the country, living standard is the lowest in 
the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. This fact is further supported by national poverty 
statistics. Official poverty line is set at real per capita expenditure per month of LKR 
3,624 (approx. EUR 20.18). If a person’s real expenditure is below this value, she is in 
poverty. In Sri Lanka, these are 1.3 million people or 6.7 percent of the total population, 
which is low by international standards. In the area under study, the share of people 
living in poverty is 11.0 percent of the population, a value that is only topped by the 
Uva region (15.4 percent), a sparsely populated area in the south-east of Sri Lanka 
(Department of Census and Statistics, 2015). When, in addition, the group of the “near-
poor” is considered, it becomes obvious that 40 percent of the population lives on an 
income less than twice the national poverty line (World Bank, 2016: 6). Efforts by the 
national government to financially support people in need are limited. According to a 
recent World Bank report, spending on social assistance programs is low by 
international standards and declined in the past (2016: 56). Details on social assistance 
programs are listed in Table 5.  
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Table 5: Social assistance programs of the Government of Sri Lanka in 2011 
Program Beneficiary Type Benefit Level Beneficiaries Expen-
diture* 
Samurdhi Subsidy 
Program 
Poor families Monthly stamps 
worth of LKR 210, 
750, 1200, 1500 per 
family 
1,541,575 
(Families) 
9,043 
Monthly Assistance 
for Disabled 
Persons with 
disabilities, of low 
income families 
Monthly assistance 
worth of LKR 3,000 
per family with a 
disabled 
11,216 
(Families) 
404 
New Elders            
Assistance Program 
Elders over 70 
years with no 
income  
Monthly relief of 
LKR 1,000 per 
elderly person 
229,892 
(2012) 
190 
(2012) 
School Meal Grade 1-5 students 
of primary and 
secondary schools 
in selected rural 
areas and students 
from special 
education 
Mid-day meal 1,117,219 2,486 
National 
Supplementary 
Food 
All pregnant 
mothers and 
lactating mothers 
for first 6 months 
and infants and 
children from 6-59 
months deviating 
from the normal 
weight and those 
who are with growth 
faltering 
Two take home 
packs of Thriposha 
once a month 
873,509 980 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2016: 55)  
Note: * in million LKR 
In addition to these social assistance programs, three social insurance schemes are in 
place: a pension scheme, a National Insurance Trust Fund and a public crop insurance 
scheme. The pension scheme under the Ministry of Social Empowerment and Welfare 
targets at the working age population. It covers public service employees; self-employed 
can contribute voluntary. While it provides pensions in the first place, it also grants 
personal accident coverage. The National Insurance Trust Fund was set-up in 2006 
under the Ministry of Policy Planning and Economic Affairs. It reaches more than 2 
million clients and offers health insurance for public servants, crop and loan protection 
for farmers, and a national natural disasters coverage. In addition, the Agriculture and 
Agrarian Insurance Board provides crop insurance since 1973. Currently it covers more 
 28 
than 700,000 farmers and additionally offers pension, personal accident and permanent 
disability benefits to farmers and fishermen (Microinsurance Network, 2016).  
1.6.2 Socio-Demographic Profile of Sri Lanka 
In 2013 around 20.5 million people lived in the nine provinces of Sri Lanka. 18.3 
percent of population lives in the urban areas and 81.7 percent in the rural areas 
whereby 4.4 percent of the rural population lives on estates, a situation specific to the 
large tea estates. Most people, 5.8 million, live in the Western Province which includes 
the greater Colombo area. Further, a multi-city urban agglomeration evolved from 
Colombo to Kandy (Central Province) and to Galle and Matara (Southern Province) 
(World Bank, 2016: 34). The Eastern Province is comparatively sparsely populated with 
a population density of 168 compared to 1,633 for the Western Province. Sri Lankan 
population grows slowly with 0.9 percent per year which is the lowest in the SAARC 
region next to Nepal (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014).   
Within the SAARC region Sri Lanka’s age structure is the oldest. 25.9 percent of the 
population is between 0 and 14 years. 60.6 percent between 15-59 years and 13.6 
percent are 60 years and above whereby the Eastern Province is the region with the 
youngest population. The age structure is also reflected in the relatively low birth rate of 
17.4 per 1,000 persons, which is for example 21.8 in India and 43.1 in Afghanistan. Life 
expectancy, estimated in 2012, is 75.1 years, which is only topped by the Maldives 
(Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014).  
In Sri Lanka, most people eligible for marriage are married which is 58.2 percent of the 
population. 32.2 percent have not been married which is a plausible number looking at 
the age structure of the country. 7.9 percent are widowed and 1.7 percent divorced or 
separated. The high percentage of widows is explainable by the conflict-situation which 
especially effected the Northern and Eastern Province until 2009 and the Tsunami of 
2004 (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015).   
Literacy rate is comparatively high with 95.6 percent of all adults aged 15 years and 
above. In the SAARC region, only the Maldives have a higher literacy rate of 98.4 
percent, in India it is only 75.2 percent. However, little more than one quarter of the 
population finished secondary education. 13.1 percent passed Grade 10 and 12.4 percent 
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finished their A-levels. Most inhabitants dropped out of school during their secondary 
education as 43.6 percent left school between grade 5 and 10. 24.7 percent of the 
population went to school for a maximum of five years and 3.7 percent of the 
population is without formal education. In the Eastern province, the educational level is 
slightly below the nation-average (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015; Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, 2014).  
Most Sri Lankans belong to the religion of Buddhism: 70.2 percent. Other religions are 
Hinduism (12.6 percent), Islam (9.7 percent) and Christianity (7.4 percent). Even 
though Buddhism is the majority religion, distribution of religion across the provinces 
and districts varies as displayed in Figure 1. For the purpose of this research the two 
districts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa are of special interest because of their religious 
diversity. In total, about 169,000 people are living in these districts. Out of this 
population about 97,000 people are Hindu (58 percent), 65,000 Muslim (38 percent), 
7,000 Christian (4 percent) and 600 Buddhist (0 percent) (Department of Census and 
Statistics, 2012).  
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Figure 1: Sri Lankan population by religion and district 
 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2012) 
1.6.3 Sri Lankan Micro Insurance Market 
Sri Lanka’s financial sector is relatively small and limited both in scope and depth of 
services provided. Access to finance is a major constraint to small and medium 
enterprises as well as to the poor. Government policies focus on subsidizing and 
controlling interest rates instead of supporting sustainable, market-based approaches 
(World Bank, 2015: 4). Still, per Global Findex data, financial inclusion is remarkably 
high compared to other developing countries in South Asia. 82.7 percent of all adults 
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had a bank account in 2014. 30.9 percent of all adults saved with a financial institution 
and 17.9 percent borrowed from a bank (World Bank, 2014). 
The private insurance sector mainly serves the corporate segment and the urban middle 
and upper-income households. In total 29 insurance companies are licensed: 12 
composite insurers with licenses for both life and non-life insurance; 2 are licensed for 
life insurance only, another 15 for non-life insurance (IBSL, 2016). Swiss Re reports 
life insurance premiums per capita of 41.1 USD with 18.5 USD for life and 24.5 USD 
for non-life in 2015 (Swiss Re, 2016). The Sri Lanka micro insurance market is in an 
early stage. Almost 6.9 percent of the population has a micro insurance policy with 
1.462 million policies issued. Out of these, 57 percent are personal accident coverage 
and 40 percent life policies as presented in the Table 6 following below 
(Microinsurance Network, 2016: 8).  
The insurance industry is regulated and supervised under the Insurance Board of Sri 
Lanka (IBSL). Contrary to other jurisdictions there is no special regulatory provision for 
micro insurance. It is regulated under the Insurance Industry Act No. 43 of 2000. In 
addition, some micro insurance schemes provided by mutuals or non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) operate outside the Insurance Industry Act.  
Table 6: Sri Lankan micro insurance industry – Key figures  
Micro insurance Gross Written Premium reported USD 16 million 
Micro insurance policies issued as a percentage of total population  6.9% 
Micro insurance policies issued 1.462 million 
(100%) 
Life  0.59 million 
(40%) 
Personal accident  0.84 million 
(57%) 
Property  0.012 million 
(0%) 
Agriculture  0.011 million 
(0%) 
Livestock  0.006 million 
(0%) 
Health  Not applicable 
Source: Adapted from Microinsurance Network (2016: 8) 
 32 
In total, the Microinsurance Landscape Study of 2016 identified three governmental 
schemes and 12 registered commercial providers of micro insurance next to non-
registered insurance schemes run by NGOs. Main private insurers offering micro 
insurance are Ceylinco Insurance, HNB Insurance, Sanasa Insurance and Co-operative 
Insurance. In the informal sector two institutions offer noteworthy micro insurance 
services: Yasiru and SEEDS. Both institutions aim at alleviating poverty. Yasiru offers 
life insurance to its 10,000 members in six districts which can be extended to 
hospitalization benefits. SEEDS (Sarvodaya Economic Enterprise Development 
Services) has one million members in 4,000 village level societies, offering a loan 
protection scheme of up to LKR 100,000 (approx. EUR 556.86). In addition, around 
30,000 death benevolent societies exist across the country. They operate on community-
level and help families to manage funerals and their expenses. These funeral societies 
have been operating for more than 50 years. Members pay a monthly fee and in case of 
death of a family members, a pre-agreed upon amount is contributed to the funeral 
expenses.  
The public schemes and private insurers offer in total 35 micro insurance products. Out 
of these products, 27 are non-life, mainly accident, five are life products, two are health 
and one is a composite product. Average premiums for life insurance ranged from LKR 
708 per year (approx. EUR 3.94) to LKR 6,333 (approx. EUR 35.27). Average annual 
premiums for personal accident coverage are slightly lower and range from LKR 575 
(approx. EUR 3.20) to LKR 3,738 (approx. EUR 20.82) (Microinsurance Network, 
2016:11). The participants of the field study are mainly insured with Amana Takaful 
(61%), Ceylinco (17%), Janashakthi (4%), Sri Lanka Insurance (4%), and Union 
Assurance (4%). Amana Takaful is an insurer operating in line with Islamic insurance 
principles (Takaful). In the area under study it offers a voluntary bundled life, personal 
accident and health product. The policyholders and up to five family members are 
protected against death (LKR 50,000, approx. EUR 278.50), accidental death (LKR 
50,000, approx. EUR 278.50), permanent total disability (LKR 50,000, approx. EUR 
278.50), hospital benefits of LKR 500 per day up to 30 days (LKR 15,000, approx. 
EUR 83.55), and medical expenses while in a government hospital (LKR 10,000, 
approx. EUR 55.70) for an annual premium of LKR 1,990 (approx. EUR 11.08) to be 
paid in three installments. In addition, Amana Takaful provides a credit-life insurance 
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product. Ceylinco is offering two products for low-income customers. The bundled 
product “Ceylinco Support Line” targets small and medium sized entrepreneurs 
providing personal accident and term life coverage. People can choose between three 
levels of sum insured. For an annual premium of LKR 1,800 (approx. EUR 10.08), 
Ceylinco offers an annual life insurance cover of LKR 50,000 LKR (approx. EUR 
278.50) and a personal accident cover of LKR 1 million (approx. EUR 5,400). An 
annual premium of LKR 3,600 (approx. EUR 20.16) guarantees life insurance benefits 
of LKR 100,000 (approx. EUR 557) and personal accident of LKR 2 million (approx. 
EUR 11,140) and for twice the premium amount life insurance benefits increase to LKR 
150,000 (approx. EUR 835.50) and personal accident cover is doubled to LKR 4 million 
(approx. EUR 22,280). The product “Ceylinco Pradeepa Insurance” is a term life 
insurance cover. For a one-time premium payment of LKR 1,250, approx. EUR 6.96, 
the policyholder receives a 5-year term life cover with a sum insured of LKR 100,000, 
approx. EUR 557. In sum these products offer a basic term life insurance coverage with 
additional benefits of personal accident or disability and in one case business 
interruption coverage in the form of hospital benefits.  
Micro insurance in Sri Lanka is mainly distributed by microfinance institutions and 
community-based organizations. One reason for the strong role of microfinance 
institutions is that micro insurance in Sri Lanka started with loan protection insurance. 
In addition, both types of organization have a good outreach in the rural areas.      
For the insurance industry, major challenges in serving the low-income households arise 
from the target group’s low levels of financial literacy and understanding of insurance. 
Many people perceive insurance as a kind of savings products which leads to the 
expectation of receiving a cash-back after some time, and credit-life insurance is seen as 
an additional loan fee. Insurers are not used to serve this target group. They are unaware 
of the target group’s needs and way of communication. In addition, to achieve cost-
efficiency, insurers need to cooperate with microfinance institutions or other 
distribution partners. Insurers must outsource many operational processes in the sign-
up, policy administration and claims pay-out process which is a new experience for 
many companies (Lanka Microfinance Practitioners’ Association, 2013).  
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In sum, micro insurance schemes in Sri Lanka are still young and many have not 
developed beyond the status of a pilot. With a weak social assistance program and low 
insurance penetration, there is a lot of potential for micro insurance to protect and 
promote the livelihoods of the low-income people.   
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2 Fundamentals of Micro Life Insurance Demand: Theory 
and State of Empirical Research 
2.1 Overview 
Based on a review of currently available theoretical and empirical research results, this 
chapter first develops an analytical framework for the determination of the factors 
affecting micro life insurance demand. Secondly, the chapter establishes the hypotheses 
for the field study.  
With the objective of designing the analytical framework, this chapter starts with a 
review of the following three streams of literature, as presented in Figure 2: (i) expected 
utility theory and its application to life insurance demand, and empirical studies on (ii) 
traditional life insurance consumption in developing countries and (iii) micro life 
insurance demand. The author decided to broaden the base of her literature study to 
include these three fields of research as academic literature on micro life insurance is 
still at an early stage and theoretical models specifically attributable to this topic have 
not yet evolved. 
Figure 2: Structure and content of theoretical framework  
 
Source: Author’s own 
The next section (Section 2.2) introduces life insurance demand in the light of expected 
utility theory. The author decided to focus on the classical models of expected utility 
theory which explain decision-making under uncertainty and insurance demand. Other 
decision-making theories such as prospect theory, endowment effect, status quo bias, 
regret and disappointment paradigms have been excluded as they do not provide 
superior results in predicting individuals’ choice behavior (Kunreuther et al., 2013). 
Section 2.2 starts with a summary of the basic insurance demand model under the 
expected utility theory approach, before elaborating different theoretical models which 
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explain life insurance demand in specific. These specific models focus on the demand 
for term life insurance and can be divided into three clusters:  
1. Models based on the life-cycle hypothesis assuming perfect information 
(Section 2.2.2), 
2. Life insurance demand models under the assumption of imperfect markets 
(Section 2.2.3), and  
3. Portfolio choice models (Section 2.2.4).  
This summary of expected utility theory models is limited to the demand models 
devised for term life insurance, as these products are currently the main products 
available for low-income households in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Majority 
micro life insurance products are annually renewable policies disbursing a lumpsum 
payment in case the policyholder or one of his direct family members dies. As such 
these term life products serve as a survivors’ insurance, as a protection against loan 
commitments and a source to pay for funerals. They are insufficient to provide for the 
policyholders’ retirement or as an investment. Hence, literature on the demand for 
endowment products or private pension insurance is excluded. The theoretical models 
discussed in this section provide a coherent set of variables that explain consumer 
decision-making and specify how and why such variables are interrelated. However, it 
is acknowledged that the theory can only describe structures and basic principles of 
decision-making processes. Actual behaviors do not always follow theoretical 
predictions.  
To overcome the shortcomings of theoretical work, empirical research is considered as 
well. With this objective, Section 2.3 reviews research studies which explain traditional 
life insurance demand in developing countries. These empirical results are expected to 
support and supplement theoretical findings. As the findings are related to the overall 
insurance market including endowment and pensions, results may only be partially 
applicable to micro life insurance. Moreover, this arm of the literature provides an 
analytical framework to structure the life insurance demand factors that is well 
established in the empirical insurance demand literature (Outreville, 2013).  
The analytical framework model is further applied to previous empirical research on the 
subject of micro life insurance demand (Section 2.4). This field of academic research 
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currently includes seven peer reviewed studies which provide indicative results, leaving 
several demand factors yet untested. Section 2.4 also maps the available micro life 
insurance research findings into the results of the theoretical models and traditional life 
insurance demand studies using the framework developed by Outreville (2013). This 
process allows the identification of gaps in research exploring micro life insurance 
demand and an extension of the previously introduced analytical framework of demand 
factors to micro life insurance research. Summarized in Section 2.5, this extended 
framework forms the analytical model for studying micro life insurance demand in Sri 
Lanka.  
The analytical model shapes the field study to be introduced in Chapter 3 in two 
manners. First, in the qualitative study it guides the content and analysis of the focus 
group discussions. Second, the hypotheses underlying the quantitative field study are 
developed based on the extended demand factors framework. These hypotheses are 
developed in Section 2.6.  
2.2 Expected Utility Theory of Life Insurance Demand  
2.2.1 Standard Expected Utility Model of Insurance Demand  
In 1968, Mossin published one of the first and most cited microeconomic models of 
insurance demand. It formalizes the consumers’ choice under uncertainty and predicts 
her choice for insurance. Assuming a risk-averse, expected utility maximizing 
consumer, insurance is demanded if a person prefers to pay a certain small premium 
instead of facing an uncertain large loss. Today his work represents the classical model 
of insurance demand within the expected utility theory framework. Even though 
Mossin’s model refers to non-life insurance, its main findings hold for term life 
insurance demand: the decision to purchase insurance protection against a specified loss 
depends on an individual’s risk aversion, her wealth, and the premium charged.  
Mossin’s model considers a representative individual with initial wealth w > 0 and a 
concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(w). The latter is at least two time 
differentiable with U’(w) > 0, indicating a positive marginal utility of wealth and a risk 
averse individual U’’(w) < 0. The total initial wealth notated by Mossin as Y is 
composed of several assets, one property with the value of L and all other assets with 
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total value of A. During any specified insurance period the property L can suffer a total 
loss with probability π or no loss with probability 1 – π. If the individual decides to 
purchase insurance, she pays the premium p. The amount of premium is optimal if the 
individual’s utility from insurance coverage is equal to the utility from not having 
insurance.  
If the individual takes insurance, her final wealth will be with certainty:  
 !" = $ + & − (  
Her utility is U (A + L – p). The final wealth of an individual not taking insurance will 
be:  
 !) = 	$$ + &				+,-ℎ	(/0121,3,-4	5+,-ℎ	(/0121,3,-4	1 − 5 
Her expected utility is π U (A) + (1 – π) U (A + L). Then, the maximum premium an 
individual is willing to pay is found by equaling the utilities:  
 57 $ + 1 − 5 7 $ + & = 7 $ + & − (  
Assuming that the individual is generally risk averse (i.e. U’’ < 0), the maximum 
premium p increases with the loss probability π and her property L.  
If the individual can decide on the amount of coverage (C), the premium she pays is 
proportional to C as well as to the indemnity payment of the insurer. The individual 
then pays a premium of p·C and in case of a stochastic loss X she receives (C/L) X from 
the insurer. Her final wealth is then a stochastic variable: 
 ! = $ + & − 8 + 9: 8 − (;  
To define the optimal amount of insurance coverage the individual maximizes her 
expected utility E[U(Y)] under the condition 0 ≤ C ≤ L. This results in:  
 <= > ?<9 		= @ 7′ ! B: − (   
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Assuming risk aversion, the second derivate is defined to be negative. For estimating 
the optimal premium for full insurance coverage (C = L), the first derivative must be 
non-negative:  
 <= > ?<9 9D: = 7′ $ + & − (& = B: − ( ≥ 0 
Since U’ > 0 this condition will hold only if pL ≤ E(X). In other words, full insurance is 
only optimal if the insurance premium is equivalent to the loss or actuarially fair 
(Mossin, 1968: 557). If the insurance premium includes a positive loading for 
administrative expenses, partial insurance coverage is optimal (Mossin’s Theorem). 
Mossin further proved a negative effect of wealth on an individual’s insurance 
consumption if her risk aversion is decreasing in wealth. 
This section introduced the standard approach in insurance economics for explaining 
insurance demand under expected utility theory. It identifies three basic demand factors 
to be considered in the empirical study: wealth, risk aversion, and pricing. The 
application of Mossin’s model to life insurance differs from non-life insurance, as the 
value L of the asset “life” is subjective, guided by the motivation to insure, and there is 
no partial loss, such that X = L. Still, the actual coverage C will be reduced if the 
premium is loaded, which directly follows from Mossin’s Theorem. Thus, the model of 
Mossin serves as a reference framework for more specific models on life insurance 
demand, which aim to allocate a value to the asset “life” (and by that define full and 
partial coverage). Main results of the introduced theoretical models are also summarized 
in Table 7 (p. 48).  
2.2.2 Life-cycle Theory and a Motive to Bequeath  
Optimal lifetime consumption under uncertainty    
In his seminal work from 1965, Yaari shows that under uncertainty of lifetime a utility 
maximizing decision-maker purchases life insurance to make the most of her lifetime 
consumption. Yaari distinguishes between two approaches:  
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In the Fisherian model, an individual maximizes her utility from lifetime consumption 
under the constraint that her wealth is 0 at the time of her death. Under these 
assumptions life insurance enables the individual to increase her consumption choices 
by means of borrowings. At the point of death, life insurance ensures that the 
individual’s wealth constraint is fulfilled by covering any remaining debt, thus, allowing 
the consumer to maximize her expected utility over lifetime. This setting is often the 
initial situation in the context of credit life micro insurance. The sum insured equals the 
financial obligations of the policyholders and the lumpsum payout covers for her 
remaining debt in case of death. Also for non-credit linked term life micro insurance, 
providing for debt could be one motivation to insure.  
The Marshallian model is different insofar as an individual’s utility from consumption 
is constrained by her need for bequest. In this model, a consumer’s utility over lifetime 
depends on his discounted consumption rate at every moment in time and her final 
wealth at the time of death, that is her bequeath. Yaari assumes that the bequest is 
always larger or equal to zero. Like in the Fisherian model, life insurance allows the 
consumer to increase current consumption. In the Marshallian model, however, life 
insurance is bought up to the point where the utility from current consumption is equal 
to its utility of bequest. As the utility of bequest depends on timing and weighted 
subjectively life insurance demand further depends on a so-called intensity for bequest. 
Similar to the purpose of protecting against the decedents’ loan obligations, micro life 
insurance could be purchased to provide financial support to the dependents and hence 
serves the intention to bequest. Contrary to traditional retail life insurance though, the 
maximum sum insured is much smaller and the policy duration shorter in term life 
micro insurance. For example, in Sri Lanka, as explicated in Section 1.6.3, the available 
products cover up to LKR 4 million (approx. EUR 22,280) but average sum insured is 
LKR 50,000 (approx. EUR 278,50) and are either annually renewable or run up to 5 
years. The author would expect that an individual who is motivated by a bequest motive 
to repeatedly renew his term life policy. Because of the limited average sum insured, 
which still covers the average monthly income of a household (LKR 7,666; approx. 
EUR 278,50) for more than six months, she expects an effect of smaller scale of a 
bequest motive in term life micro insurance.  
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Following the approach of Yaari, Fischer (1973) explicates the effect and individual 
importance of a bequest motive. He shows that an individual with a large weighting on 
the bequest function would buy even heavily loaded insurance, whereas an individual 
with a low intensity for bequest would abstain from purchasing life insurance, even if it 
is actuarially fair or sold at a subsidized premium rate. He further demonstrates that 
insurance demand increases, the higher the weighting attached to the bequest motive, 
which in turn reduces current consumption. On the other hand, if the weighting attached 
to bequest is low and the probability of death increases, insurance demand decreases as 
current consumption grows. For the case of micro term life insurance, it is expected that 
even though premiums are loaded with operational and distribution expenses, a bequest 
motive could support its uptake.    
Uncertainty about labor income    
Introducing labor income to his model, Fischer (1973) illustrates that a wage earner who 
plans to leave an inheritance is more likely to buy life insurance than an individual 
living off her wealth and that the amount of coverage positively relates to the future 
labor income. Life insurance is purchased to compensate for a loss of income the 
policyholder would share with her family. Further, a wage earner is more likely to 
purchase life insurance early in her lifetime. Campbell (1980) takes up the point of 
Fischer (1973) that some individual cares more about uncertainty related to her income 
streams from labor than from her assets. In his model, the main and sole breadwinner of 
the household is maximizing her utility from current wealth and future labor income. 
Until the retirement of the breadwinner, the utility from future human capital income is 
uncertain as it depends on the survival of the breadwinner. To transfer the uncertainty of 
future labor income streams, the breadwinner can purchase term life insurance. 
Insurance premium is calculated based on the expected loss and a loading factor. Due to 
the law of large numbers, the insurance company knows the expected loss, whereas the 
probability of death assumed by the risk averse household might be biased. The optimal 
amount of term life insurance is then determined by the future expected income of the 
household, reduced by a proportion of her total wealth, whereby the proportion of 
wealth is dependent on the households’ intensity for bequest, its risk aversion and 
perception of the insurer’s loading fee. Campbell finds that the demand for term life 
insurance of a risk averse household with an interest in leaving an inheritance increases 
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if (i) her intensity of bequest or level of risk aversion increases, or (ii) the perceived 
loading factor of the insurer decreases, or (iii) she is overestimating her death 
probability and at the same time underestimating the loading factor of the insurer. In 
sum, the models of Fischer and Campbell emphasize the relevance of a bequest motive 
by introducing a second factor that defines the scope of a bequest motive: the protection 
against lost income flows of the breadwinner in case she dies. In the case of micro term 
life insurance, it could be argued that a bequest motive related to lost labor income is 
irrelevant because the target group does not have regular, monthly income flows or 
because the total sum insured is relatively small and hence is not able cover lost labor 
income over a long period. Even though, income flows are unsteady they guarantee a 
household’s survival and with the average sum insured of term life micro insurance 
products available in the region under study, a payout of LKR 50,000 (approx. EUR 
278.50) compensates the average monthly income of LKR 7,666 (approx. EUR 42.44) 
for six and a half months. 
Campbell further shows that the optimal amount of insurance is less than full insurance 
coverage, that is the present value of the wage earners future income flows. Up to the 
amount of her accumulated assets, the household can self-insure its human capital 
income. Full insurance is only optimal if the breadwinners’ utility from consumption, 
conditional on her survival, is equal to her utility from bequest, and if the actuarially fair 
premium charged by the insurer is perceived as such by the household. The possibility 
of self-insurance further explains the fact that older households demand less insurance. 
Over their lifetime, these households have built up a higher stock of assets and their 
expected income from human capital decreases. This theoretical approach is of special 
interest to the field study because it introduces the possibility of self-insurance and a 
life-cycle effect, the latter meaning that life insurance consumption is related to a 
person’s age and working years. If self-insurance is a suitable instrument for low-
income households must still be assessed, as their capacity to save and accumulate 
assets is usually limited.   
Preferences of the dependents  
In 1989, Lewis published another modification of Yaari’s idea of a bequest motive in a 
life cycle model under uncertainty. Lewis directly incorporates the preferences of the 
dependents in the consumption function of the breadwinner, and provides a first 
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analysis of the demand for life insurance according to the preferences of dependents. He 
assumes that the breadwinner of a family regularly conducts income transfers to her 
dependents. Hence, the utility function of the children and spouse depends on the 
breadwinner’s uncertain income. A utility maximizing dependent will prefer that some 
income is allocated to insure the ability of the breadwinner to generate and transfer 
income beyond the breadwinner’s lifetime. In his model the amount of life insurance 
increases with the breadwinner’s probability of death, present value of the dependents 
consumption and their degree of risk aversion while it decreases with the premium 
loading factor and the household’s wealth. Similar to Fischer’s model, insurance is 
understood as a measure to secure future income flows. However, Lewis incorporates 
that the decision not only depends on the breadwinner’s utility, but on the utility of the 
family. 
Overall, the models presented in this section, and summarized in Table 7 (p. 48), 
assume that life insurance allows an individual, who does not know how long she will 
live, to increase her utility either from consumption or a bequeath motive. In the context 
of term life micro insurance the models provide the theoretical foundations for the 
relevance of a a bequest motive (relative to the premium loadings), labor income (in 
dependence of a bequest motive, risk aversion, death probability, accumulated assets, 
and premium loadings) and a lifecycle effect for micro life insurance consumption. 
These expected utility theory models assume complete life insurance markets. The 
following section describes life insurance demand behavior if this assumption is 
released.  
2.2.3 Life Insurance Demand under Market Imperfections    
Contrary to the previously presented demand theories, life insurance markets in reality 
are incomplete. This section introduces two market imperfections of asymmetric 
information: adverse selection and contract non-performance as well as search and 
transactions costs. It further explains why these market imperfections might lead to 
partial micro life insurance coverage. For an overview, results are again summarized in 
Table 7 (p. 48). Even though, most of the presented models are developed in the context 
of non-life insurance, they are applicable to term life insurance as in both cases the 
purpose of insurance is to protect a specific loss by providing a lumpsum payment in 
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case of risk occurrence. The situation would be different, i.e. in the context of 
endowment insurance or private pensions because of the involved savings components 
or frequent annuity payments over an uncertain time span.   
Informational asymmetries  
In a typical life insurance market, the information available to the customer and insurer 
is incomplete. Usually, information of the two parties is distributed asymmetrically 
between the two. For example, insurers may not have sufficient information at hand to 
assess the risk to be insured. In most cases the consumer knows more about her living 
conditions and her personal health status, which both determine her risk profile. If her 
risk profile is high, she may opt for higher insurance coverage, known as adverse 
selection. On the other side, consumers do not know how the insurer performs 
financially over time or in case of a loss, and are therefore exposed to the risk of 
contract non-performance. The issue of moral hazard, where an insured person takes 
more risk after concluding an insurance contract, is not discussed in this setting, as in 
the context of micro life insurance it would mean that a person is willing to put her life 
at risk after taking out insurance, which is a rather unrealistic scenario. 
Adverse selection  
Literature on adverse selection tells that in the state of a separating equilibrium high-
risk individuals are more likely to buy full insurance coverage at a higher premium 
whereas low risk individuals partially insure at a lower rate (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). In their model for non-life insurance, Rothschild and Stiglitz assume full 
competition and two kinds of individuals: high risk and low risk consumers. If 
information asymmetries are present and insurance companies do not have sufficient 
knowledge about risk-profiles, they offer insurance services at an average premium with 
an expected profit of zero. However, an average premium attracts more high risk 
individuals knowing their risk profile. Insurance is relatively cheap for them than. Low 
risk consumers on the contrary will under purchase or buy no coverage at all. In a 
second scenario, the insurer could also offer separate insurance contracts for the low and 
high risk customers at actuarially fair premiums. If the insurer does not know which 
customer is of low or high risk, then all high-risk individuals will purchase the low risk 
insurance contract. In both cases and under full competition the insurer makes a profit 
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of zero with the low risk customers but losses with the high-risk customers, leading to a 
loss in profits or an increase in premium further reducing the number of low-risk 
profiles within a company’s customer base. Under these circumstances the insurer offers 
full coverage to high risk individuals at a premium which allows him to make no losses 
but zero profits with this market segment. While he offers only partial insurance at a 
premium rate which is on the one hand attractive to the low risk individuals but on the 
other hand still ensures that high risk customers prefer full coverage at a higher 
premium. Under adverse selection, low risk customer prefer lower insurance coverage 
at a lower premium rate whereas high risk individuals buy higher coverage at a higher 
premium (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Schlesinger, 1994), which also applies to term 
life insurance.  
Contract non-performance 
In the earlies nineties, the discussion started on how an incomplete information about 
the insurer impacts insurance consumption. On the supply side the insurer is more 
knowledgeable about her performance which poses a risk of contract non-performance 
for the customers. Based on the non-life insurance model of Mossin (1968), Doherty 
and Schlesinger (1990) analyzed how contract non-performance affects an individuals’ 
decision to purchase insurance. They consider the case where an insurance company 
might not perform on its contractual obligation due to insolvency, on-going disputes 
about eligibility of a claim payout, or heavy delay in claim settlements. Under the 
assumption of default risk, Doherty and Schlesinger show that previous theoretical 
results on insurance demand do not hold. In the case of default risk, it is optimal for an 
individual to buy less than full insurance coverage even if the premium is actuarially 
fair. In the context of term life insurance offered as microinsurance product, contract 
non-performance could be of great relevance, as consumer protection rights and 
complaints mechanisms are typically weak and the supervision of the insurance sector 
and legal enforcement is less developed compared to industrialized countries.     
Search and transaction costs 
Search and transaction costs (which may include money, time or any other effort) 
increase the indirect costs of insurance. If the effort to obtain information on insurance 
premiums is too high or the purchase of insurance involves travel costs to the nearest 
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agent, it might be more efficient for the individual to refrain from life insurance 
consumption and to self-insure instead. Under the presence of search or transaction 
costs an individual will only bear these costs and purchase insurance if the difference in 
expected utility with and without insurance is sufficiently large (Kunreuther et al., 2013: 
70-71; Schlesinger and Doherty, 1985). In the context of term life micro insurance, 
these costs might be relatively large as potential customers are often not aware or 
knowledgeable about insurance, obtaining information may be time-consuming, and 
insurance services might not be accessible in their neighborhood.   
This section summarized main explanations of demand behavior if markets are 
incomplete. If information is distributed asymmetrically between the insurer and the 
insured, full life insurance coverage is only attractive to a specific segment of the 
market, the high-risk individuals, whereas partial coverage is selected by low risk 
consumers. The risk of contract non-performance may turn life insurance to be 
perceived as unattractive by the low-income consumer. Search and transactions have 
been introduced as additional costs, further factors reducing the consumption of micro 
life insurance.   
Overall, the last two sections of this chapter analyzed the decision to consume life 
insurance as an isolated choice of the household. The models presented so far did not 
consider other risk management strategies and their interdependence with life insurance 
consumption. This is the content of the following section.  
2.2.4 Portfolio Choice and Life Insurance Demand  
In their portfolio approach, Mayers and Smith (1983) studied the interplay of insurance 
uptake and other assets. Using the example of liability insurance they proved that the 
decision to insure is not a separable decision but part of a portfolio decision on the 
ownership of different assets. Next to insurance, holdings of marketable assets can serve 
as a mean for protection against unforeseen events or a hedge against certain risks. For 
diversification purpose, an individual could also choose to self-retain some risks and at 
last, insurance payouts across different assets may be interrelated. Mayers and Smith 
(1983) conclude that the optimal level of insurance depends on the level of insurable 
risks and the portfolio composition. Doherty (1984) added to this discussion that 
insurance is only necessary if diversification within a portfolio of assets is incomplete. 
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The portfolio choice approach emphasizes that the decision to uptake micro life 
insurance is not an isolated decision, but that people usually consider other means of 
risk management, e.g. savings, or non-monetary assets such as land or housing, next to 
the purchase of micro life insurance. However, as low-income households might have 
fewer possibilities for such diversification because of their economic status, insurance 
to protect against the risk of death might be of high relevance.  
Summarizing the above discussion, Section 2.2 began with the introduction of the 
classical model of insurance demand under uncertainty, before discussing the most 
common life insurance demand models as well as models of contract theory that are 
relevant for term life micro insurance. This theoretical work guides the author’s 
empirical study on micro life insurance demand among low-income households in the 
Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. The field research is further based on the results of 
previous empirical studies that validate theoretical results but also identify additional 
life insurance demand factors. A review of empirical studies analyzing life insurance 
consumption in developing countries in general and on micro life insurance demand in 
specific is provided in the following two sections.  
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Table 7: Life insurance demand factors derived from expected utility theory 
Demand factor Author Study 
Risk aversion  Mossin (1968) Aspects of Rational Insurance 
Purchasing 
Wealth Mossin (1968) Aspects of Rational Insurance 
Purchasing 
Labor income Fischer (1973), Campbell (1980) A Life Cycle Model of Life Insurance 
Purchases 
Price of insurance    
   Premium loading Mossin (1968) Aspects of Rational Insurance 
Purchasing 
   Search and    
   transaction cost 
Schlesinger and Doherty (1985) Incomplete Markets for Insurance: An 
Overview 
Life cycle hypothesis Yaari (1965), Fischer (1973) Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and 
the Theory of the Consumer 
Bequest motive Yaari (1965), Lewis (1989) Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and 
the Theory of the Consumer 
Adverse selection Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics 
of Imperfect Information 
Contract non-
performance 
Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) Rational Insurance Purchasing: 
Consideration of Contract 
Nonperformance 
Portfolio choice  Mayers and Smith (1983),  
Doherty (1984) 
The Interdependence of Individual 
Portfolio Decisions and the Demand 
for Insurance 
Source: Author’s own  
 
2.3 Empirical Results on Life Insurance Demand in Developing 
Countries    
Despite the focus of this research on micro life insurance, a review of the literature on 
traditional life insurance markets seems necessary as academic research on micro life 
insurance demand is still nascent and results are often ambiguous.  By using the term 
“traditional insurance markets”, the author refers to the overall life insurance market in 
developing countries that usually targets high-income customer segments and covers 
term life as well endowment products and private pensions. Even though the demand 
dynamics of the two market segments are expected to be different, a general 
identification of life insurance demand drivers or barriers in developing countries 
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should be possible based on a profound literature analysis. Later in Section 2.4, the 
conclusions are compared and completed with the results of the seven peer reviewed 
studies available on micro life insurance demand.  
The structure of the review follows an insurance demand factors framework developed 
by previous researchers (such as Outreville, 2013; Feyen et al., 2011; Hussels et al., 
2005; Zietz, 2003). This section applies the latest version of the framework, as outlined 
in Outreville (2013). His framework groups the demand factors into four categories:  
1. Economic factors  
2. Demographic factors  
3. Social and cultural factors  
4. Structural factors.  
This framework is considered to be an appropriate instrument for structuring literature 
results as it is well established in academia and has already been applied within the 
research area of micro insurance demand. Eling et al. (2014) previously used his 
framework for a literature review on micro insurance demand, covering the academic 
literature published between 2000 and 2014 on weather index, agricultural, health, 
property, and life insurance. Contrary to the framework of Outreville (2013), this study 
excludes demand factors that have not been tested in a developing country and whose 
effect cannot be tested in a single country setting, such as risk aversion, real interest 
rate, interest rate volatility, stock market impact, and population density. The 
framework of Outreville provides a very systematic approach in clustering life 
insurance demand factors. However, it does not capture the interdependencies between 
the various demand determinants. 
This review of empirical studies includes peer-reviewed studies that (i) cover at least 
one low-income or lower-middle income country in their sample, (ii) have been 
published until April 2016, and (iii) are a part of the SJR SCImago Journal and Country 
Ranking. Further, only studies published in English or German are considered because 
of the language skills of the author.  
The studies have been identified by searching two online databases: EBSCO and 
ProQuest, complemented by the list of references from previous literature reviews on 
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the topic of life insurance demand (Outreville, 2013; Feyen et al., 2011; Hussels et al., 
2005; Zietz, 2003). To search the online databases, the researcher used the following 
key terms: “life AND insurance AND demand”, “life AND insurance AND purchase”, 
“life AND insurance AND consumption”, as well as “life insurance” AND the name of 
each low-income and lower-middle income country listed by the World Bank as of 
March 2015. Finally, the author searched for recent publications which cited any of the 
identified literature reviews with the help of Google Scholar. In total, the review 
encompasses 12 cross-national studies and three literature summaries which are 
presented inTable 8 (p. 51). The table lists the analyzed studies chronologically, 
including a description of the sample set, source, and the period.  
The first empirical study which researched the demand for life insurance covering non-
OECD countries, is attributable to the work of Bernard Wasaw (1986). Empirical 
studies have frequently considered the low-income and lower-middle income countries 
of Cameroon, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and Zimbabwe because of data availability reasons. However, life 
insurance demand in Bangladesh, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Syria 
and Vietnam has only been studied once. Nevertheless, a growing interest in the Asian 
region has been observed in the recent years. 
In the following sections, the main findings of these studies are reported, in line with the 
structure of the demand factors frameworks outlined by Outreville (2013). Table 9 (p. 
60) provides an overview of the identified demand factors, their significance and the 
direction of their relationship with the dependent variables: life insurance density or life 
insurance penetration. 
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Table 8: List of life insurance demand studies (low-income or lower-middle income countries)  
Year Author Source Article # of countries 
(total; low-/lower-
middle income) 
Dependent variable Period 
1986 Wasaw, B.  Insurance Industry in 
Economic 
Development 
Determinants of Insurance Penetration: A 
Cross-country Analysis 
48; 9 Life insurance             
penetration  
1982 
1993 Browne, M.J. and K. Kim Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 
An International Analysis of Life Insurance 
Demand  
45; 8 Life insurance in force; 
Premiums 
1980;1987  
1996 Outreville, J.F.  Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 
Life Insurance Markets in Developing 
Countries 
48; 48 Life insurance density 1986 
2002 Ward, D. and R. Zurbruegg Geneva Papers on 
Risk and Insurance 
Law, Politics and Life Insurance 
Consumption in Asia 
37; 4 Life insurance density  1987-1998 
2002 Park., H., Borde, S.F., and 
Y. Choi 
International Business 
Review  
Determinants of insurance pervasiveness: A 
Cross-country Analysis 
37; 3 Life insurance            
penetration  
1997   
2003 Beck, T. and I. Webb The World Bank 
Economic Review 
Economic, Demographic, and Institutional 
Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption 
across Countries 
68; 12 Life insurance              
penetration  
1980-2000  
2008 Arena, M. The Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 
Does Insurance Market Activity Promote 
Economic Growth? A Cross-country Study 
for Industrialized and Developing Countries 
55; 11 Life insurance            
penetration 
1976-2004 
2008 Chui, A. CW and Chuck CY 
Kwok 
Journal of 
International Business 
Studies 
 
National culture and life insurance 
consumption  
41; 41  Life insurance density 1976-2001 
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Year Author Source Article # of countries 
(total; low-/lower-
middle income) 
Dependent variable Period 
2009 Chui A. C.W. and Chuck 
C.Y. Kwok,  
Journal of Multi-
National Financial 
Management 
Cultural practices and life insurance 
consumption: An international analysis using 
GLOBE scores 
38 Life insurance        
penetration  
Life insurance density 
1966-2004 
2012 Chen, Pei-Fen, Chien-
Chian Lee and L. Chi-Feng 
Journal of 
International 
Development 
How does the Development of the Life 
Insurance Market Affect Economic Growth? 
Some International Evidence 
60; 9 Life insurance         
penetration  
Life insurance density  
1976-2005 
2013 Chang, C.P. and A. N. 
Berdiev 
The Geneva Papers Natural Disasters, Political Risk and 
Insurance Market Development 
39  Life insurance        
penetration 
Life insurance density  
1984-2009 
2013 Subir Sen and S. 
Madheswaran 
Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature 
Regional determinants of life insurance 
consumption: evidence from selected Asian 
economies 
12; 7; Asian 
economies only 
Life insurance          
penetration  
Life insurance density  
1994-2008 
Literature Reviews            
2013 Outreville, F. J. Risk Management and 
Insurance Review 
The Relationship between Insurance and 
Economic Development: 85 Empirical 
Papers for a Review of the Literature 
      
2003 Zietz, E. Risk Management and 
Insurance Review 
An Examination of the Demand for Life 
Insurance 
      
2005 Hussels, S., Ward, D., and 
R. Zurbruegg 
Risk Management and 
Insurance Review  
Stimulating the Demand for Insurance       
Source: Author’s own  
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2.3.1 Economic Factors  
Income and wealth 
According to the theoretical work Fischer (1973) and Campbell (1980) life insurance is 
purchased to transfer the uncertainty of future labor income streams and demand is 
expected to increase with income. Almost all cross-country demand studies on life 
insurance demand prove a positive relationship between life insurance penetration or 
density and income. Income is usually measured by gross domestic product (GDP) or 
GDP per capita and therefore further serves as a proxy to measure for wealth (Browne 
and Kim, 1993; Outreville, 1996; Park et al. 2002; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Chang 
and Berdiev, 2013). Interestingly, Beck and Webb (2003) show that the permanent 
income per capita is not relevant for insurance consumption in developing economies. 
Even though results are not consistent, six out of eight studies observe a positive 
relationship of income per capita and life insurance consumption globally.   
Price of insurance 
Per expected utility theory, the insurance premium is a key determinant for life 
insurance demand, which is negatively related to a premium’s loading factor for 
operational and distribution expenses. Due to measuring difficulties only Browne and 
Kim (1993) have estimated the price effect on life insurance in force in the context of 
low-income and lower-middle income countries and proved a negative relationship. In 
the context of micro life insurance, the premium could also indicate the economic 
capacity of the potential customer.  
Inflation rate  
Based on a Brazilian sample Babbel (1981) showed for the first time that inflation has a 
significant negative effect on endowment life insurance demand. If inflation is 
anticipated the value of life insurance decreases and hence its demand. In cross-country 
studies, the negative effect of inflation on insurance demand is clearly proven for the 
case of the real inflation rate (Beck and Webb, 2003; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Chen 
et al. 2012; Chang and Berdiev, 2013; Sen and Madheswaran, 2013) and the anticipated 
inflation rate measured by the average inflation rate of the last eight years (Browne and 
Kim, 1993; Outreville, 1996). Further, Ward and Zurbruegg (2002) have demonstrated 
that inflation is much more important for growth of life insurance density in the Asian 
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region when compared to OECD countries. As the focus of the empirical study is on 
term life insurance, this factor is not further considered.  
2.3.2 Demographic Factors  
Young dependency ratio  
Following the theoretical work on a bequest motive, the young dependency ratio 
defined as the number of people under 15 over the working age population is assumed 
to have a positive effect on life insurance demand. If the number of dependents 
increases a working age individual is more likely to be attached to a youngster she 
would like to leave an inheritance to. Empirically, evidence for a significant positive 
relationship is provided by Browne and Kim (1993), Outreville (1996) and Ward and 
Zurbruegg (2003) for their overall sample, whereas more recent work by Sen and 
Madheswaran (2013), Chen et al. (2012) and Chang and Berdiev (2013) show a 
negative effect. The latter studies explain this negative effect by a savings for retirement 
function of life insurance. If a nations number of young dependents is relatively large 
compared to the working age population, the need to save for retirement is 
proportionally small. A third group of studies cannot show a significant relationship for 
the sample of Asian Non-Tiger states (Beck and Webb, 2003; Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2003). As the present study excludes endowment or private pension products, the 
author expects to observe a positive correlation between uptake and young dependency 
ratio, indicating a bequest motive.   
Old dependency ratio 
In contrast to the young dependency ratio, it is assumed that the ratio of old dependents 
defined as the number of people above 65 over the working age population is negatively 
related to insurance demand. Applying the theoretical model of Campbell (1980) it can 
be argued that older people are more likely to self-insure as their stock of assets is 
higher compared to younger households. In addition, the incentive to purchase life 
insurance decreases with age as premiums increase. Beck and Webb (2003) prove this 
correlation for their full sample. Because of the assumed correlation of age and 
accumulated assets, which is not applicable to the context of low-income people in 
developing countries, the old dependency ratio should be a negligible demand factor. 
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Life expectancy  
According to the theory of adverse selection and the life cycle hypothesis, life insurance 
demand is expected to be higher if life expectancy is lower. However, empirical 
findings on the relationship are ambiguous. Studies by Outreville (1996) and Ward and 
Zurbruegg (applying their Asian sample; 2002) find a positive effect of life expectancy 
at birth on life insurance density, whereas Beck and Webb (2003) prove the opposite 
correlation for life insurance penetration and Browne and Kim (1993) find no effect 
looking at life insurance in force and premiums.  
Urbanization 
From the theoretical work on search and transaction costs, it is assumed that 
urbanization positively relates to life insurance demand. Due to geographic proximity to 
the insurance providers and their distribution channels, search and transaction costs are 
lower for consumers in urban settings. Hence, demand in urban areas should be higher 
than in rural ones. Further, if products specifically address the urban population the 
premium loading should be lower as operational processes, marketing, and distribution 
can be run in a more cost-efficient manner (Beck and Webb, 2003). A lower gross 
premium should increase uptake as discussed in the previous in the section. Sen and 
Madheswan (2013) find evidence for this hypothesis measuring insurance demand in 
terms of insurance density. However, if demand is measured in insurance penetration 
the relationship is insignificant. In the context of micro life insurance, urbanization 
could influence demand, but the author would argue that such an effect is rather supply 
than demand driven. In many countries, micro insurance providers face operational 
challenges in serving the rural market and therefore restrict their services to the cities.   
2.3.3 Social and Cultural Factors  
Education  
The authors of empirical studies bring forward four main reasons for a positive effect of 
education on life insurance consumption. First, secondary or tertiary education 
lengthens the time of dependency, which increases the demand for life insurance by the 
households’ breadwinner (Browne and Kim, 1993; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2003). 
Second, it is assumed that more educated people are more likely to purchase insurance 
as they are more aware of the benefits of insurance (Browne and Kim, 1993), have a 
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better understanding of the value of insurance (Beck and Webb, 2003) and are more 
likely to earn a higher income to afford micro life insurance. Third, more educated 
people are assumed to be more risk averse because of their increased risk awareness and 
knowledge about risk management (Ward and Zurbruegg, 2003; Beck and Webb, 
2003). Fourth, it is argued that human capital increases with education. Hence, wage 
income increases and so the need to secure future income streams to the dependents in 
case of premature death (Campbell, 1980). Most empirical studies prove the postulated 
positive relationship of education on life insurance consumption. Most relevant for the 
following field research is a finding of Ward and Zurbruegg (2003): They demonstrate 
that with a rising proportion of the population completing secondary education 
insurance density increases in the Asian Non-Tiger countries. However, it is not known 
if this effect is facilitated for example by an effect of income or risk aversion. 
Culture  
People of different cultures might have different perceptions of risk, diverse attitudes 
towards risks or ways of handling risks (Park et al., 2002). The relevance of culture on 
life insurance penetration and density is measured by Park et al. (2002) and Chui and 
Kwok (2008; 2009) using the concept of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. According to 
Hofstede et al. (2010), culture comprises of multiple elements: values, rituals, heroes or 
persons, symbols and practices whereby the element of practice subsumes rituals, 
persons and symbols. Values are belief, attitudes or feelings, and form the core of the 
definition. Rituals are generally accepted patterns of behavior that support social 
interactions. Heroes are outstanding persons that are highly appreciated and people can 
identify with. Symbols are words, objectives, pictures that have a specific meaning. In 
his empirical work on culture in the context of organization theory, Hofstede defines 
four dimensions labeled power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. 
collectivism, and masculinity vs. femininity. Hofstede and his research team collected 
data on these dimensions for 50 countries. Relating these data to life insurance 
consumption, three studies (Park et al., 2002; Chui and Kwok, 2009; 2008) find 
evidence for an effect of specific cultural aspects and yet, evidence is ambiguous. 
According to Park et al. (2002) people of more masculine oriented cultures, i.e. cultures 
focused on values such as power, wealth, and status, are more likely to purchase 
insurance compared to members of more feminine cultures which value personal 
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relationships and welfare. Chui and Kwok (2008) show the opposite arguing that in 
more feminine oriented societies the motivation to care for one’s dependents drives the 
demand for life insurance, a finding closely related to the theoretically derived bequest 
motive. Individualism and the motivation to avoid uncertainty and ambiguity support 
the development of life insurance markets (Chui and Kwok, 2008). In higher power-
distance cultures where subordinates expect their superiors to provide protection, life 
insurance is less prevalent (Chui and Kwok, 2008). In a later publication, Chui and 
Kwok (2009) validate their findings for the importance of individualism as measured by 
the GLOBE’s cultural values. Further, they find if people are more likely to take pride 
in memberships in small groups, e.g. family and close friends, insurance consumption is 
lower. This result further emphasizes the role of social networks in life insurance 
demand and the difficulty to clearly differentiate between the various concepts of 
culture, social capital and religion. A topic further discussed in the following paragraph 
and considered in the data analysis and interpretation process of this study.  
Religion 
The above introduced definition of culture already indicates that religions do not exist in 
a vacuum but are part of a subject’s culture. Religions shape values, rituals and 
symbols, and in many religions Gods are worshiped or extraordinary human beings are 
in a leadership role. However, the concept of culture is broader in its nature and religion 
is one formative factor of culture among others. Previous empirical cross-country 
studies that examine the effect of religion and life insurance consumption used the 
simple proxy of religious denomination to measure for the complex construct of 
religion. Based on macro level data they find a negative impact of the religion of Islam 
on life insurance consumption while for the Christian religions they cannot establish a 
significant relationship (Beck and Webb, 2003). To explain for the negative relationship 
between Islam and life insurance consumption, Ward and Zurbruegg (2003) reason that 
some Islamic laws do not allow for consumption of conventional life insurance. Zelizer 
(1979) argues historically that religious people in the U.S. were rather reluctant to 
purchase insurance as it might be viewed as a distrust in the protection provided by 
God. This attitude may still be prevalent in Islamic societies. Beck and Webb (2003: 60) 
add to the latter argument that insurance might be considered as “a hedge against the 
will of Allah”. People might prefer to accept financial losses if they perceive the 
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occurrence of an unexpected event as a divine act (Park et al., 2002). Further, Wasaw 
(1986), Browne and Kim (1993), and Beck and Webb (2003) suggest that people in 
predominantly Islamic countries might have a different risk attitude or level of risk 
aversion. However, none of the above-citied study provides evidence for her argument 
2.3.4 Structural Factors  
Financial system  
As the insurance sector is part of the financial sector and closely linked to the banking 
sector, a positive relationship is assumed between the insurance market, banking sector, 
and stock market development. A well-functioning banking sector provides efficient 
payment systems to the insurance sector and profitable investment opportunities (Beck 
and Webb, 2003). Cross-country studies including low-income and lower-middle 
income countries generally confirm a strong positive correlation of the development of 
the insurance sector and the banking sector (Outreville, 1996; Ward and Zurbruegg, 
2002; Arena, 2008; Sen and Madheswaran, 2013). However, a study by Beck and Webb 
(2003) on a sample of only developing countries finds deviating results, which might be 
caused by a population’s preference for informal risk management strategies. This 
demand factor is not further investigated as it is not testable in a single-country setting.    
Insurance market structure  
Regarding the theory of competition, it is argued that life insurance consumption 
increases if insurance supply is not restricted by protectionism or monopolistic market 
structures. Outreville (1996) proves the latter empirically. Wasaw (1986) as well as Sen 
and Madheswaran (2013) test for an effect of foreign insurance companies and find a 
positive relationship. In the case of micro life insurance, Allianz is an example of a 
foreign insurance company driving the development of micro insurance in Indonesia. 
However, because of the single-country setting of the field study, this demand factor is 
not further considered. 
Regulatory and legal environment  
Market structure is heavily dependent on the regulatory system in place, which is 
proven to have a stronger effect on the supply side than on the demand side (Wasaw, 
1986; Park et al., 2002). Further, if individual rights cannot be guaranteed or enforced, 
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the development of life insurance markets is constrained, which is proven by several 
studies (La Porta et al., 1997b, 1998, 2000) and related to the risk of contract non-
performance. 
State-organized social security 
If government provides social insurance or social assistance, private provision to protect 
against life risks is crowded out. Almost all empirical studies find prove for such a 
substitution effect (Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Chang and Berdiev, 2013; Chen et al., 
2012).   
Savings  
Following the portfolio choice approach, empirical studies test for the relationship 
between savings and insurance consumption. Again, empirical findings are inconsistent. 
Sen and Madheswaran (2013) find a positive effect for life insurance density and 
penetration while Chen et al. (2012) show the opposite relationship for life insurance 
density. This negative relationship could be explained by a substitution effect. 
Households might prefer to accumulate savings to protect against a financial shock 
instead of transferring their risk by insurance. This could hinder the uptake of micro life 
insurance, as people might not be familiar with the idea of insurance, but trust their 
savings institution. 
Summing up the above-presented discussion, this section provides a comprehensive 
review of the factors supporting or hindering life insurance demand in developing 
countries, as summarized in Table 9. Despite the focus of this study’s empirical work on 
micro insurance, a review of research on traditional insurance markets was necessary as 
existing academic literature on the consumption of micro life insurance is limited to 
merely seven studies and five of them are from the same group of researchers using 
similar household questionnaires and data sources. In the context of term life micro 
insurance the author expects the factors of income, wealth, young dependency ratio, 
education and religion to substantially influence demand. The next section provides a 
deeper insight into current micro life insurance demand studies. Supplementing the 
findings from the previously presented theoretical and empirical work on traditional life 
insurance markets, Section 2.4 builds the third pillar of the analytical framework, 
guiding the field research on the demand for micro life insurance in Sri Lanka.   
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Table 9: Life insurance demand factors derived from empirical research 
Variable Positive Effect Negative Effect Insignificant 
Economic Factors 
Income per capita 
(Wealth, Labor 
income) 
Browne and Kim (1993); 
Outreville (1996); 
Park et al. (2002); 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002) 
Beck and Webb (2003: full 
sample) 
Chang and Berdiev (2013: 
life insurance density) 
  Beck and Webb (2003; 
developing economies) 
Chang and Berdiev (2013: 
life insurance penetration) 
Price of insurance 
(Premium) 
 Browne and Kim (1993)  
Anticipated inflation 
rate 
  Browne and Kim (1993);  
Outreville (1996) 
  
Inflation rate   Beck and Webb (2003) 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002) 
Chang and Berdiev (2013: 
life insurance density and 
penetration) 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density and penetration) 
  
Demographic Factors 
Young dependency 
ratio 
(Bequest motive) 
Browne and Kim (1993); 
Outreville (1996); 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002: OECD, Asia Tiger 
countries) 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density and penetration) 
Chen et al. (2012: life 
insurance density)  
Chang and Berdiev (2013: 
life insurance density and 
penetration) 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002: Asia non-Tiger 
countries) 
Beck and Webb (2003) 
Chen et al. (2012: life 
insurance penetration) 
Old dependency 
ratio 
  Beck and Webb (2003)   
Life expectancy  
(Adverse selection; 
life cylce hypotheses)  
Outreville (1996); 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002); 
Beck and Webb (2003) 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013) 
Browne and Kim (1993); 
Urbanization 
(Search and 
transaction costs) 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density) 
  Outreville (1996) 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
penetration) 
Social and Cultural Factors 
Education Browne and Kim (1993:  
life insurance in force 
1980)  
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002: Asia, OECD, Asia 
non-Tiger) 
Beck and Webb (2003); 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
  Outreville (1996);  
Browne and Kim (1993: 
life insurance in force 
1987 and premiums 
1987);  
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002: Asia Tiger) 
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density and penetration) 
Religion: Muslim   Wasaw (1986);  
Browne and Kim (1993: 
premiums 1987; life 
insurance in force 1987); 
Outreville (1996); 
Beck and Webb (2003) 
Browne and Kim (1993: 
life insurance in force 
1980); 
Religion: Catholic or 
Christian 
    Beck and Webb (2003) 
Culture Park et al. (2002); 
Chui and Kwok (2008) 
Chui and Kwok (2009) 
Chui and Kwok (2008)) 
Chui and Kwok (2009) 
  
Structural Factors 
Financial sector 
development            
Outreville (1996); 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002); 
Beck and Webb (2003: 
overall sample); 
Arena (2008); 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density and penetration) 
  Beck and Webb (2003: 
developing countries) 
Insurance market 
structure 
Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density and penetration) 
Wasaw (1986); 
Outreville (1996) 
Outreville (1996) 
Regulatory 
environment 
Wasaw (1986); Park et al. (2002)  
Legal environment La Porta et al. (1997, 
1998, 2000) 
  
Social security  
(Portfolio choice) 
Browne and Kim (1993: 
premiums 1987 und life 
insurance in force 1987) 
Ward and Zurbruegg 
(2002) 
Chang and Berdiev (2013: 
life insurance density and 
penetration) 
Chen et al. (2012: life 
insurance density and 
penetration) 
Browne and Kim (1993: 
life insurance in force 
1980) 
Outreville (1996) 
Savings Sen and Madheswaran 
(2013: life insurance 
density and penetration) 
Chen et al. (2012: life 
insurance density) 
Chen et al. (2012: life 
insurance penetration) 
Source: Author’s own  
Note: Related theoretical concepts are put in parentheses   
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2.4 Empirical Results on Micro Life Insurance Demand in Developing 
Countries 
This section summarizes the results of the few peer-reviewed studies on micro life 
insurance demand and compares their findings with the results from the previous two 
sections. It thereby validates the theoretical and empirical findings for micro life 
insurance, identifies specific demand characteristics of this market segment and points 
out research gaps.  
The approach employed by the author is similar to the work of Eling et al. (2014). 
However, their review did not differentiate between the different product lines of micro 
insurance and mainly studied agricultural and health insurance schemes. In contrast to 
their work, this review focuses only on the demand of life insurance. From the author’s 
point of view, it is necessary to use life insurance as a focal point because the demand 
determinants for life insurance are expected to differ from agriculture or weather index 
insurance and health insurance. The latter products are much more complex and face 
product specific demand barriers, such as the availability of health facilities whereas 
index insurance is troubled with basis risk and covers idiosyncratic shocks. However, 
results from the studies on agricultural or index insurance and health insurance are used 
selectively in this review, if they provide additional evidence which complements the 
findings from micro life insurance demand studies or emphasize current research gaps.  
In her literature search, the author identified seven peer reviewed studies which were 
published in academic journals between 2002 and early 2016. She searched the two 
economic literature databases EBSCOhost and ProQuest, initially using the search terms 
“life insurance” AND “micro”. Due to the low number of results, she extended the 
search criteria and used the terms “insurance” AND every country listed by the World 
Bank as low-income or lower-middle income as of March 2015. Since the results for 
India and Georgia exceeded more than 200 entries, she added the term “demand” in her 
search for these two countries. Table 10 presents the search results. It lists the empirical 
studies on micro life insurance demand chronologically, including the 
operationalization of the dependent variable, a description of the sample set, source and 
the year of data collection.  
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As mentioned earlier, the present literature review follows the work of Eling et al. 
(2014) and Outreville (2013) in terms of structure. The author clustered the empirical 
evidence using the demand factors framework, as summarized in the previous section. 
However, the author added a fifth cluster termed as ‘Risk aversion and exposure’ and 
adapted the individual demand factors listed under the initial four categories based on 
her review results:  
1. Economic factors,  
2. Demographic factors,  
3. Social and cultural factors, and  
4. Structural factors  
5. Risk aversion and exposure. 
So far, the empirical studies on micro life insurance demand have gathered data by 
using household surveys, focusing on the demand in one country (or region). Whereas, 
life insurance demand in general is usually studied across various countries using global 
databases provided by sources such as the World Bank or Swiss Re. Consequently, the 
results explaining macroeconomic factors, such as inflation, are not available for the 
low-income market segment. Nonetheless, the household surveys allowed the 
researchers to measure additional microeconomic factors, including risk aversion. Table 
11 (p. 74) presents the extended analytical framework of demand factors of micro life 
insurance. In total, it summarizes 30 characteristics. Again, the clustering approach of 
the framework hides the fact that various demand factors might correlate. This is a 
weakness the author mitigates by making special references wherever relevant.   
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Table 10: List of micro life insurance demand studies 
Year Author Journal Article Operationalization 
of dep. variable 
Data source Sample  
countries 
Period 
2002 Churchill, Craig Journal of 
International 
Development 
Trying to understand the 
demand for micro insurance 
Not specified Not specified Not specified Not 
specified 
2005 Cohen, Monique. and 
Jennefer Sebstad 
Journal of 
International 
Development 
Reducing vulnerability: the 
demand for microinsurance 
  Focus group 
discussion, in-
depth and 
individual 
interviews  
Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya 
  
2011 Bendig, Mirko. and 
Thankom Arun 
Journal of Economic 
Development 
Microfinancial Services and 
Risk Management: Evidences 
from Sri Lanka 
Use of insurance Household 
survey; #330  
Sri Lanka 2008 
2011 Giesbert, Lena, Steiner, 
Susanne and Mirko 
Bendig 
The Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 
Participation in Micro Life 
Insurance and the Use of 
Other Financial Services in 
Ghana 
Household is insured Household 
survey; #350 
Ghana 2008 
2012 Arun, Thankom, Bendig, 
Mirko. and Shoba Arun 
World Development Bequest Motives and 
Determinants of Micro Life 
Insurance in Sri Lanka 
Purchased life 
insurance 
Household 
survey; #330  
Sri Lanka 2007-
2008 
2015 Giesbert, Lena and 
Susanne Steiner  
Journal of 
International 
Development 
Client Perceptions of the Value 
of Microinsurance. Evidence 
from Southern Ghana 
Person is insured  Focus group 
discussion; #32  
Ghana 2008 
2016 Bendig, Mirko and 
Thankom Arun    
Geneva Papers Uptake of Multiple 
Microinsurance Schemes: 
Evidence from Sri Lanka 
Purchased life 
insurance 
Household 
survey: #330 
Sri Lanka 2007-
2008 
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Year Author Journal Article  # of studies 
included  
 # of health 
schemes 
 # of life 
schemes 
 # of 
agriculture 
schemes  
2011 Brau, James C., Merrill 
Craig and Kim B. Staking 
Journal of 
Developmental 
Entrepreneurship 
Insurance Theory and 
Challenges Facing the 
Development of 
Microinsurance Markets 
13   9   1  3  
2013 Matul, Michal, Aparna 
Dalal, Ombeline De Bock 
and Wouter Gelade 
Enterprise 
Development and 
Microfinance 
Microinsurance Demand: 
Determinants and Strategies 
30   5  1  7 
2014 Eling, Martin, Shailee 
Pradhan and Joan T. 
Schmit  
The Geneva Papers The Determinants of 
Microinsurance Demand 
41    15  2  5 
Source: Author’s own 
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2.4.1 Economic Factors 
Income and wealth  
Traditional life insurance demand studies usually find a positive effect of income on life 
insurance consumption using national income data on an aggregated level, confirming 
theoretical models. On a household level, (annual) income is much more challenging to 
measure in a developing country. Most of the population receives irregular incomes 
from working in the informal sector. Such fluctuations make it difficult for a household 
to estimate income reliably. Therefore, micro life insurance demand surveys usually 
measure for an effect of wealth and collect information on the regularity of income or 
employment status of the household members.  
Wealth is measured using a predetermined set of assets representing different levels of 
wealth. The previous studies established a positive effect of wealth on micro life 
insurance uptake in Ghana and Sri Lanka (Bendig and Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011; 
Arun et al., 2012). However, it should be noted that for the micro insurance customer 
segment wealth might rather proxy for the ability to pay a regular insurance premium 
whereas for the traditional retail customer segment the positive relationship is explained 
by potentially higher losses to protect against (Eling et al., 2014: 234-7). In addition, the 
demand factor of wealth might correlate with several other demand factors, i.e. 
remittances, young dependency ratio, education and financial literacy, usage of financial 
services, risk exposure.   
Employment status 
In micro life insurance research, the role of labor income is further analyzed considering 
the household’s occupational situation. Theoretically, labor income increases the 
demand for term life insurance to secure future income streams for one’s dependents 
(Fischer, 1973; Campbell, 1980). Empirically, formal sector jobs are associated with 
steady income flows, which are more likely to allow for regular premium payments. 
However, previous studies could not provide evidence for such causalities (Bendig and 
Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011; Arun et al., 2012). This might be caused by the 
limited ability of term life micro insurance products to cover for lost income over a 
longer time period. 
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Remittances 
In developing countries, an important income source are remittance payments of family 
members working abroad or in urban areas. It is further argued that such remittance 
payments could be substitutes for insurance or crowd out insurance, as such transfers 
might smoothen income flows in the case of financial losses due to sickness, accident or 
death, which is evidenced in Ghana (Giesbert et al., 2011) whereas in Sri Lanka, Bendig 
et al. (2016) find the opposite effect. The receipt of remittances might also correlate 
with a household’s level of wealth as workers usually earn a much higher income 
abroad.  
Price of insurance 
Related to theoretical work on (life) insurance demand, focus group discussants in 
Ghana named the premium amount as an uptake barrier (Giesbert and Steiner, 2015). 
Respondents frequently raised the topic of affordability of life insurance premiums. If 
the premium amount is set too high or perceived as such by the (potential) customers, 
households are less likely to purchase life insurance. This inverse relationship is also 
found in cross-country studies analyzing traditional life insurance consumption in 
developing markets. The effect of pricing and the (perceived) premium loading could be 
a fruitful area for future research. In contrast to demand research on micro health or 
weather index insurance quantitative or experimental evidence is lacking for the 
business line of micro life insurance. Research studies on pricing in agricultural and 
health micro insurance indicate price elasticities ranging from 0.44 (Mobarak and 
Rosenzweig, 2012; Karlan et al., 2012) to 1.16 (Cole et al., 2013) compared to price 
elasticities between 0.2 and 0.4 of traditional market segments (Eling et al., 2014). 
Hence, setting the price at a level acceptable for the target group could increase demand 
significantly. Further research could also focus on the role of search and transactions 
costs. Implicit costs, e.g. travels for premium payment or claims filing, could potentially 
affect uptake (Matul et al. 2013). 
2.4.2 Demographic Factors 
Young dependency ratio  
The work of Yaari (1965) established the relevance of a bequest motive for life 
insurance demand within the theoretical framework of expected utility theory. Empirical 
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studies in the field of traditional life insurance typically measure for a bequest motive 
by the young dependency ratio. Yet, their results are inconclusive. Previous studies in 
micro life insurance demand follow this approach. Arun et al. (2012) observe a positive 
effect of a household’s number of young dependents on micro life insurance ownership 
in Sri Lanka, whereas the overall household size is insignificant (Bendig and Arun, 
2011). Further, in their qualitative study Giesbert and Steiner (2015) find that the 
possibility of leaving a bequest to the family is the main social value of life insurance 
(p. 26). However, their earlier quantitative study (Giesbert et al., 2011) does not support 
this finding. When testing for an effect of the young dependency ratio, it should be 
considered that the number of children might relate to a household’s level of wealth.    
Age 
In the field of micro life insurance, age is used as another proxy to test for a bequest 
motive and to estimate an life cycle effect. In both cases, life insurance demand is 
expected to decrease with age. In the first case dependencies vanish as children become 
independent whereas in the second case the stock of accumulated assets over lifetime 
serves as an instrument of self-insurance reducing insurance consumption. If the latter 
effect is applicable to the setting of micro life insurance and the wealth situation of its 
target group is questionable. Overall, empirical results are ambiguous. In Ghana, 
Giesbert et al. (2011) find a positive effect of age on micro life insurance uptake, 
whereas in Sri Lanka demand is negatively affected (Arun et al., 2012; Bendig and 
Arun, 2011).   
Marriage status  
In previous micro life insurance demand studies, both theories of a bequest motive and a 
life cycle effect are further measured by a household’s family status. However, none of 
the micro life insurance demand studies find a significant relationship.  
Gender   
In the context of micro insurance, researchers argue that women are more exposed and 
vulnerable to life risks compared to men and hence are more likely to insure (Cohen and 
Sebstad, 427-428). Nevertheless, previous studies have not observed any significant 
effect (Bendig and Arun 2016 and 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011; Arun et al., 2011). 
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Gender and insurance consumption by low-income households could be an interesting 
field of research. In developing countries women are often responsible for a family’s 
well-being and must cope with unexpected losses. Further research would be needed to 
provide evidence for the different risk transfer needs of women and men and how to 
address them. However, as data on gender and micro insurance is scarce, it is difficult to 
establish a rationale for such a research.   
2.4.3 Social and Cultural Factors 
Education and financial literacy 
In accordance with results from traditional life insurance demand studies (Sen and 
Madheswaran, 2013; Beck and Webb, 2003; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Browne and 
Kim, 1993), a low-income household’s level of education positively influences its 
decision to insure against life risks (Arun et al., 2012; Bendig and Arun, 2011; Giesbert 
et al., 2011). Moreover, Giesbert and Steiner (2015) provide qualitative evidence for a 
positive effect of financial literacy on life insurance demand from Ghana. If households 
have a better understanding and knowledge about insurance, and know how to access 
insurance services, they are more likely to consume micro life insurance. The 
quantitative validation of these qualitative results on the effect of financial literacy on 
micro life insurance uptake is still pending. Demand research in agriculture insurance 
evidenced a positive relationship between financial literacy initiatives and insurance 
consumption (Cai et al., 2015; Dercon et al, 2014) or no effect (Cole et al., 2013). 
However, as term life micro insurance is less complex than a weather index insurance 
policy, the effect of financial literacy on uptake is expected to be much smaller.  
Religion  
Demand studies of traditional life insurance markets established a negative correlation 
between Islam and life insurance consumption which is explained by religious concerns 
towards life insurance or differences in risk attitudes. In micro life insurance, the 
relevance of religion is so far considered by one study. Arun et al. (2012) studied the 
relationship of life insurance coverage and the religious denomination of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and Christianity in Sri Lanka. He found a significant negative effect for 
Hinduism, which could also be explained by the Hindu’s affiliation to the Sri Lankan 
ethnic minority of Tamils (p. 1707). Other hypotheses on the role of religion raised by 
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life insurance demand research remain untested for the low-income market segment and 
other target groups. An understanding about the effect of religious denomination on life 
insurance consumption is still lacking. The “effects of religion on risk attitudes and 
insurance demand” are suggested as a future research area (Eling et al., 2014: 242) 
which is further elaborated in Section 2.6.2.  
Peer effect and social networks 
Extending the scope of traditional life insurance demand studies Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) analyze their focus group discussions for an influence of peers on a household’s 
insurance consumption behavior. They show that policyholders share their knowledge 
on insurance and try to convince the non-insured about the value of micro insurance 
while the non-policyholders respect the insureds as some kind of experts on the topic (p. 
31). These positive effects of peers are in line with findings from weather index 
insurance demand studies showing an increased insurance consumption if peers, e.g. 
friends, relatives and neighbors own insurance (Cai et al. 2015; Giné et al., 2008). Cai et 
al. (2015) studied the role of peers for index insurance uptake in China through a (i) 
diffusion of information leading to an increased awareness of insurance, an (ii) imitation 
of consumption behavior and a (iii) learning effect from a peer’s insurance experience 
which also creates trust. The idea of testing for various functions of peer networks in 
microinsurance uptake builds on the previous work of Giné et al. (2008). They find that 
membership in an informal or formal organization as well as a peer’s insurance status is 
positively significantly for index insurance uptake in India. Future research could 
further improve the understanding about the different kinds of peer mechanisms and 
their applicability to micro life insurance.   
Informal risk sharing 
Giesbert et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between insurance uptake and 
informal savings institutions, e.g. Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. In their 
research, they do not find evidence for a substitution or crowding out effect. On the 
contrary, usage of informal financial services and micro life insurance are 
complementary as both risk management strategies serve different needs. In the context 
of health insurance Jowett has investigated the relationship between informal risk 
sharing and micro insurance demand, Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) for weather 
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index insurance and Landmann et al. (2012) in the abstract setting of a laboratory 
experiment in the Philippines. However, their results are not yet conclusive. Strong 
informal risk sharing networks crowd out health insurance uptake in Vietnam (Jowett, 
2003) while in the Philippian laboratory setting formal insurance may reduce informal 
transfers if savings are not available (Landmann et al., 2012). Mobarak and Rosenzweig 
(2012) find that under basis risk the effect of informal insurance on formal index 
insurance depends on the type of indemnification by the informal arrangement and on 
the extent of basis risk. Informal risk sharing reduces formal insurance if the informal 
insurance protects against covariate shocks but not against the idiosyncratic shocks, the 
individuals face. If the formal insurance involves basis risk, informal risk sharing 
arrangements can enhance the benefits of formal insurance. However, these findings are 
not transferable to the life insurance segment as from example in the case of agricultural 
insurance the models assume covariate shocks and the presence of basis risk. Academic 
research could further investigate on the interplay of informal and formal risk sharing 
related to micro life products to better understand the needs of the target segment and to 
identify how formal insurance could leverage on the informal mechanisms. As informal 
risk sharing or the access to financial resources can be considered as a function of social 
networks next to information exchange (Chuang and Schechter, 2015), this research 
studies the impact of peer effects and informal risk sharing within the broader 
sociological concept of social capital.  
2.4.4 Structural Factors  
Savings and other financial services 
Considered the results of life insurance demand studies for the traditional market 
segment (Sen and Madheswaran, 2013; Arena, 2008; Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; 
Outreville, 1996), Giesbert et al. (2011) and Giesbert and Steiner (2015) test for the 
relationship between insurance consumption and the usage of other financial services. 
Insurance ownership should be more likely if the financial sector is well developed and 
services are provided to the low-income groups (Arena, 2008; Beck and Webb, 2003; 
Ward and Zurbruegg, 2002; Outreville, 1996). For example, term life insurance policies 
are often distributed by microfinance institutions or bundled with microcredits (Cohen 
and Sebstad, 2005: 339). However, current research results are ambiguous. The usage of 
microcredits or savings can support or hinder micro insurance uptake (Giesbert and 
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Steiner, 2015; Giesbert et al., 2011). The negative relationship could be explained by a 
crowding out effect of life insurance consumption by other financial instruments as 
indicated by portfolio choice models.   
Contract non-performance  
Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) proved theoretically that under the presence of a default 
risk by the insurer, it is optimal for the consumer to buy less than full non-life insurance 
coverage. Focus group discussions from Ghana indicate that a lack of trust in a valid 
claim payment is a main barrier for micro life insurance consumption (Giesbert and 
Steiner, 2015: 24). If the reputation of the insurance provider or his products is 
tarnished and the consumer does not trust in the insurance promise, e.g. because of 
agent fraud, long claims processes, or the risk of insolvency of the insurer, he is less 
likely to purchase insurance. This negative effect of a risk of contract non-performance 
is validated by previous research on micro insurance demand using theoretical 
modelling (Liu and Myers, 2014) and experimental testing in the field (Biener et al., 
2014). However, these results are not yet applied to the context of micro life insurance. 
Compared to industrialized countries the risk of contract non-performance might even 
be a stronger demand barrier in developing countries as institutions responsible for legal 
enforcement of customer rights and consumer protection measures are comparatively 
weak, slowing down the development of an insurance market (e.g. La Porta et al., 
2000). 
2.4.5 Risk Aversion and Exposure   
Risk aversion  
Applying expected utility theory, demand models usually assume that individuals are 
risk averse where risk aversion positively influences insurance consumption. Using a 
survey question on the respondent’s willingness to take risks, Giesbert et al. (2011) find 
that more risk averse households are less likely to be insured which is a finding in 
contradiction with the predictions of standard expected utility theory assuming 
decreasing relative risk aversion. To explain their results Giesbert et al. (2011) argue 
that low-income households with low levels of financial literacy might perceive the 
purchase of insurance as a risk itself. By not fully understanding the product and its 
benefits, risk averse households might be more reluctant to spend their few dollars of 
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income on an intangible financial service. However, their result could also be caused by 
the selected survey measurement approach. Since the 1980’s empirical studies usually 
use a lottery design to measure for risk aversion, as the methodology allows to observe 
actual behavior. Two lottery approaches are well-established: Binswanger lottery (1980; 
1981) or Holt and Laury lottery (2002). As risk aversion is one of the fundamental 
determinants of insurance uptake, future research could further investigate on the 
relationship between risk aversion and micro life insurance consumption using the more 
sophisticated measurement approach of a lottery design.  
Risk exposure  
The work of Stiglitz and Rothschild (1976) on adverse selection predicts that 
households with a higher likeliness of risk occurrence are more likely to insure, 
assuming equal premiums and benefits. However, results for the micro life insurance 
customer segment on adverse selection are mixed. According to Giesbert et al. (2011), 
risky households, measured by their self-perceived exposure to several risks, are less 
likely to insure, whereas Bendig and Arun (2011) find a positive correlation for their Sri 
Lankan sample using the same measurement approach.  
Experience of risk events  
In addition, studies on micro life insurance demand collected information about a 
household’s experience with different risk events and their financial impact. Past shocks 
might influence a household’s perception of the likeliness of a risk occurrence 
(Kunreuther, 1996) or affect her risk coping ability (Eling et al., 2014) which then 
affects her demand behavior. In most cases past risk experiences did not influence 
current insurance consumption except for the agricultural risks of crop failures and 
increases in input prices. Both events negatively affect insurance uptake (Bendig and 
Arun, 2011) by reducing the household’s financial resources and liquidity, which in turn 
affects their ability to pay for regular premium payments. 
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Table 11: Micro life insurance demand factors 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Positive Effect Negative Effect Insignificant 
Effect 
Economic Factors 
Income / Wealth 
Assets Bendig and Arun (2011); 
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
    
Land ownership Arun et al. (2012) 
 
  Bendig and Arun (2011);  
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
Income per capita Not yet tested   
Employment status     Bendig and Arun (2011; 
self-employment and 
unemployment);  
Giesbert et al. (2011; 
employment); 
Arun et al. (2012; self-
employment and 
unemployment) 
Bendig and Arun (2016; 
self-employment and 
unemployment) 
Remittances Bendig and Arun (2016) Giesbert et al. (2011) Bendig and Arun (2011) 
Price of insurance   Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
Cohen and Sebstad 
(2005)  
 
Demographic Factors 
No. of young 
dependents 
Arun et al. (2012)       
No. of old 
dependents 
    Arun et al. (2012) 
Dependency ratio    Giesbert et al. (2011) 
Household size Bendig and Arun (2011) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
    
Bequest motive Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
  Giesbert et al. (2011) 
Age   Giesbert et al. (2011) Bendig and Arun (2011);  
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
  
Age squared Bendig and Arun (2011) Giesbert et al. (2011)   
Life expectancy  Not yet tested   
Marriage status      Giesbert et al. (2011), 
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
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Urbanization Not tested   
Gender (Female 
household head) 
Cohen and Sebstad 
(2005)  
  Bendig and Arun (2011);  
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012);  
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
 
Social and Cultural Factors 
Education  Bendig and Arun (2011; 
secondary education); 
Giesbert et al. (2011; no of 
schooling years); 
Arun et al. (2012)  
Bendig and Arun (2016; 
none, primary or 
secondary education) 
  Bendig and Arun (2011; 
no primary education) 
Financial literacy Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
    
Religion     Arun et al. (2012; Hindu) Arun et al. (2012; 
Buddhist) 
Culture Not yet tested   
Informal risk 
sharing  
  Giesbert et al. (2011)  
Peer effects Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
    
Institutional and Structural Factors 
Access / usage of 
microcredit 
Giesbert et al. (2011) 
Cohen and Sebstad 
(2005)  
Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
  
Access / usage of 
savings 
Giesbert et al. (2011) Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
 
Social security Not yet tested   
Contract non-
performance    
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) 
  
Risk Aversion and Exposure 
Risk aversion 
(willingness to take 
risk) 
 Giesbert et al. (2011)    
Risk exposure   Bendig and Arun (2011)  
Bendig and Arun (2016; 
ratio of ill HH-members)  
Giesbert et al. (2011) Arun et al. (2012)  
Bendig and Arun (2016; 
self-assessment) 
Experience of risk events  
Death       Bendig and Arun (2011); 
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016) 
Illness    Bendig and Arun (2016) Bendig and Arun (2011);  
Giesbert et al. (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012) 
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Draught     Bendig and Arun (2011) 
Animal threat     Bendig and Arun (2011) 
Crop failure   Bendig and Arun (2011)   
Increase in input 
prices 
  Bendig and Arun (2011)   
No ability to sell 
agricultural products 
    Bendig and Arun (2011) 
Other severe shocks   Bendig and Arun (2011); 
Arun et al. (2012) 
Bendig and Arun (2016)  
Giesbert et al. (2011) 
Natural disasters Not yet tested   
Source: Author’s own 
 
2.5 Summary of the Analytical Framework 
A summary of the analytical framework for studying micro life insurance demand is 
provided in Figure 3. The results from existing micro life insurance demand studies 
indicate that the theoretical predictions and results from the traditional life insurance 
market in developing countries are generally applicable to the low-income segment. 
Broadly speaking, academic studies have so far identified wealth, education, risk 
aversion and the usage of other financial or insurance services as main explanatory 
factors for the demand of micro life insurance whereby the demand factors of wealth, 
education and usage of financial services are expected to correlate. These possible 
correlations are further considered in the process of data analysis and interpretation of 
the qualitative and quantitative study. Indicative evidence is also provided for a life-
cycle effect and a bequest motive. Some research results are particularly interesting, as 
they deviate from the expected utility theory of life insurance demand. For instance, 
risk-averse households are less likely to purchase micro life insurance. The level of 
financial literacy and premiums as well as the risk of contract non-performance seems 
to be much more important in the decision to insure when compared to traditional retail 
life insurance (Giesbert and Steiner, 2015; Giesbert et al., 2011).  
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Figure 3: Analytical framework (research model)  
 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
The overall picture of why low-income households purchase or do not purchase life 
insurance is still vague as some of the demand factors have not been studied yet or their 
measurement approach is weak. This means a thorough understanding of why these 
factors support or hinder micro life insurance uptake is still missing. In the author’s 
opinion, future research could especially focus on:  
• Role of peers and social networks in the decision to insure  
• Interdependence of formal and informal insurance mechanisms 
• How religions impact micro life insurance uptake 
• Risk of contract non-performance  
• Effect of pricing and various premium levels on micro life insurance demand 
• Understanding the inverse effect of risk aversion.  
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The author decided to focus her research on the two demand factors:  
1. The role of peers, social networks and informal risk sharing strategies grouped 
under the sociological concept of social capital and  
2. Religion.  
A choice which is further elaborated in Section 2.6.1.1 and 2.6.2.1. The next section 
develops the specific research questions, defines the main concept, and formulates the 
hypotheses.  
2.6 Conceptualization and Formulation of Hypotheses 
The previous chapter summarized the theoretical framework explaining micro life 
insurance demand and identified several potential research areas including two key 
areas of interest that address (i) the role of social networks and peers in the decisions to 
insure and (ii) impact of religions on micro life insurance uptake. These two potential 
demand factors are not yet fully understood but could be critical in increasing the 
uptake of micro life insurance. This chapter and its sub-sections explain in detail why 
the author decided to empirically study the two demand factors of social capital 
(2.6.1.1) and religion (2.6.2.1). It defines the concepts of social capital (2.6.1.2) and 
religion (2.6.2.2) and develops the hypotheses to be tested in the quantitative study 
(2.6.1.3 and 2.6.2.3).   
2.6.1 Social Capital and Micro Life Insurance Demand  
2.6.1.1 Relevance of Social Capital for Micro Life Insurance Demand 
In the last 15 years, several economists have started to consider the role of social capital 
or social ties in connection with goods, productive assets, and monetary and human 
capitals in their work (Glaeser et al., 2000). Their interest is nurtured by several studies 
that provide evidence for an impact of social capital on economic behavior in various 
areas, including the adoption of new agricultural practices (Maertens and Barrett, 2013), 
health technologies (Oster and Thornton, 2012; Kremer and Miguel, 2007), job search 
(Munshi, 2003), and credit uptake (Banerjee et al., 2013). In the research that aims to 
investigate micro life insurance demand, the subject of social capital and the influence 
of its various functions have not received significant attention so far. To the author’s 
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best knowledge, peer reviewed studies on micro life insurance demand have not yet 
directly tested for an effect of social capital on micro life insurance demand, even 
though closely related research on non-life micro insurance products suggests existence 
of an impact of social networks on insurance uptake (Cai et al., 2015; Karlan et al., 
2012; Morsink, 2012; Giné et al., 2013 and 2008). The work of Cai et al. (2015) and 
Giné et al. (2008) are the first who systematically study the various channels through 
which social capital affects uptake micro insurance uptake. They find that social 
networks influence the demand for weather index insurance among low-income 
households due to the exchange of information about insurance among peers. 
Consequently, social networks can increase awareness and understanding of insurance. 
However, the researchers do not find evidence for an imitation effect. The research 
presented in this section follows the comprehensive approach employed by Cai et al. 
(2015) and Giné et al. (2008). It examines if social capital influences life insurance 
demand among low-income households in Sri Lanka. It further investigates the channels 
through which social capital works. Thereby, this study introduces a demand factor 
which has not been researched in relation with micro life insurance consumption.  
2.6.1.2 Definition of Social Capital   
Research on social capital gained importance with the work of Granovetter published in 
1973 and experienced a further upswing in the 1990ies following the work of Coleman 
(1990) and Putnam’s publication of “Making Democracy Work” (1993). Due to its 
applicability to various research areas, the concept of social capital became kind of an 
“umbrella concept”; a term that means “many things to many people” (Narayan and 
Pritchett, 1997: 2). In economic research, the following definition of Putnam (1993, 
2000) is cited frequently: “Social capital refers to connections among individuals – 
social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” 
(2000: 19). In 2001, Putnam further clarified his understanding of social capital. He 
acknowledges the multidimensional nature of the concept and stresses the central role of 
social networks in human interactions and behaviors. On the one hand, social networks 
refer to the formal institutions of the communities; for example, societies, associations, 
and clubs (Putnam, 2000: 27). On the other hand, the term ‘social networks’ is also used 
to indicate the “informal ties through which people connect” or other social activities 
such as meeting friends or family members for coffee and cake after work (Putnam, 
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2000: 92). These social networks are associated with the norms of reciprocity and 
altruism. In addition, generalized trust is considered to be a close consequence of social 
capital. According to Putnam, altruism and generalized trust are good proxies to 
measure social capital, although reciprocity, altruism and generalized trust are not part 
of his definition of social capital (Putnam, 2001).  
Contrary to Putnam (1993), Coleman (1990) emphasized that “social capital is defined 
by its function” (p. 302), rather than by its formalization of engagement and interaction. 
According to him, social capital is defined by two characteristics: the relationships 
between persons and more importantly the facilitation of actions of the people within a 
social structure. Social capital is of value if “actors achieve particular ends that would 
have been impossible without it” (Coleman, 1990: 302).  
This research acknowledges both of the above-mentioned approaches towards defining 
social capital and the implied multidimensional nature of the concept. Taking these two 
approaches in account, it firstly examines if the participation of households in social 
networks affects micro life insurance demand. Secondly, this research is interested in 
studying the actions facilitated by social networks or the reasons for an effect of social 
capital on micro life insurance demand. Applying these various aspects of social capital 
to this field study, the author follows an empirical approach proposed and applied by the 
World Bank, in the context of the developing world (World Bank, 2016).  
Presented in Table 12, the following six dimensions are usually considered in the 
research related to social capital: (i) group membership in various types of groups and 
networks, (ii) generalized trust, (iii) collective action and cooperation, (iv) access to 
information and communication infrastructure, (v) social cohesion and inclusion, and 
(iv) empowerment and political action (World Bank, 2016).  
The first two dimensions cover the forms of social capital as suggested by the definition 
of Putnam (2001, 1993). The third and fourth dimensions measure the actions facilitated 
by social networks or the ways in which social capital operates, as proposed by 
Coleman (1990). The last two dimensions represent major outcomes of social capital 
(Grootaert et al., 2004: 5).  
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Table 12: Dimensions of social capital 
Forms of social capital Mode of action Outcome 
(i) Group membership (iii) Collective action and      
      cooperation  
(v) Social cohesion and  
     Inclusion 
(ii) Generalized trust (iv) Access to information  
      and communication 
(vi) Empowerment and  
      political action 
Source: Adapted from Grootaert et al. (2004: 5) 
For the purpose of this study, uptake of micro life insurance is considered to be the 
outcome of social capital which reduces the number of outcome dimensions to one. 
Current research provides evidence for both modes of actions through which social 
capital might affect micro insurance demand: (iii) collective action and cooperation and 
(iv) access to information and communication. The function of ‘collective action and 
cooperation’ relates to financial flows (Chuang and Schechter, 2015). Social networks 
provide direct or indirect access to money; directly by giving credit or money to the 
members of the same social network and indirectly by monitoring credit repayments in 
the setting of group loans provided by financial institutions. In the context of insurance, 
collective action is relevant because informal risk sharing mechanisms might interact 
with micro life insurance demand. Under the function of ‘access to information and 
communication’, three different kinds of effects are summarized: First, social capital 
works through access to information about innovations or formerly unfamiliar 
technologies, services or products, by familiarizing an individual with something new 
and creating an understanding of how it works. In the context of insurance, for example, 
a consumer might become aware of and learn about the concept of insurance in a 
discussion with her relative. Second, when a person observes how the benefits of a new 
technology, product or service benefited her peers, her trust in these new developments 
might increase. Similarly, trust in insurance might increase after hearing from a friend 
or relative that she received an insurance pay-out. Third, an individual might adopt a 
behavior purely by imitation as she wants to follow the actions of one of her peers. In 
case of insurance, this implies that a person might simply buy micro life insurance 
because she wants to imitate the insurance consumption decision of someone she 
knows, such as her neighbor or a friend.    
Table 13 summarizes the application of multidimensional concept of social capital to 
the study of micro life insurance demand. Because of the multidimensional definition of 
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social capital, the author expects to observe correlations between the various 
dimensions, especially between the forms of social capital and its modes of action. The 
forms of social capital are expected to serve certain functions, and specific functions 
might require a certain form of social capital. Consequently, the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter 4 controls for multicollinearity between the dimensions of social capital. 
Table 13: Dimensions of social capital and micro life insurance demand 
Forms of social capital Mode of action Outcome 
(i) Group membership (iii) Collective action and      
      cooperation:                      
      Informal risk sharing   
(v) Micro life insurance 
     demand 
(ii) Generalized trust  
      
(iv) Access to information  
      and communication 
      -     Awareness/  
Understanding 
      -     Trust building 
      -     Imitation  
Source: Author’s own  
2.6.1.3 Development of Hypotheses  
Group membership  
Giné et al. (2008) provide first evidence for a positive effect of formal social networks 
on weather index insurance in Southern India: “Households that are members of the 
village Gram Panchayat [a local self-help organization] are significantly more likely to 
purchase insurance” (p. 558). In line with their research, this research tests for a positive 
effect of institutionalized social networks on micro life insurance demand:    
H1: Membership in a formal organization increases micro life insurance demand. 
(“Group membership hypothesis”)   
In the context of the qualitative and quantitative field study, the term formal 
organization is operationalized and defined as membership in one of the following 
groups, associations or organizations: village development society, women rural 
development society, religious society, savings group/association, agricultural 
association/fishery society, sports club, political party, and others to be specified. This 
definition indicates that the two research areas of social capital and religion are not 
independent of each other. Social capital could be institutionalized in the form of an 
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involvement in a religious community for example. However, religion is only one out of 
various sources for the emergence of social capital.3 
Generalized trust 
According to Putnam (2001), generalized trust is a good proxy to measure social capital. 
Generalized trust is defined as a basic attitude towards human. It includes the trust that 
evolves in strong and frequent relationships, but more importantly the trust towards 
strangers (Putnam, 2000: 136). To the best of the author’s knowledge, the relationship 
between generalized trust and insurance consumption has not been discussed in the 
literature, although previous literature has well-established the relevance of trust in 
economic decision-making (for instance, Gächter et al., 2004; La Portal et al., 1997; 
Knack and Keefer, 1997). Assuming an overall positive relationship between social 
capital and micro life insurance demand and generalized trust as a good indicator for 
social capital, it is hypothesized:  
H2: Generalized trust increases micro life insurance demand. (“Generalized trust 
hypothesis”)   
Section 2.6.2.3 further discusses how religion might shape an individual’s generalized 
trust.  
Creation of awareness and understanding 
Academic studies and practitioners frequently emphasize the relevance of insurance 
awareness and understanding for micro (life) insurance uptake (Giesbert and Steiner, 
2015; Cai et al., 2015; Dercon et al., 2014; Cole et al., 2013). In many environments, 
the concept of insurance is unknown to low-income households. They lack an 
understanding of insurance principles, its benefits, and obligations which eventually 
leads to a suppressed demand. Earlier studies found that social networks can effectively 
                                                
 
3 Data from the quantitative study shows the around 50% of the survey participants belong to at least one 
formal organization. Most of the time this is a women rural development society, followed by a village 
development society, agricultural association or religious society.   
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help in raising awareness for and understanding of micro insurance (Giesbert and 
Steiner, 2015; Cai et al., 2015; Giné et al., 2013). However, evidence for the micro life 
insurance segment is limited to the qualitative study conducted by Giesbert and Steiner 
(2015) in Ghana. They provide evidence that insured Ghanaians share their knowledge 
about the concept and value of insurance with their non-insured acquaintances (Giesbert 
and Steiner, 2015: 31).  
Evidence for the relationship between social networks and agriculture insurance is more 
robust. In their setting of a randomized field experiment in Kenya, Giné et al. (2013) 
explore if social networks (in this case neighbors) contribute to the efficiency of 
financial literacy measures through information sharing. They find that the likelihood of 
uptake of an index-based draught insurance increases if neighbors also received 
financial literacy materials. Using data from a randomized experiment in China, Cai et 
al. (2015) reported similar findings. They find that social networks influence insurance 
understanding by effectively transferring knowledge about the concept and value of 
insurance. However, according to their study, information about a peer’s insurance 
consumption decision is not shared in social networks outside the experimental setting, 
even though this information would be highly valued by others when they make their 
own consumption decisions. In another related research area within the broader field of 
financial inclusion, Banerjee et al. (2013) find that social networks positively influence 
the uptake of microcredits due to their ability to distribute information on microfinance 
services. Based on these previous findings, it is hypothesized:   
H3: People who discuss the concept of insurance within their social network are 
more likely to buy micro life insurance. (“Creation of awareness/ 
understanding hypothesis”)   
Imitation 
To date, only a few studies have analyzed the effects of peer consumption decisions on 
individual micro insurance demand (Karlan et al., 2012; Morsink, 2012; Giné et al., 
2008). Studying the uptake of rainfall insurance in Southern India, Giné et al. (2008) 
observed an increased demand if a larger number of peers also bought insurance: “one 
additional purchasing household among the respondent’s primary group raises the 
probability of the household purchasing insurance by 12 percent” (p. 558). Primary 
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group in this context are people affiliated with the same village organization. The 
experimental work of Cai et al. (2015) also supports a similar imitation effect. In the 
context of a randomized experiment in China, they noted that the individuals who 
participated in the experiment are more likely to purchase weather insurance, if they 
observe insurance purchases among their peers. Consequently, it is assumed that 
imitation effects support micro life insurance uptake:   
H4: People who know of a friend, relative or a neighbor who has a micro 
insurance policy are more likely to purchase micro life insurance cover for 
themselves. (“Imitation hypothesis”)   
Trust building  
In contrast to the other micro financial products like savings or credit, micro insurance 
requires a significant level of trust in the product and service providers. People first 
must pay for a feeling of security. They only find out later in future at the time of claims 
settlement, if the insurer is willing and able to fulfill the contractual terms and 
conditions. This risk of contract non-performance demands trust on the consumer side 
(Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990). In line with this, previous research on micro insurance 
has identified lack of trust as one of the main demand barriers (Giesbert and Bendig, 
2015). This effect is often amplified by the target group’s relatively high risk 
environment. Low-income households usually live in settings where contractual 
obligations are difficult to enforce legally and consumer protection mechanisms are 
commonly not in place (e.g. La Porta et al., 2000). Based on this situation, some studies 
have analyzed the role of social capital in building trust in the performance of insurance 
providers. Karlan et al. (2012) and Morsink (2012) focus on the influence of claim 
payments within a person’s social environment on micro insurance consumption. Both 
studies reported an increased demand for an agricultural (Karlan et al., 2012) and a 
bundled non-life insurance product (Morsink, 2012), if households were aware of claim 
payouts within their environment. This positive consumption behavior is explained by a 
trust building effect, arising out of their peers’ experiences. In line with these findings, 
it is hypothesized:  
H5: People who observed a claims settlement are more likely to demand micro life 
insurance. (“Trust building hypothesis”)   
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Informal risk sharing 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003), Townsend (1994), and Udry (1994) have effectively 
demonstrated in their empirical studies that low-income households provide each other 
with informal insurance. Their social ties support consumption smoothening and give 
access to financial means in times of need. However, informal networks can only 
provide partial risk coverage due to their limited size and financial capacity, creating a 
scope for formal insurance. The effects of informal risk sharing strategies on micro life 
insurance demand are not yet fully explored. Giesbert et al. (2011) expected to observe 
a negative relationship between insurance uptake and informal savings or credits. 
Contrary to their expectations, they found out that informal savings or credits and micro 
life insurance complement each other. They conclude that both risk management 
strategies serve different needs of the target group. On the subject of agricultural 
insurance, a few studies have emerged in the last four years which investigate the 
relationship between informal risk sharing groups and agricultural insurance (Mobarak 
and Rosenzweig, 2012; Dercon et al., 2014; de Janvry et al., 2014; Boucher and 
Delpierre, 2014). They developed different theoretical models in a setting of covariate 
shocks and basis risks, to explain the effects of informal risk sharing on formal 
agricultural insurance. However, their findings are of minor relevance to the life 
insurance segment as basis risk is not present and life shocks are usually idiosyncratic. 
In another related research area that investigates public health insurance, Jowett (2013) 
analyzed the effects of social capital on public health participation in Vietnam. He 
argues that “highly cohesive communities, and those endowed with dense horizontal 
networks, are more prone to collective action, and thus more likely to purchase health 
insurance” (p. 1160). Using three measures of social capital including membership in 
financial networks, cohesion, and kin heterogeneity, his results are ambiguous. A 
negative effect on insurance uptake is observed if people are members of strong 
financial networks and if a community is more cohesive. Kin heterogeneity of member 
organizations either has a significantly positive or negative effect, depending on the 
geographic area under study. Following the initial crowding-out assumption of Giesbert 
et al. (2011), it is hypothesized that:  
H6: Access to informal risk sharing reduces the demand for micro life insurance.  
(“Informal risk sharing hypothesis”)   
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2.6.2 Religion of Islam and Micro Life Insurance Demand  
2.6.2.1 Relevance of Islam for Micro Life Insurance Consumption     
An interesting observation regarding micro insurance unfolds that life insurance 
penetration is lower in the Muslim majority countries than in non-majority ones, as 
presented in Figure 4. One explanation for this empirical observation could be non-
compliance of conventional insurance with the Islamic principles, as explained in detail 
in Section 2.6.2.2. A need for insurance products which are adapted to the religious 
particularities of Islam may also be derived from the growth of Takaful which is a 
Sharia compliant form of insurance, based on the concept of social solidarity, 
cooperation and mutual indemnification (IFSB and IAIS, 2006). Access of low-income 
households to Takaful is still in its infancy. However, Micro Takaful which is the 
Islamic counterpart of micro insurance is increasingly gaining importance among 
insurance supervisors, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), 
and the insurance industry, particularly in the Muslim majority countries such as 
Indonesia.  
Figure 4: Life insurance penetration in developing countries by share of Muslim population  
  
Source: Author’s own illustration, data from Swiss Re (2016)  
Academic knowledge about the relationship between religion and micro life 
consumption is mostly fragmented. Arun et al. (2012) established a significant negative 
effect of Hinduism on micro life insurance uptake in Sri Lanka. In a demand study for 
flood insurance in Pakistan, Turner et al. (2014) controlled for the influence of Islam 
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but did not find any effects. However, the authors replaced the term insurance with 
“flood protection payments” (p. 214) in their communications with the participants, to 
avoid possible biases or stigma about insurance. This linguistic adaptation, a simplified 
insurance setting and the low literacy level of the participants might have been the 
reason why no effects were observed.  
Summarized in Chapter 2, cross-country studies on the demand for traditional life 
insurance also support the argument for a negative relationship between Islam and life 
insurance consumption. These studies find life insurance markets to be less developed 
in countries where Islam is the predominant religion (Browne and Kim, 1993; 
Outreville, 1996; Beck and Webb, 2003). Furthermore, they noted that a country’s 
national insurance consumption decreases with an increasing share of Muslim 
population (Beck and Webb, 2003). Though these studies provide valuable insights, 
cross-country samples do not explain individual choice behavior or why the religion of 
Islam influences life insurance uptake.  
Based on a systematic and intensive literature review, the author identified three 
primary mechanisms through which the religion of Islam might possibly affect life 
insurance demand: compliance with religious principle of (i) riba, (ii) mutuality, and 
(iii) risk aversion. All three mechanisms are discussed in detail in Section 2.6.2.3. The 
next section provides a summary on the general implications of Islam on micro life 
insurance. 
2.6.2.2 Background Information on Islam and Micro Life Insurance Demand 
Islamic religious law (Sharia4) 
This section explains the content of Islamic law (Sharia) and its hierarchical structure 
(see Figure 5: Sources of Islamic law) as Sharia sets the framework for insurance 
operations from an Islamic point of view. It legitimizes the existence of insurance 
practices, defines the motivation of insurance supply as well as demand, and influences 
                                                
 
4 Appendix 1 provides a glossary of the Islamic terms used and their definition. 
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the business conduct. Sharia aims to safeguard people’s well-being in the current life 
and the afterlife (Kamali, 2008: 27–28). It consists of both specific and general rulings 
on religious and moral matters as well on the rules of conduct. The latter are subject of 
Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh). Sharia comprises the Quran and the Sunnah as the two 
primary sources. The Quran is the principal source of Islamic law. It provides guidance 
and instructions to the believers of Islam. It contains 6,235 Quranic verses (Ayat) 
(Kamali, 2008: 19). Between 200 and 500 verses, out of the total, deal with legal 
arrangements (Bekkin, 2007: 4) and 70 verses are concerned with commercial and 
financial activities (Kamali, 2008: 19). The Quran’s prominent position in Sharia is 
constituted by its completeness. According to scholars, the Quran contains a 
methodology to find an answer to any question (Bekkin, 2007: 6). After the Quran, the 
second source is the Sunnah which is also known as the traditions of the Prophet 
Mohammad. It consists of Ahadith, the reported sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Mohammad as well as the accounts of his life in the ancient community of Medina. 
Most of the Ahadith reiterate, interpret and explain the Quran. The others provide 
guidelines for the issues that are not explicitly addressed in the Quran (Kamali, 2008: 
25).  
The primary sources of Sharia are complemented by the secondary sources, which are 
accepted by all the schools of Islamic law. The secondary sources and their verdicts are 
directly deducted from the primary sources either by the consensus (Ijma) or individual 
reasoning by analogy (Qiyas) of Islamic scholars (Ulama). Hence, Ijma and Qiyas are 
the methods of Islamic jurisprudence based on logic which allow a development of 
Islamic law. They cover the matters that are not explained directly in the primary 
sources, however the verdicts of Ulama must not contravene with the primary sources. 
Nevertheless, a diversification of rulings on same matters has evolved over time as 
scholars are geographically dispersed and belong to different legal schools (Bekkin, 
2007: 10).    
As additional sources are not acknowledged by all schools of Islamic law, they are not 
further considered in this research.  
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Figure 5: Sources of Islamic law 
 
Source: Erlbeck (2010) 
The conduct of insurance is mostly influenced by Quran, Sunnah, Ijma and Qiyas 
(Bekkin, 2007a: 5–6). However, insurance as we know of today did not exist at the time 
of the Prophet Mohammad. Consequently, the Quran and Sunnah do not directly refer 
to insurance and most of the decisions on the compliance of insurance are based on 
reasoning by the Ulama, belonging to different schools of Islamic law (Bekkin, 2007: 
18). Thus, current Islamic insurance practices vary highly in their institutional set-up 
and operations across the globe. 
Islamic jurisprudence on (micro)insurance 
“Microinsurance does not meet the basic principles of Shari’ah, where elements of Riba 
(usury), Maysir (gambling) and Gharar (uncertainty) are prohibited”. (IFSB and IAIS, 
2015:4). To understand the objections of Islam against conventional (micro)insurance, 
this section explains the implications of the above stated principles of Islam for 
insurance undertakings: riba (usury), gharar (uncertainty) and maysir (gambling). 
These explanations are a summary of the previous work by the author (Erlbeck, 2010).  
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Riba is usually translated as “excess”, “increase”, “growth” or “addition” (Iqbal, 2007, 
p. 14). Riba bans all kinds of interest as well as any disparity between sums of money or 
trade exchanges (Khorshid, 2004: 38). The prohibition of Riba aims to prevent 
exploitation as well as unfair or dishonest business behavior. According the principle, 
income should not be earned because of an unequal capital distribution and acquisition 
of wealth at the expenses of others should be avoided (Hassan and Lewis, 2007: 51; 
Khorshid, 2004: 31). The prohibition of riba is one of the main influencing factors for 
Islamic financial activities and it profoundly impacts the conduct of insurance. Four 
major categories of riba are illustrated in Figure 6. In its traditional meaning, as 
explained in the Quran, riba refers to usury in debt (riba al-nasiah). However, Islamic 
scholars extend the meaning of riba al-nasiah to all forms of interest to be paid for debt 
(El-Gamal, 2006). The ban on riba al-nasiah is acknowledged by all schools of Islamic 
law and is justified by several verses of the Quran. Insurance is affected by riba al-
nasiah as conventional insurance companies invest in interest bearing assets. This 
interest is a pure form of riba al-nasiah (Bekkin, 2007: 29). To avoid riba in investment 
activities, Sharia compliant insurers are restricted to Islamic financial instruments. 
Figure 6: Categories of riba 
 
Source: Erlbeck (2010) 
The second source of Islamic law after the Quran, the Sunnah is not only concerned 
with usury in debt, but also extends the concept of riba to sales usury (Riba al-buyu) 
(Khorshid, 2004: 34). Within riba al-buyu, one can differentiate between riba al-fadl 
and riba al-nisa. The former exists if two goods of the same kind and quality are 
exchanged using an unequal quantitative ratio (El-Gamal, 2006: 50; Muslehuddin, 
1969: 126). Regarding life and non-life insurance some scholars argue that money 
exchanged between insurers and insured are not equal in quantity. Premium payments 
and claim payouts usually do not match each other (Khorshid, 2004: 63). In their view, 
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one contracting partner therewith benefits at the expense of the other partner which is 
not in line with Sharia. Moreover, it is argued that insurers acquire their wealth in an 
unjustified manner for pure risk covers. If there are no losses, a policyholder does not 
receive any financial benefit for her premium payments (Khorshid, 2004: 63). However, 
both arguments do not hold as they neglect the intangible benefit of protection during 
the insurance period. Riba al-nisa prohibits the exchange of identical products at 
different points of time as they must be traded “from hand to hand” (El-Gamal, 2001: 4; 
Muslehuddin, 1969: 129). This prohibition applies to insurance as there is always a time 
lag between premium payments and claim payouts in conventional commercial 
insurance (Bekkin, 2007: 28). The debate on riba and its consequences concludes that 
conventional commercial insurance is invalid in Islam because the conventional 
insurance contract contains elements of riba al-nisa in money transfers and riba al-
nasiah in investment activities and premiums. 
Gharar rules out injustice in trade caused by incomplete information and uncertainty 
intrinsic to the contract object (El-Gamal, 2006: 58). Both of the primary sources of 
Islamic law, the Quran and Sunnah, establish the prohibition of gharar. However, they 
do not explicitly define its meaning. Therefore, the understanding of gharar and its 
implications are derived from the understanding and consensus of religious scholars. In 
general, gharar refers to uncertainty but very heterogeneous opinions exist on its 
detailed understanding (Ayub, 2007: 58). According to Ayub (2007), gharar is a “sale 
of a thing which is not present at hand, or the sale of a thing whose ‘aqibah’ 
(consequences) is not known or a sale involving hazard in which one does not know 
whether it will come to be or not”. Hence, gharar refers to uncertainty concerning (i) 
obligations of the contracting parties and their ability to fulfill them, (ii) contract terms 
and a lack of complete information, and (iii) nature of the subject matter. In case a 
contract contains any of these characteristics, the agreement is void (Bekkin, 2007: 21–
22). Regarding insurance, the first two conditions are eliminated by clear contract terms. 
However, few scholars raise concerns because it is not clear at the time of contract 
conclusion if, when, how many times and to which extent the policyholder will receive 
a financial compensation (Bekkin, 2007: 21). Moreover, claim payments are contingent 
on the occurrence of an unknown event. This dependency causes further debates on the 
validity of insurance, in the light of Islamic law. The sale of an object which is 
 93 
contingent on the occurrence of a precondition invalidates a contract in Islamic law 
(Ayub, 2007: 58). Therefore, some scholars conclude that insurance should not be 
permitted under Islam as its core nature inhibits gharar (Rahman, 1979: 136). The 
opponents argue that the nature of an insurance contract is to protect against unforeseen 
events that cause damage or loss. The intangible benefit of security or feeling of 
protection constitutes the core nature of insurance and not the claims payout 
(Muslehuddin, 1969: 110). Consequently, the subject matter of the contract is free from 
uncertainty. In addition, the legitimacy of insurance is derived from the other financial 
contracts in Islam which inhibit uncertainty, like Kafala (equivalent to a conventional 
guarantee) and Bai Salam (credit for financing agricultural commodities) (Bekkin, 
2007: 23; Khorshid, 2004: 62). The scholars approving of insurance conclude that 
businesses in Islam do not have to be free from uncertainty, as it is already accepted in 
some transactions. Furthermore, these scholars argue that uncertainty cannot be avoided 
altogether in businesses as it is a precondition for commercial activities (Bekkin, 2007: 
22). Contemporary scholars, therefore, differ between various degrees of uncertainty 
and conclude that only contracts containing excessive gharar (fahish) are void. 
Contracts, like insurance, which include minor gharar (yasir) are still valid (El-Gamal, 
2006: 58). In their opinion, gharar in insurance is minor because the nature of the 
contract is not based on lies. Additionally, risk occurrence and cash-flows can be well 
estimated for the collective levels and it is only a single insurance policy which might 
be affected by a high level of uncertainty. Due to the law of large numbers, it is possible 
to calculate claim probabilities, loss repartitions, and estimated claim payments as well 
as profits (Wilson, 2007: 73). Lastly, uncertainty in insurance does not put one of the 
contracting partners at disadvantage (Khorshid, 2004: 41, 61). This summary of a still 
continuing debate illustrates that gharar is not rejected in the same strict manner as riba 
and stated by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) though elements of gharar 
may be forgivable depending on the circumstances” (2006: 4).   
Maysir refers to a game of chance which is strictly banned in Islam. Maysir is derived 
from the Arabic term “yusr”, meaning ease and convenience. It describes the wealth 
which is received with ease or without an equivalent amount of effort or liability (Ayub, 
2007: 61–62; Rahman, 1979: 115–116; Siddiqi, 1985: 34). According to Quran, the 
game of chance is considered to be a tool of the devil which causes enmity and distracts 
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from Allah. Concerning insurance, some scholars argue that conventional insurance is a 
form of gambling as both insurance and gambling are based on chance. A small 
contribution in the form premium gives the policyholders an entitlement to receive a 
large amount of money (claim), depending on the occurrence of an uncertain event and 
at least one party does not receive a benefit from its wager. If the pre-defined event 
happens resulting in a loss, the claim payment amounts to a multiple of premiums paid 
and most likely the income earned on premium is lost for the insurer on the individual 
level. If there is no claim, the insured does not receive any financial benefit, although 
she paid the premium amount, which can be interpreted as a gambling stake (Rahman, 
1979: 121–123; Siddiqi, 1985: 28). The advocates of insurance disagree in this regard. 
In their opinion, insurance is not a form of gambling as the motivation is different. A 
gambler is motivated by self-interest. She would like to make a large amount of money 
with little or no effort. For quick and hefty profits, she voluntarily seeks out a situation 
of uncertainty. On the other hand, an insured opts for an insurance cover to protect her 
financial situation. She chooses an instrument which mitigates her risks and guarantees 
a compensation for unexpected losses. A policyholder has an insurable interest. In 
addition, claim payments usually do not lead to an increase of assets but only protect 
one’s achieved status (Bekkin, 2007: 27–28; Siddiqi, 1985: 28–29). Furthermore, the 
money lost in gambling is an absolute loss while a premium payment cannot be 
considered as a payment without a (promised) benefit in return. Even in cases where 
there are no claim payments, the insured is not exposed to certain risks during an 
insurance term (Bekkin, 2007: 27; Siddiqi, 1985: 31). In conclusion, the prohibition of 
gambling has the weakest normative implication for insurance because it is difficult to 
establish an analogy between gambling and insurance. However, the prohibition of 
gambling in Islam might influence a person’s attitude towards risk. This argument is 
further discussed in the following section.  
Because of the above-discussed three principles of Islam and their proximity to 
conventional insurance, three positions have evolved concerning the acceptance of 
insurance. The first group rejects all kinds of insurance as it involves riba, gharar, and 
maysir. As all three elements are prohibited by Sharia, they void each contract 
(Khorshid, 2004: 50–51). The second group rejects commercial insurance as those 
insurers benefit from the uncertain situation of the insured and elements of riba, gharar 
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and maysir cannot be eliminated. Those scholars approve of insurance that abstains 
from riba and is based on mutuality. Consequently, they accept social insurance and 
Takaful practices (Hassan and Lewis, 2007: 419). The concept of Takaful is explained 
later in this section. The third group differentiates between insurance products and 
allows only indemnity insurance. In their point of view, life insurance is a gamble on 
the life of a person and therewith forbidden (Billah, 1998: 411). As this research 
concentrates on life insurance, only two views remain in the end: first, life insurance is 
prohibited per se. Second, social security and Takaful are acceptable because of their 
underlying principle of mutuality and abstinence from interest.  
Micro Takaful: Micro insurance in Islam   
Takaful is an insurance practice based on the principle of mutuality (Ta’awun) and gift 
or donation (Tabarru), while respecting the prohibition of riba. Takaful minimizes the 
Sharia concerns regarding riba, gharar and maysir (Wahab et al., 2007: 375). Under 
Takaful schemes, people voluntarily contribute or donate an amount of money into a 
general fund (Tabarru fund) to support those who might suffer a loss in future from a 
predefined peril. Risks are not transferred as in conventional proprietary insurance but 
mitigated cooperatively by risk pooling. Solidarity, self-help and mutual assistance 
(Ta’awun) are the primary goals, instead of profit maximization (Bakar, 2009: 31). 
Legally, the contract of buying and selling insurance is substituted by the unilateral 
gracious contract of donation (Bakar, 2009: 35). Consequently, the members give up 
their individual entitlements with the act of donation and the funds belong to all 
members (Wahab et al., 2007: 375). Indemnity is settled from the risk pool with no 
direct relationship to the prior donation (Bakar, 2009: 33). Thereby, the principle of 
Ta’awun eliminates the element of maysir in Takaful. Similarly, the constituents of 
gharar are resolved by the motivation of mutuality and the one-sided contract of 
donation. The unilateral character of Tabarru also removes the attributes of Riba al-nisa 
(usury in trade). In addition, riba al-nasiah (usury in debt) is avoided by adherence to 
Sharia conforming investments.  
In a pure cooperative model, which is clearly preferred by Islamic scholars, the Tabarru 
fund is managed by the members themselves. In practice, however, management is 
delegated to a third party, referred to as Takaful operator. Hence, Takaful companies 
consist of a two-tier structure. The insurance pool (Tabarru fund) is institutionalized as 
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a co-operative, whereas management of underwriting, investments and other activities is 
delegated to a Takaful operator which is a commercial entity owned by external 
shareholders (Archer et al., 2009: 11). The assets of the participants and shareholders 
are strictly separated as insurance contributions are still in the ownership of the insured. 
The Takaful operators make their profits from risk management, instead of risk taking 
(Wahab et al., 2007: 376). Either, they receive a share of returns (Mudarabah model), a 
fee for the management services (Wakala model), or both (Wakala Mudarabah) (Wahab 
et al., 2007: 377, 381).  
Takaful is either institutionalized in the form of a stand-alone insurer, as a subsidiary of 
another financial institution such as an Islamic bank or a conventional insurer, or as a 
window operated by a conventional insurer. In the latter case, Takaful business is 
delivered by conventional insurers using the same distribution channels as used for their 
conventional products. Nonetheless, the operations and accounting of Takaful are 
separated from the conventional products (Schoon, 2009: 53). Generally, Takaful 
companies engage in three types of insurance business: General Takaful, Family 
Takaful, or Retakaful. General Takaful is comparable to conventional non-life 
insurance, whereas Family Takaful resembles conventional life insurance. Retakaful is a 
Sharia compliant form of reinsurance (Obaidullah, 2005: 140–142). Takaful offered to 
the low-income population is termed as Micro Takaful which “is the Islamic counterpart 
of micro insurance, and exists in both Family and General forms.” Conceptually it “does 
not differ from Takaful” but “is a subset of Takaful” (IFSB and IAIS, 2015: 4). Product 
details on the Micro Family Takaful products offered in the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka are given in Section 1.6.3. 
2.6.2.3 Development of Hypotheses      
Contributing to the results of cross-country studies on the demand of life insurance and 
the outlined Islamic principles, it is assumed that the religion of Islam negatively 
impacts the consumption of micro life insurance. However, the focus of this study is not 
to test for an effect of Islam. Instead, it aims to understand why the religion of Islam 
could determine micro life insurance uptake. Therefore, this study tests for the 
relevance of three channels through which the religion of Islam might influence 
insurance uptake: (i) interest (riba), (ii) mutuality and (iii) risk aversion. These channels 
have been identified based on the results of an extensive literature review. In her 
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literature review, the author first considered the findings and assumptions from the 
cross-country life insurance demand studies. Secondly, she broadened her search 
strategy beyond the topic of insurance and investigated how a religion affects economic 
behavior in general (for example, Iannaccone, 1998). Thirdly, the author searched for 
academic studies on the relationships of these demand factors and religion, based on the 
literature review of (micro) life insurance demand factors presented in Chapter 2. In 
sum, she found two more arguments explaining the possible impact of a religion on life 
insurance demand: (iv) fatalism and (v) generalized trust. However, as elaborated in the 
following, they are not further considered.   
Prohibition of interest 
Based on the explications from the previous section, it is expected that the religious 
prohibition of riba has a negative impact on conventional life insurance consumption by 
Muslims:  
H7: The involvement of riba in conventional insurance negatively affects 
conventional micro life insurance uptake among Muslims. (“Interest 
hypothesis”)   
Principle of mutuality 
Following the argument that the principle of mutuality eliminates religious concerns 
about uncertainty (gharar) and gambling (maysir), it is assumed that Muslims are more 
likely to purchase life insurance if they understand or acknowledge its mutual character. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is tested:   
H8: Muslims are more likely to purchase micro life insurance (conventional or 
Takaful), if it is perceived as an institutional form of supporting each other in 
need. (“Mutuality hypothesis”)   
In the case of the ‘mutuality hypothesis’, it could also be argued that a mutual support in 
times of need is a function or benefit of a person’s social capital as well. To 
unambiguously attribute the perception of insurance to religion, the author looks for 
differences between the religious groups in the quantitative analysis. 
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Risk aversion  
In their cross-country studies on life insurance demand, Wasow (1986), Browne and 
Kim (1993), and Beck and Webb (2003) justify lower levels of life insurance 
consumption in pre-dominantly Islamic countries by differences in risk-taking attitudes 
or risk aversion. However, they did not test the validity of their justifications. The 
closest related literature explains how corporate financial decision-making relates to 
religious denomination and risk taking (Berry-Stölzle and Xu, 2015; Kumar et al., 
2011). The main argument is that a religious acceptance or rejection of gambling shapes 
a person’s risk appetite which determines economic choices. Kumar et al. (2011) find 
that the willingness to gamble is more pronounced among U.S. Catholics, compared to 
Protestants. These preferences are assumed to influence investment decisions. Indeed, 
Kumar et al. (2011) show that the investment portfolios of small to medium-sized 
companies in the Catholic concentrated regions are riskier compared to corporate 
investment portfolios in the Protestant areas. Based on the work of Kumar et al. (2011), 
Berry-Stölzle and Hu (2015) analyze the risk-taking behavior of life insurance 
companies and connect it with the share of Catholics or Protestants living in the county 
where each company is headquartered. Their research finds that Catholics have a more 
risk-tolerant culture. According to the authors, life insurers engage in riskier business 
activities in the counties with a higher share of Catholics (p. 4). Barsky et al. (1997) 
provide empirical evidence on differences in the level of risk aversion in relation with 
an individual’s religion. They found that Protestants in the U.S. are the most risk averse, 
followed by Catholics and Jews (p. 550). Noussair et al. (2013) confirm that Protestants 
in the Netherlands are more risk averse than Catholics, using a lottery design to measure 
risk aversion. As stated above, these differences in risk aversion or risk-taking attitude 
(Kumar et al., 2011) are usually explained by opposing views and behaviors towards 
gambling. Due to their moral norms, Protestants are more reluctant to engage in 
gambling activities and assumed to be more risk averse compared to Catholics (Shu et 
al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2011). If one transfers these results about the relationship 
between different Christian religions and risk aversion to the religious group of 
Muslims, it can be concluded that Muslims are expected to be more risk averse because 
of the prohibition of gambling in Islam. Thus, the author is interested in studying if the 
rejection of gambling in Islam influences risk aversion, as risk aversion is one of the 
main theoretical concepts of expected utility theory to explain for life insurance 
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demand. A rejection of insurance because of its allegedly gambling nature, as put 
forward by some Islamic scholars, is not studied in detail. Considering the results from 
previous micro insurance demand studies which imply a negative correlation between 
risk aversion and insurance demand (Cole et al., 2012; Giesbert et al., 2011; Giné and 
Yang, 2007), it is argued that risk aversion reduces micro life insurance uptake. It is 
assumed that this negative effect is especially prevalent among Muslims because the 
religious prohibition of gambling might imply higher level of risk aversion. In sum, it is 
hypothesized:  
H9: Risk aversion negatively affects life insurance demand for low-income Muslims 
(conventional or Takaful). (“Risk aversion hypothesis”)    
Fatalism 
Historically, Zelizer (1979) argued that religious people in the U.S. were rather reluctant 
to purchase insurance as it was viewed as distrust in the protection by God. This attitude 
may still be prevalent in Islamic societies. Beck and Webb (2003) argue similarly that 
insurance might be considered as “a hedge against the will of Allah” (p. 60). People 
might prefer accepting financial losses over insurance, if they perceive the occurrence 
of an unexpected event as a divine act (Park et al., 2002). These arguments imply that 
insurance consumption is not so much influenced by specific principles or beliefs of a 
religion, instead by the degree to which a person takes individual decisions to actively 
shape his life. Although the question if a person’s degree of religiosity effects life 
insurance consumption is both relevant and interesting, the author of this work decided 
to focus on the implications of an individual’s religious denomination for micro life 
insurance uptake in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. Previous empirical studies 
provide indications for such a relationship, but cannot explain for it. In addition, the 
author acknowledges the complexity of measuring for different degrees of religiosity 
across the four religions present in the area under study: Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Christianity. Further, an overall very high degree of religiosity in Sri Lanka does 
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not support a test for differences5. Hence, the argument of fatalism is not further 
pursued. 
Generalized trust  
Putnam (1993) claims that hierarchically organized religions such as Roman Catholic, 
Eastern Orthodox, or Islam have a negative effect on the social connectedness of 
communities and they discourage the formation of trust: “Vertical bonds of authority 
are more characteristic of the Italian church” and these vertical bonds tend to undermine 
“horizontal bonds of fellowship” (p. 107). Other authors empirically confirm his 
reasoning for the religion of Catholicism (La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; 
Bjornskov, 2006) and Islam (Zak and Knack, 2001; Bjornskov, 2006) based on the data 
from the World Values Surveys. However, overall empirical results on the effect of 
various religions on trust are ambiguous. Guiso et al. (2003) show that Catholicism 
fosters trust like Protestantism (p. 263), whereas Hinduism is negatively associated to 
generalized trust, using a sample of 66 countries. Using a survey and experimental 
method to measure trust in rural Bangladesh, Johansson-Stenman et al. find no 
significant differences between Muslims and Hindus in trust (2009: 469). In nutshell, 
the logic on how differences in trust between the various religious groups might 
influence life insurance consumption is long and evidence for an effect of religious 
denomination on generalized trust is inconclusive. Consequently, the author decided not 
                                                
 
5 Initially, the author planned to measure for an effect of religiosity on micro life insurance demand. She 
followed the work of Huber (2007) and the interdisciplinary “Religionsmonitor” project of the 
Bertelsmannstiftung. In the context of the “Religionsmonitor” project, a survey and interview tool was 
developed to measure for religiosity. Following previous academic work, Huber first defined religiosity 
in five dimensions: intellect, ideology, public practice, private practice, and experience. Secondly, a 
religiosity index, the Centrality of Religiosity Scale, is developed that differentiates between three 
degrees of religiosity: highly religious, religious, not religious. A representative survey was conducted 
in 21 countries with 21,000 participants of all main religions aiming at understanding the current role of 
religions and religiosity at the level of the society and the individual. In this research’s field study, even 
though it followed the “Religionsmonitor” approach, it turned out that it is very challenging to measure 
the concept of religiosity across various religions with comparable results. The variance within the 
answers as given by the participants was low, which is probably related to the overall high degree of 
religiosity in Sri Lanka. According to a Gallup Survey from 2010, in Sri Lanka religiosity is among the 
highest worldwide. Moreover, the author observed a correlation between the religions of Hinduism and 
Islam and the degree of religiosity, which suggests a measurement error. 
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to proceed with this line of argumentation. However, the concept of generalized trust 
and its effect on micro life insurance uptake is estimated in the field study, and used as a 
proxy to measure for social capital. This approach once more indicates that the concepts 
of social capital and religion are not accurately separable but related. In the process of 
data analysis and interpretation, these relations are discussed in more detail. 
2.6.3 Summary of Hypotheses  
In the conclusion of this chapter, all research hypotheses of this study are summarized 
in Figure 7. As described in the previous sections, when testing the hypotheses and 
interpreting the results, the author takes into account possible interdependencies 
between the various hypotheses. She is aware of first, a possible correlation between the 
forms of social capital: group membership and generalized trust with the functions of 
social capital: awareness creation, imitation, trust building and informal risk sharing. 
For example, organizations serve a specific purpose or function that require an 
institutional set-up. Second, the two concepts of social capital and religion overlap in 
some regards. Religious societies as a formal organization can contribute to the 
generation of social capital. Generalized trust, in this study defined as another form of 
social capital, is found to differentiate between religious groups and therefore could also 
explain for a religious effect. Mutuality, assigned to religion by the author, could also be 
attributed to social capital and its collective function of supporting each other in need. 
Consequently, the quantitative analysis explicitly tests for a relationship between 
religious denomination and mutuality.  
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Figure 7: Overview of hypotheses   
 
Source: Author’s own 
Note: *Expected effect on life insurance uptake 
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3 Qualitative Study  
3.1 Overview 
With its qualitative research approach, this section explores the factors which facilitate 
or hinder micro life insurance consumption in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. It 
specifically aims to enhance the understanding of the relevance of social capital and 
religion for micro life insurance consumption, by investigating the following research 
questions:  
1. What explains an effect of social capital on micro life insurance consumption?    
2. What mechanisms explain an influence of religion on micro life insurance 
consumption?   
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide qualitative answers to the above research 
questions. Moreover, it attempts to confirm the relevance of the developed hypotheses 
and assign them to an overall context. The structure and content of the focus group 
discussions (FGDs), as presented in Appendix 2, are guided by the theoretical concepts 
introduced in Chapter 2 and the hypotheses derived in Section 2.6. However, the open 
and semi-structured format of FGDs allows for exploration of demand drivers and 
barriers that go beyond the ideas developed from the literature review and captured in 
the hypotheses. In Chapter 4, these demand factors will serve as control variables for 
the quantitative data analysis.     
Guided group discussions are facilitated and analyzed by the method of content 
analysis, to generate a rich understanding of the participants’ attitudes, opinions and 
experiences related to micro life insurance consumption. The qualitative methods of 
content analysis and FGDs are used widely to look “at individuals’ attitudes, opinions, 
knowledge or beliefs” in different research areas and to ground the research on the 
participants’ own understanding of the research topic (Wilkinson, 1998: 185; Morgan, 
1997: 11). FGDs provide detailed insights into the needs and interests of the consumers 
and allow researchers to understand their consumption decisions in depth (Morgan, 
1997: 12, 31; Morgan, 1996: 139). Furthermore, the selected qualitative data collection 
method helps in exploring a nascent research area, where the theory can possibly offer 
guidance but may not be able to explain the actual consumer behavior. As pointed out in 
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the literature review in Chapter 2, this is the case for micro life insurance demand 
research. However, a qualitative research approach cannot generate data that is 
representative of a greater population (Wilkinson, 1998: 187). The generation of 
generalizable results is the objective of the quantitative study in Chapter 4. Further, the 
author is aware of a possible moderator or respondent bias (Wilkinson, 1998: 186: 
Morgan, 1996: 139).   
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 describes the sample selection and Section 
3.3 discusses the collection of data by FGDs. The collected data is analyzed by the 
method of content analysis which is explained in Section 3.4. Key results are presented 
in Section 3.5. Lastly, Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Sample  
In August and September 2013, focus group discussions were conducted in the districts 
of Batticaloa and Trincomalee in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. The participants of 
FGDs were selected using a purposive sampling frame. Purposive sampling is a 
technique primarily used in qualitative studies. In this technique cases, for instance 
persons, events, or settings, are selected based on the purpose and specific interests of 
the research questions (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009: 170). To reflect the research 
questions under study, the sampling strategy of this study considers two characteristics 
of the participants to specify the composition of the focus groups. To identify the factors 
facilitating or hindering micro life insurance consumption, the status of micro life 
insurance policy ownership is a key household characteristic. To study the relevance of 
religion or the differences between various religious groups’ insurance consumption, the 
second characteristic of interest is religious denomination. As detailed in Section 1.6.2, 
the key religions followed by the people living in the region under study include Islam, 
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity.  
Generally, the literature on the design of focus group research recommends conducting 
separate group discussions for each characteristic under study. The objective is to be 
able “to compare and contrast how certain types of people talk about an issue” (Krueger 
and Casey, 2009: 21). Besides, it is advised to run each combination of characteristics 
for three to four groups or to continue data collection until saturation is reached. 
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Saturation occurs if no new information can be gathered in the FGDs (Krueger and 
Casey, 2009: 21; Morgan, 1996: 144). For this study, the implication of these 
recommendations is to ideally conduct up to 32 group discussions. Eight different types 
of FGDs are to be considered, as four religions and two insurance policyholder statuses 
apply, with each combination to be run a maximum of four times. Considering the 
available resources of the researcher, the embedding of the focus group approach in a 
mixed method design and the narrow research questions, the author decided to limit the 
number of focus groups for each type to two FGDs. Overall, it still amounts to four 
groups of policyholders and non-policyholders each. In addition, it already occurred 
during the data collection that arguments discussed in the focus group were frequently 
repeated and no new information emerged.  
Recruitment of participants was done by a local consultant in collaboration with a non-
governmental organization (NGO) that offers microfinance services in the districts of 
Batticaloa and Trincomalee. The local staff of the NGO aimed to recruit the following: 
two groups of Hindu policyholders, two groups of Hindu non-policyholders, two groups 
of Muslim policyholders, two groups of Muslim non-policyholders, two groups of 
Christian policyholders, and two groups of Christian non-policyholders. Buddhist 
households are excluded from the sample because their share of the population in the 
area under study is less than 1 percent (Department of Census and Statistics, 2013). Due 
to its microfinance operations and existing customer base, the local staff could precisely 
nominate policyholders and non-policyholders belonging to the religion of Islam. 
However, sampling errors occurred for the Hindu policyholder and non-policyholder 
groups. Further, only one mixed group of Christian policyholders and non-policyholders 
could be recruited because of the low number of Christians living in the area, 4 percent 
of the total population (Department of Census and Statistics, 2013). In the end, the 
actual data was collected from: two groups of policyholders from the Islamic belief 
(FGD 1 and 7); two groups of Muslim non-policyholders with two participants having 
mandatory motor vehicle insurance (FGD 2 and 6); one group of Hindu policyholders 
(FGD 8); two groups of Hindu non-policyholders with two participants having 
mandatory cattle insurance (FGD 5 and 9); one mixed group of Hindu policyholders and 
non-policyholders (FGD 4); and another mixed group from the Christian belief (FGD 
3).  
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Due to the above-mentioned sampling errors, the data analysis strategy needed to be 
adapted. Therefore, the characteristics and attitudes attributable to policyholders and 
non-policyholders across all focus groups are analyzed, instead of comparing the 
motivation and attitudes of policyholders and non-policyholders.  
Each focus group consisted of seven to eight participants, following the general 
recommendation of six to ten participants in one focus group. This group size allows for 
a sufficient level of participant involvement (Liamputtong, 2011: 42; Morgan, 1996: 
146). The composition of the groups was homogeneous as all the participants were 
female who are typically engaged in domestic chores, family and childrearing activities, 
small-scale business or agriculture and were available during day-time. As previous 
micro life insurance demand studies did not find a significant effect of gender on micro 
life insurance uptake, the author assumed that a concentration on female participants 
does not lead to gender biased results (Bendig and Arun, 2016; Arun et al. 2012; Bendig 
and Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011).  Table 14 provides an overview of key 
characteristics of the participants.  
Participation in the FGDs was voluntary. However, the participants received a 
compensation of LKR 300 (around EUR 1.67) at the end of the FGD, for their time and 
travel costs to the location. The participants were not aware of the compensation plan 
beforehand. 
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Table 14: Characteristics of focus group participants 
Focus 
group 
number (#) 
No. of        
participants 
Insurance 
status        
(majority) 
Religion Years of 
education 
(mean) 
Number of   
children (mean) 
1 8 Policyholder Muslim 10 2 
2 8 Non-
Policyholder 
Muslim 11 4 
3 8 Policyholder  
Non-
Policyholder 
Christian 10 1 
4 8 Policyholder Hindu 8 3 
5 8 Non-
Policyholder 
Hindu 10 2 
6 7 Non-
Policyholder 
Muslim 8 2 
7 8 Policyholder Muslim 6 2 
8 8 Policyholder Hindu 12 3 
9 8 Non-
Policyholder 
Hindu 9 2 
Total 71   8 2 
Source: Author’s own  
3.3 Data Collection: Focus Group Discussions   
One local moderator held the FGDs in Tamil (a local language), mostly at one of the 
participants’ houses. In two cases, the FGDs were conducted in the auditorium of a 
local primary school. Appendix 6 provides some impressions from the focus group 
discussions. The discussions were semi-structured, meaning a structured set of 
questions was prepared to guide the interviews during the discussions. However, the 
moderator allowed the participants to steer the content of the discussion, wherever 
deemed appropriate and beneficial given the research purpose (Malshe and Sohi, 2009: 
404).  
The discussion guidelines reflect the hypotheses to be tested and include three sections 
(please refer to Appendix 2: Focus Group Discussion Guidelines for details). For each 
section, the semi-structured interview guidelines state the core question and its purpose, 
along with additional probing questions in case the discussion does not take off. The 
questions are sequenced in a manner that the conversation “naturally flows from one 
question to another” (Krueger and Casey, 2009: 38). After an introductory round, the 
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discussions begin with the questions about the participants’ experiences with 
unexpected events or risks. The purpose is to encourage all participants to contribute to 
the discussion. The second cluster of questions asks the participants to share their 
understanding of and opinions on insurance with the group. After this set of transitory 
questions, the key questions on factors hindering or supporting the demand for 
conventional insurance or Takaful are raised. In the discussions, the researcher 
substituted the term Takaful with Islamic insurance as the participants are more familiar 
with this terminology. The discussions ended with a final question to reassure that all 
the relevant content on the topic of insurance consumption have been discussed.  
The key questions always differentiated between the two insurance concepts: 
conventional insurance and Islamic insurance or Takaful. This was necessary as both the 
risk transfer instruments are available in the area under study and it was expected that 
the demand drivers and barriers for the two insurance forms differ, depending on the 
religious background of a person. Therefore, it was important to make it clear to the 
participants which the concept was under discussion for each question. This distinction 
and separation of the concepts under discussion was also supported by visual aids as 
displayed in Appendix 3: Exemplary visual aid. During the FGDs, the moderator 
showed four drawings to the participants: one female conventional insurance 
policyholder, one female member of Islamic insurance (Takaful), one female non-
policyholder of conventional, and one female non-member of Islamic insurance 
(Takaful). The drawings did not only serve the purpose of enhancing understanding, but 
also enriched the discussion and kept the participants attentive and engaged. Further, a 
slightly different questionnaire was used for policyholders and non-policyholders as the 
first group could elaborate their motivations to purchase insurance, whereas the second 
group could explain why they do not have insurance coverage. In sum, the outline of the 
questionnaire guidelines closely follows the approach described by Krueger and Casey 
(2009: 38-41).  
The questions for the discussions were formulated in a simple, local language, using 
minimal technical terms. They are easy to understand, short and usually open-ended 
(Krueger and Casey, 2009: 38). Insights from practitioners with prior experience of 
conducting micro insurance-centered FGDs among low-income communities were 
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considered while defining the core and probing questions (Sebstad et al., 2006; Hina et 
al., 2009; Asian Development Bank, 2006).  
A pilot of the semi-structured questionnaire guide was tested during an initial field trip 
to Sri Lanka in December 2012. A key outcome of this pilot was reformulation of some 
of the questions to avoid closed-ended questions and to incorporate terminologies that 
are more familiar to the local population. Moreover, the order of the questions was 
changed to ensure that the participants of the FGDs are more engaged since the 
beginning. 
The discussions lasted on average 30 minutes. This rather shorter time span allowed the 
participants to join the FGDs, despite their busy daily routines. Besides, the shorter 
duration helped the moderator in keeping them attentive and interested in the rather 
narrow topic of risk management and insurance. Consequently, the contribution of the 
participants to the discussions was substantial. The discussions were recorded using 
audio recorders and a research assistant provided written protocols, including notes on 
the reactions and interactions of the participants. Additionally, the author attended five 
FGDs herself6 to observe the behavior, interaction and emotions of the participants. 
However, she did not intervene in the discussions, unless requested by the moderator. 
The information gathered during the FGDs was completely transcribed in Tamil. 
Afterwards, the transcripts were translated into English under the supervision of the 
FGDs’ moderator. In total, the FGDs data accumulated to 74 pages. The author of this 
thesis carefully read the transcripts to understand the data. Whenever the transcribed 
data was not clear, the researcher confirmed with the translator and moderator to limit 
possible mistakes in translation.   
                                                
 
6 The author was not able to attend all the FGDs as her presence caught the attention of the local military 
unit and led to delays in conducting the research and possibly unpleasant implications for the 
participants. Therefore, she refrained from joining further FDGs.  
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3.4 Content Analysis  
3.4.1 Methodology of Content Analysis 
The data from the FGDs is analyzed using the method of content analysis. The content 
analysis enables structuring of the data as well as facilitates analysis and interpretation 
of reoccurring patterns (Harwood and Garry, 2003: 479). The content analysis is guided 
by the hypotheses and the analytical framework summarized in Section 2.5. A coding 
scheme is developed initially because it filters the information relevant for the research 
questions. The author defined the classification criteria, so-called a-priori categories 
(Mayring, 2010: 65), that are applied in a deductive manner to the text material. This 
approach towards content analysis is also termed as “Typisierende Strukturierung” 
(Mayring, 2010: 92-94; 98-101). Although the analysis is guided by a conceptual 
framework, other high frequency categories and relevant outliers referring to micro life 
insurance demand behavior are considered in the second step of the content analysis. 
This approach reflects the exploratory nature of the qualitative research paradigm.  
In the first step, the researcher started by developing a provisional coding frame. 
Displayed in Table 15 below, this coding frame consists of the a-priori categories 
reflecting the theory-induced demand factors. 
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Table 15: Content analysis – A-priori coding scheme   
Category Sub-category Definition 
Social capital Membership Coded if statement refers to a 
household’s membership in a formal 
social network7 
 Generalized trust Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s general attitude of trusting 
others  
 Creation of awareness / 
understanding 
Coded if statement refers to an 
information exchange with others, a 
discussion about the topic of 
insurance or advice  
 Imitation  Coded if statement refers to an 
imitative behavior in insurance 
consumption, i.e. insurance is 
bought because peer did  
 Trust building  Coded if statement indicates that 
trust in insurance increases because 
of a peer effect, i.e. claims 
experience of peers  
 Informal risk sharing  Coded if respondent receives 
support from family network in case 
of an unexpected financial loss 
because of an uncertain event 
Religion Interest 
 
Coded if statement refers to the 
involvement of interest in insurance  
 Mutuality Coded if statement refers to the 
solidarity character of insurance 
 Risk aversion  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s willingness to take risk  
Economic factors 
Income    Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s (labor) income 
Wealth  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s wealth, her assets or land 
ownership 
Price of insurance    Coded if statement refers to 
insurance premium or the price of 
                                                
 
7 The definition of formal social networks follows the definition used in the quantitative study and 
includes membership in at least one of the following: village development society, women rural 
development society, religious society, savings group/association, agricultural association/fishery 
society, sports club, and political party. 
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insurance 
Remittances  Coded if statement refers to 
remittances received or paid 
Demographic factors  
Bequest motive  Children Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s number of children 
 Age Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s age 
 Family status Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s family status  
 Gender Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s gender 
Social and cultural factors 
Education  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s education 
Financial literacy  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s financial literacy or 
knowledge about insurance  
Structural factors 
Access to credit  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s access and usage of credits    
Access to savings  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s access and usage of 
savings    
Social assistance  Coded if statement refers to social 
assistance received  
Contract non-
performance 
Refusal of claims 
payments 
Coded if statement refers to an 
insurer who refused to settle a claim 
 Delay in claims payment 
 
Coded if statement refers to an 
insurer who delayed claims 
settlement  
 Solvency of the insurer Coded if statement refers to an 
insurer who might go bankrupt 
Risk aversion and exposure 
Risk exposure  Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s current or previous risk 
exposure     
Other risk management 
strategies 
Reduced consumption  Coded if statement refers to a 
person who manages her 
unexpected losses by reducing her 
consumption    
 Borrowing   Coded if statement refers to a 
person who manages her 
unexpected losses by borrowing    
 Pawning 
 
Coded if statement refers to a 
person who manages her 
unexpected losses by pawning    
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 Savings 
 
Coded if statement refers to a 
person who manages her 
unexpected losses by drawing from 
savings    
 Sale of assets Coded if statement refers to a 
person who manages her 
unexpected losses by selling her 
assets    
Source: Author’s own 
Furthermore, two attributes are added to every coded text passage for data analysis: (i) 
religious denomination: Hindu, Muslim, or Christian and (ii) the kind of insurance in 
focus: conventional insurance or Islamic insurance (Takaful), as given in Table 16. In 
the pilot coding of four FGDs transcripts (one policyholder and one non-policyholder 
group for the religion of Hinduism as well as for Islam), this provisional theory-led 
coding frame of the various categories and attributes was tested. To support a 
systematic coding process, the QSR International’s NVivo software was used.  
Table 16: Content analysis – Attributes of provisional coding scheme   
Attributes Characteristic Definition 
Religious denomination  Muslim Coded if respondent is Muslim or 
statement refers to a Muslim 
 Hindu Coded if respondent is Hindu or 
statement refers to a Hindu 
 Christian Coded if respondent is Christian or 
statement refers to a Christian 
Type of insurance Conventional Coded if statement refers to 
conventional micro life insurance 
 Takaful (Islamic 
insurance) 
Coded if statement refers to Family 
Micro Takaful  
Source: Author’s own 
After the pilot coding, the coding frame was reassessed (Mayring, 2010: 50). So-called 
in-vivo codes or a-postiori categories were added, if the participants discussed demand 
factors beyond the a-priori defined categories (Barbour, 2007: 115-119). These 
categories, summarized in Table 17, were checked for their degree of differentiation in 
comparison with the a-priori categories and were clearly defined before addition to the 
coding frame.  
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The sub-category of ‘reputation’ was added to the category of social capital as Muslim 
participants expressed their concern that the purchase of conventional insurance could 
threaten their reputation within their community.  
Four additional subcategories are developed for the category of religion: ‘importance of 
Islamic insurance provider and distributor’, ‘religiosity’, ‘living according to religious 
rules’, and ‘not specified’. The first sub-category includes text references to the 
importance of the insurance being offered by a service provider or distribution channel 
which runs its business in accordance with the Islamic principles. The sub-category 
‘religiosity’ includes general statements about a person’s religiousness which cannot be 
attributed to one of the five dimensions of religiosity: intellect, ideology, public 
practice, private practice, and experience (Huber, 2007: 21), while the category ‘living 
according to religious rules’ refers to the specific dimension of religiosity of a person’s 
public or private practice. Several respondents related their insurance consumption 
decision to their personal behavior of living their lives in accordance with the rules of 
their religion. In some cases, text material related to religion was not specific enough to 
be clearly assigned to a sub-category. For example, some respondents stated that there is 
(not) a relationship between micro life insurance uptake and religion but did not provide 
any further information. Therefore, the sub-category ‘not specified’ was introduced.  
The participants frequently referred to the terms and conditions of the offered policies 
as a decision criterion for purchasing insurance. Hence, the category ‘terms and 
conditions’ was added to the coding frame. As the number of text references is 
considerably large, it was further classified into two sub-categories: (i) (dis)satisfaction 
with the ‘benefits’ of the insurance product and (ii) the ‘mandatory’ nature of an 
insurance product. The category ‘mandatory’ is applied, if the person either refers to 
vehicle and livestock insurance that is mandatory by law or credit life products where 
the customer is obliged to get insurance.  
Several participants described their experiences with dishonest agents who defrauded 
them by pocketing their premium money and never sending it to the insurance company 
for issuance of an insurance policy in their names. To reflect this finding, an additional 
sub-category ‘fraud by agent’ was created within the main category of ‘contract non-
performance’. As in the case of religion, further references were made by the 
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participants to the context of contract non-performance. However, the information was 
not detailed enough to assign the text material to a separate sub-category. Therefore, it 
led to the introduction of the sub-category ‘not specified’.  
During the first coding cycle, it became obvious that errors in sampling occurred as 
outlined in the previous section. Usually, the groups consisted of both policyholders and 
non-policyholders, contrary to the initial decision to run separate focus groups. Hence, 
the author decided to change the data analysis strategy and introduced a third attribute 
to the coding frame. The purpose of this attribute is to allow for a distinction between 
the motivations and characteristics assigned to policyholders and non-policyholders. If a 
focus group participant stated a reason to support insurance consumption, the text was 
coded as a ‘driver’. Whereas, all the statements about a characteristic or motivation that 
hinders uptake of micro insurance were coded as a ‘barrier’. If the statement was neither 
positive nor negative towards insurance consumption, the author applied the code ‘not 
specified’. In a nut shell, the following categories and attributes were added:  
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Table 17: Content analysis – Additions to the a-priori coding frame  
Category Sub-category Definition 
Social capital Reputation Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s insurance consumption and 
its effect on her reputation within her 
social network  
Religion Importance of Islamic 
insurance provider and 
distributor     
Coded if statement emphasizes the 
importance of an insurance supply or 
distribution by an institution that 
operates based on Islamic principles   
 Living according to religious 
rules 
Coded if respondent states that she 
follows religious rules in her life  
 Religiosity  
 
Coded if statement refers to a 
person’s religiosity in general without 
a specific reference to the 
dimensions of intellect, ideology, 
public practice, private practice or 
experiences (Huber, 2007: 21) 
 Not specified Coded if statement is related to a 
person’s religion but not specific 
enough for further classification 
Terms and 
conditions  
Benefits 
 
Coded if statement refers to the 
benefits of an insurance product  
 Mandatory  
 
Coded if statement refers to a credit 
life insurance product or a cover 
mandatory by law, such as vehicle or 
livestock 
Contract non-
performance 
Fraud by agent 
 
Coded if statement refers to fraud by 
an insurance agent  
 Not specified 
 
Coded if statement is related to 
contract non-performance but not 
specific enough for further 
classification  
   
Attributes Characteristic Definition 
Insurance uptake Driver  
 
Coded if statement is related to a 
factor supporting micro life insurance 
consumption  
 Barrier 
 
Coded if statement is related to a 
factor preventing or reducing micro 
life insurance consumption  
 Not specified Coded if statement is related to micro 
life insurance consumption but its 
effect is unclear     
Source: Author’s own 
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Based on the revised coding framework, a coding cycle followed which included all the 
transcribed text materials. After the first round of coding all the focus group transcripts, 
the author of this study reviewed all the categories and the text materials assigned to 
them. If no text material could be assigned to a theory-led category, the category was 
dropped. This was the case for five sub-categories related to the research questions on 
social capital and religion including: (i) ‘membership’, (ii) ‘generalized trust’, (iii) ‘trust 
building’, (iv) ‘risk aversion’, and (v) ‘mutuality' and another six categories suggested 
by the analytical framework: (i) ‘remittances’, (ii) ‘age’, (iii) ‘gender’, (iv) ‘access to 
credit’, (v) ‘savings’, and (vi) ‘social assistance’. The categories with fewer references 
were assessed for mergers. Here, the statements assigned to the sub-categories ‘refusal 
of claims payments’ and ‘delay in claims payments’ were merged and the sub-category 
renamed as ‘payment of claims’. Further, sub-categories for ‘other risk management 
strategies’ are combined. In other cases, the definitions of codes were fine-tuned and the 
categories were adapted, wherever necessary. For the case of the category ‘number of 
children’, most of the coded text passages referred to the motivation of purchasing 
insurance for the protection of children and not to the number of children. Hence, the 
category was renamed as ‘protection for children’. The category ‘price of insurance’ 
was labeled ‘mode of premium payment’ and moved to the category ‘terms and 
conditions’. To ensure an unambiguous data analysis and due to the similar nature of the 
two categories, ‘wealth’ and ‘income’ were merged as one category.  
Moreover, the categories and their assigned text passages were reviewed for 
consistency. If coding errors were found, the material was recoded. All the uncoded 
materials were cross-checked and appropriate categories and attributes were assigned to 
the text passages, wherever possible.  
A second coding cycle was exercised based on the revised coding framework. Lastly, 
the accuracy of the coded text material was double-checked during the analysis. If 
results appeared inconsistent or not plausible, the coded materials were reviewed. If a 
coding error had occurred, the transcript excerpt was recoded.  
Table 18 shows the frequency counts of the final coding scheme. It also presents the 
different categories, sub-categories and if applicable, the number of statements made 
during the various FGDs and the number of sources. In some cases, subtotals presented 
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for a category are not equal to the sum across the sub-categories. This is caused by the 
quotes assigned to two subcategories, but only accounted once for the category to avoid 
double-counting. The next section evaluates the quality of the content analysis. 
Table 18: Content analysis – Final coding scheme and frequency of statements 
 No. of references No. of 
sources Categories Sum Driver Barrier Not specified 
Social capital 25 9 5 11 6 
Awareness/ understanding 18 7 0 11 5 
Informal risk sharing 4 1 3 0 3 
Reputation 2 0 2 0 1 
Imitation 1 1 0 0 1 
Religion 77 27 33 17 8 
Religiosity 6 4 2 0 4 
Living according to religious rules 13 2 11 0 4 
Interest 31 9 17 5 5 
Importance of Islamic insurance 
provider or distributor  
15 9 2 4 4 
Not specified 13 3 2 8 6 
Income & wealth 56 15 40 1 9 
Bequest motive  17 14 3 0 6 
Children 14 13 1 0 6 
Family status 3 1 2 0 3 
Education 7 0 2 5 3 
Financial literacy 7 4 3 0 4 
Other risk management strategies 53 0 3 50 9 
Contract non-performance 16 0 16 0 5 
Payment of claims 8 0 8 0 5 
Fraud by agent 5 0 5 0 4 
Not specified 3 0 3 0 5 
Risk exposure 7 4 3 0 5 
Terms and conditions 38 30 6 2 7 
Benefits   31 24 5 2 7 
Mandatory 6 5 1 0 4 
Mode of premium payment 3 1 2 0 3 
Source: Author’s own  
Note: In some cases, subtotals presented for a category are not equal to the sum across the 
subcategories. This is caused by the quotes assigned to two subcategories, but only accounted 
once for the category to avoid double-counting.     
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3.4.2 Quality of Content Analysis: Validity, Reliability and Objectivity   
The author took several measures to maintain methodological rigor and data 
trustworthiness. In the following section, the methodological approach is evaluated 
against three quality criteria of qualitative research as introduced in Section 1.5.2: (i) 
internal validity or more specifically construct validity, (ii) reliability, and (iii) 
objectivity. The criterion of reliability is further defined in terms of: a. consistency or 
inter-coder stability, b. stability or intra-coder reliability, and c. accuracy following the 
methodological literature on content analysis (Mayring, 2010; Krippendorff, 2003).  
In this research, construct validity is supported by the theoretical foundations of the 
concepts under study. The theoretical constructs are derived from previous academic 
studies on social capital and religion or on the demand for life insurance and micro 
insurance. These categories are precisely defined and operationalized following 
academic standards and complemented by newly evolving ones.  
The criterion of consistency refers to the reproducibility of the analysis and its results. 
Consistency depends on the explicitness and precision of the procedure description and 
can be measured by inter-coder reliability. Inter-coder reliability is the consistency of 
coding results across different researchers (Mayring, 2010: 120). In the setting of this 
dissertation, inter-coder reliability was difficult to establish because no second 
researcher was available to code the material. However, the process of data preparation 
and analysis is systematic and described in a detailed and transparent manner, allowing 
other researchers to replicate the results.  
Stability or intra-coder reliability is given when replication of the analysis at a later 
point in time results in the same coding. Even though the author conducted the full 
coding process once only, intra-coder reliability of the results is established by 
constantly checking the consistency of the (sub-) categories applied, revising (sub-) 
categories, and eliminating coding errors.  
Accuracy measures the degree to which the analysis corresponds to a given standard. It 
requires stability and consistency and it is the strongest measure of reliability. However, 
it is also the most difficult aspect to check (Mayring, 2010: 121; Krippendorff, 2003). 
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This criterion is ensured by precise category definitions, multiple reviews of the coded 
materials, and merging of ambiguous categories.  
To fulfill the quality criteria of objectivity, subjective influences on the data collection 
and analytical process are minimized as much as possible. FGDs are guided by a set of 
theory-based semi-structured interview guidelines which minimizes the moderator’s 
influence. The data is evaluated using a theory-induced coding frame, precisely defined 
categories and a constant plausibility check for the coded materials. For an objective 
analysis of the collected material, the author measured frequencies first before selecting 
individual (sub-) categories and references.    
In summary, the data analysis is based on a theory-led coding frame and the author 
carefully checked for possible biases. The data preparation process is accurate and 
transparent. Even though the qualitative study may perform weak against the criterion 
of inter-coder stability, the author is confident about construct validity, reliability, and 
objectivity of the content analysis.  
3.5 Results 
This section presents the main results of the qualitative study. The objective of the 
section is to contribute to the main research questions of this thesis, by exploring the 
relevance of social capital and religion for micro life insurance demand in the Eastern 
Province of Sri Lanka. While summarizing the main findings, this section focuses on 
the results that are insightful, frequently mentioned by the participants, and have not 
been discussed extensively in the previous literature.   
The data displayed in Table 18 show that the various demand drivers and barriers are 
discussed with different degrees of intensity by the focus group members. In all focus 
groups, the participants discussed about the relevance of income or wealth and other 
risk management strategies. Most frequently, the participants discussed the 
compatibility of insurance with Islam, current risk management practices, the role of 
income and wealth, and product terms and conditions. The role of social capital and 
contract non-performance was raised in at least half of the discussions. 
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The frequent statements about elements of religion and other risk management 
strategies might have been caused by the semi-structured design of the FGDs, as both 
topics were explicitly put forward to the participants by the moderator. Hence, using a 
simple frequency count of the various statements assigned to the different topics does 
not provide a realistic picture of the relative importance of the different demand factors. 
Nevertheless, the frequency count approach reduces the risk of ‘anecdotalism’ or 
‘cherry-picking’ of the statements which are most interesting to the researcher (Barbour, 
2014: 505). To further reduce the risk of such biases in the analysis, the statements are 
put into their context. That is, it is documented who is saying what (Barbour, 2014: 500) 
and contrasting opinions are presented, wherever possible. Hence, the relative 
importance of the demand drivers and barriers can be established from the content of 
the reported voices of the participants. This helps in providing deeper insights into the 
participant’s views and opinions.  
This section proceeds as following: Section 3.5.1 presents the key findings related to the 
role of social capital on micro insurance demand, whereas Section 3.5.2 focuses on the 
role of religion in general and the specific role of Islam. As the focus group study 
attempts to provide context to the hypotheses, Section 3.5.3 discusses other demand 
factors that are relevant for the uptake of micro insurance in the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka. The purpose is to provide valuable insights into the topics raised beyond the 
theoretically indicated demand factors, place the findings on social capital and religion 
into context, and to identify control variables for the quantitative analysis. Section 3.6 
concludes on the main demand drivers and barriers for micro insurance in the Eastern 
Province of Sri Lanka. If not stated differently, the term insurance always refers to both 
conventional life insurance and family Takaful in this chapter for linguistic 
simplification.   
3.5.1 Social Capital and Micro Life Insurance Demand  
The theoretical chapter of this thesis identified six dimensions of social capital that 
could influence decisions concerning life insure demand: (i) membership in formal 
social networks, (ii) generalized trust, (iii) awareness and understanding, (iv) imitation, 
(v) trust-building, and (vi) informal risk sharing, whereby the first two measure for the 
forms of social capital and the following estimate its possible functions. This also 
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means that the two sets of dimensions, form and function, interrelate as the function 
builds upon the form. This section analyzes the relevance of these six dimensions 
serving as possible explanations for an effect of social capital on micro life insurance 
uptake. 
Table 19 presents the quantitative details on the expressed views in terms of frequency. 
The author does not find evidence for an effect of the two forms of social capital: 
membership in an association, society or another organization. The same applies for the 
form of generalized trust and for the function of a trust-building effect related to peers’ 
experience with insurance. However, in four group debates, the participants mentioned 
specific trust in insurance as a reason for having insurance coverage, whereas the lack 
of trust was indicated as a reason for being uninsured in two cases. This relevance of a 
specific trust in insurance for uptake is closely related to the risk of contract non-
performance to be discussed later. 
Table 19: Social capital – Frequency of statements 
 
No. of 
references 
Driver Barrier Not specified No. of 
sources 
(FDGs) 
Social capital (total)  25 9 5 11 6 
Membership 0 0 0 0 0 
Generalized trust  0 0 0 0 0 
Awareness/ understanding by 18 7 0 11 5 
Family member 9 5 0 4 4 
Religious leader 5 1 0 4 3 
Village leader 1 1 0 0 1 
Not specified 3 0 0 3 2 
Imitation 1 1 0 0 1 
Trust building 0 0 0 0 0 
Informal risk sharing 3 1 2 0 2 
Reputation  2 0 2 0 1 
Source: Author’s own  
The participants mainly responded to the proposed awareness increasing function of 
social capital. In five group discussions, the participants revealed that they exchanged 
views with someone else or asked someone for advice before purchasing insurance. In 
almost all cases, a male family member was consulted for advice. It seems that the 
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decision to insure is a decision of both wife and husband as the female participants 
frequently consulted with their husbands. Only in one case, a religious or village leader 
was consulted: 
“Because whatever they [insurance agent] will tell, we will not just believe them at 
once. We will discuss with our family or relatives regarding this.” (Bardunisa, 
Hindu)  
“To be honest, it happened like this. They came and introduced the product to us. 
Then, based on their introduction we tried to analyze possible benefits ourselves 
and then after discussing with our family members, we decided to purchase it.” 
(Driver, Krishanthini, Hindu)  
Moderator: “Now, there are some situations where we ask for advice or 
suggestions from someone else before we make a decision. It may be our siblings or 
anyone else. Did you ask from anyone before you purchased the insurance […]? 
“Yes, from [my] husband.” (Driver, Fathima, Muslim) 
“From my husband. Not from the other neighbors.” (Driver, Jumaira, Muslim) 
“Husband” (Driver, Najeema, Muslim) 
“We purchased insurance for our child from Amana [Provider of Family Micro 
Takaful in the region]. So, we asked for suggestions from my uncle who is one of 
the religious leaders.” (Driver, Zukriya, Muslim) 
“Asked Grama Sevaka [Village Administration Officer]. He said that we can 
purchase.” (Driver, Jumaira, Muslim) 
Evidence for an imitation effect is weak. In one focus group, a participant mentioned 
that insurance uptake might be influenced by the behavior of others:  
“She may be thinking of purchasing insurance as the others also have purchased 
[insurance].” (Driver, Esaniya, Muslim) 
Besides this isolated statement, no other participant said that her consumption decision 
was driven by an imitation effect.  
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Evaluating the few statements regarding the relationship between informal risk sharing 
and insurance consumption, it seems that the participants expect family members to take 
care of each other in times of need. For instance, when the moderator showed a card 
displaying a woman without insurance and asked the participants to describe her, one of 
the responses was: 
“Her siblings may take care of her.” (Barrier, Shaheera, Muslim) 
No references are made to the circumstance where micro insurance might not be of 
interest because family members or friends support in times of need. Hence, this study 
cannot provide evidence that supports the expected crowding-out effect of informal 
networks.  
However, another topic came up in one of the dialogues. One participant is afraid that 
her reputation within her social network could be affected, if she, as a Muslim, 
purchases conventional micro life insurance:  
“People do judge us on our Halal and Haram behavior.” […] “We have a fear. 
After we die, there would be gossips among neighbors as ‘she had lived a Haram 
life and her children also are the same way’. We are afraid of that.” (Barrier, 
Simaya, Muslim) 
This quotation also shows that the theoretical concepts of social capital (here: 
reputation) and religion (here: adherence to religious norms) are not always clearly 
distinguishable. This possible interrelation is further discussed in the quantitative study. 
Based on the conducted FGDs, it can be concluded that social capital influences the 
decision to purchase micro life insurance mainly because of an information exchange 
between peers which leads to an increased awareness of and understanding about micro 
insurance. People consult each other especially within their family, before they decide 
to buy micro life insurance. Further, an imitation effect is indicated by at least one 
person. So far, there is no evidence for the presence of a strong crowding-out effect of 
informal risk sharing, a trust-building effect through peers, or for the two forms of 
social capital: membership in formal social networks and generalized trust. However, it 
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is too early to reject any of the theoretically derived hypotheses at this stage and they 
will be tested in the quantitative study. 
3.5.2 Religion and Micro Life Insurance Demand   
This section discusses how religion influences micro life insurance consumption. As 
lined out in Section 2.6.2, religion is operationalized in terms of religious denomination. 
In the context of this qualitative study, two religious denominations are of relevance: 
Hinduism and Islam. Due to the low number of relevant statements given by the 
Christian participants as shown in Table 20, the following analysis compares the views 
of Hindu and Muslim participants only. The analysis first discusses the possible 
channels through which religion affects micro life insurance demand. As described in 
detail in section 2.6.1 academic literature suggests three mechanisms through which 
religion may influence uptake: (i) religious norms, (ii) idea of mutuality, and (iii) risk 
aversion. Afterwards, this analysis further considers the difference between demand for 
conventional and Takaful micro insurance products, as it is assumed that the latter 
products specifically address the religiously motivated needs of Muslims.  
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Table 20: Religion – Frequency of statements 
 Muslim Hindu Christian 
 
Driver Barrier Not  specified Driver Barrier 
Not  
specified Driver Barrier 
Not  
specified 
Social Capital 7 4 8 1 1 2 1 0 1 
Awareness/ understanding 6 0 8 0 0 2 1 0 1 
Imitation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Informal risk sharing 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Reputation   0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Religion 26 32 6 0 0 5 1 1 6 
Interest 8 17 1 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Importance of Islamic insurance    
  provider & distributor 
9 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Living according to religious rules 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Religiosity 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Not specified 3 2 1 0 0 5 0 0 2 
Income & wealth 7 16 1 6 22 0 2 2 0 
Bequest motive 9 1 0 5 2 0 0 0 0 
Protection for children 8 0 0 5 1 0 0 0 0 
Family status 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Education 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Financial literacy 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other risk management strategies 0 2 27 0 1 22 0 0 1 
Contract non-performance 0 3 0 0 13 0 0 0 0 
Payment of claims 0 3 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
Fraud by agent 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 
Not specified 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 
Risk exposure 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Terms and conditions 12 1 1 15 5 0 3 0 1 
Benefits  8 1 1 14 4 0 2 0 1 
Mandatory 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode of premium payment 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Source: Author’s own 
Note: In some cases, subtotals presented for a category are not equal to the sum across the subcategories. This is caused by the quotes assigned to two 
subcategories, but only accounted once for the category to avoid double-counting.     
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While comparing different motives of Muslims and Hindus to buy or not to buy micro 
life insurance, the overview of frequency counts presented in Table 20 clearly shows 
that religious reasons are mainly a cause of concern for Muslims. Primarily, they are 
worried about the involvement of interest in conventional insurance because riba 
(interest) is forbidden under their religious guidelines and is closely related to their 
attitude of living in accordance with their religion’s rules. Further, Muslims prefer an 
insurance provider or distributor who operates on Islamic principles. Hindus mentioned 
the topic of religion only five times during the four FGDs, but without any specific 
reference to micro life insurance consumption.  
As shown in Table 20 and mentioned earlier, Muslims are strongly concerned with the 
involvement of interest-based activities in conventional micro life insurance:  
“Even though we feel it is needed, we fear about the interest; the problem is how do 
we identify Halal and Haram products.” (Barrier, Hilmiya, Muslim) 
“Also, there is this interest issue. It is a huge barrier.” (Barrier, Safeeka, Muslim) 
“But it involves interest. Therefore, we did not get that.” (Barrier, Jumma, Muslim) 
Most of the Muslim participants believe that conventional insurance contravenes with 
the religious principles of Islam. The purchase of conventional micro life insurance does 
not seem to be an option as the participants prefer to follow their religious rules in daily 
lives:  
“Mostly we dislike [insurance] because we are religious and we consider Haram 
and Halal principles. So, it directs most of the people to avoid getting any 
insurance.” (Barrier, Safeeka, Muslim) 
“During our lives in this world, Halal practices should be followed and it will lead 
us to live a Halal life forever and our children will grow up in a Halal environment 
and we will get a satisfaction in our lives. But, if we do not consider Halal and 
purchase Haram goods in our lives, everything will be Haram. We will lose our 
happiness and start to suffer in our lives. Also, our good deeds will not be 
considered. Also, it will bring burden to us and sudden sickness.” (Barrier, 
Rushana, Muslim) 
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Moreover, Muslims emphasize their preference for Micro Takaful8 products because 
these products do not involve the concept of interest:   
“As there is no interest applicable in Islamic Insurance, we like it.” (Driver, 
Jumaira, Muslim) 
The qualitative evidence strongly indicates that the religion of Islam may affect 
insurance consumption because of the religious rules that prohibit riba. Interestingly, it 
was observed that the comments of the participants on insurance and its involvement in 
interest are superficial. None of the participants explained in detailed how insurance and 
interest are related. Only one participant provides some details:  
“The procedure is based on Islam. Therefore, no interest. It gives us the profit on 
Islamic basis.” (Barrier, Fasmina, Muslim) 
In general, it seems that Muslim focus group participants lack a thorough understanding 
or comprehensive judgement of the compatibility of conventional insurance with 
Islamic principles. For example, religious scholars explain that conventional insurance 
is not a Halal financial product because it contravenes with the Islamic principles of 
uncertainty (gharar) and gambling (maysir) (e.g. Kwon, 2007). Such detailed 
understanding is not expressed by the participants. It rather seems that their religious 
views on conventional insurance are based on superficial knowledge and understanding 
as revealed by their general statements quoted earlier.  
Related to the concepts of gharar and maysir and an implied preference for a mutual 
insurance scheme in Islam, the author expected to find references to the idea of 
mutuality and insurance. However, none of the participants mentioned the mutual 
character of insurance or it being an instrument of helping each other in times of need.  
                                                
 
8 In this context, the participants usually used the term Islamic insurance when referring to Micro 
Takaful. 
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In line with the expectations of the author, the participants did not mention the topic of 
risk aversion and its relevance for insurance consumption. The abstract concept of risk 
aversion is difficult to articulate verbally. Therefore, in academic research, risk aversion 
is usually measured quantitatively either by evaluating investment choice patterns or 
self-statements of a person’s risk willingness. This approach is followed in the 
quantitative study (Chapter 4).    
Income and wealth, product terms and conditions and a motivation to provide for one’s 
children affect the life insurance demand for both of the groups. However, a regular 
access to financial resources seems to be the main uptake barrier for Hindus as they are 
not concerned about any religious rules or norms. Furthermore, mainly Hindus put 
forward the risk of contract non-performance. However, these patterns seem to be 
unrelated to a household’s religion. Instead, they refer to the respondent’s environment 
and previous experiences.  
When further differentiating between the two forms of micro life insurance 
(conventional and Takaful), it is observed that awareness of Micro Takaful is rather low 
among Hindus and they have limited knowledge about it: 
“I do not have a clear idea about Islamic Insurance.” (Barrier, Bardurnisa, Hindu) 
“We do not know much about that… What is Islamic Insurance?” (Barrier, 
Thangamalar, Hindu) 
“I think all of us are in the same boat. We do not know about it.” (Barrier, 
Navaneethan Keerthika, Hindu)  
The results show that people mainly refrain from buying conventional micro life 
insurance because of a lack of financial resources, the involvement of interest, and the 
risk of contract non-performance. On the other hand, people are insured if they feel their 
income is sufficient, if they are satisfied with the general terms and conditions, and if 
the insurance coverage benefits their children. Low levels of income and a general 
discontent with the terms and conditions of the available products were mentioned as 
the key reason for not considering Micro Takaful cover. People sign up for Micro 
Takaful because it does not involve interest, the terms and conditions are satisfactory 
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and their children can benefit from the policy, whereby a concern for interest is raised 
exclusively by Muslims. Interestingly, in the context of Micro Takaful, the income 
situation of the household seems less relevant. However, external advice on insurance 
consumption is sought more often in this case. Overall, the core factor which determines 
if people consume conventional micro insurance or Micro Takaful is their attitude 
towards interest. The next section further discusses the role of these socio-economic 
characteristics on micro life insurance consumption in the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka.  
Concluding the above discussion, the author expects to find further evidence during the 
quantitative study for a relationship between religion and insurance consumption among 
low-income households. This relationship is most likely to be negative for the religion 
of Islam because of the religious rules that forbid riba. How risk aversion affects micro 
life insurance demand and if risk aversion relates to religion is yet to be studied. 
3.5.3 Other Micro Life Insurance Demand Drivers and Barriers  
Income and wealth 
Table 18 shows that in all nine FGDs, the participants emphasize the role of income or 
wealth in their decisions to insure. More than 50 quotes refer to the necessity of having 
a sufficient income or wealth to be able to purchase micro insurance:  
“To be honest, we would like to have insurance. But the only thing is that we do not 
have is sufficient money to pay for it.” (Barrier, Dharmaseelan Subathra Devi, 
Hindu) 
“Because our financial situation is not so good, we are unable to purchase it.” 
(Barrier, Fathima, Muslim) 
Bequest motive 
Another factor supporting the ownership of micro life insurance is the policyholder’s 
wish to provide protection for their children. This factor was brought forward by the 
participants in six focus groups:  
“If we have got the life insurance for us or for our children, it will be useful in 
future for our children.” (Driver, Priyadharshini, Hindu) 
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“At least our children can use it to manage the expenses of our funeral.” (Driver, 
Suranjani, Hindu) 
The importance of a bequest motive is a shared finding with the work of Giesbert and 
Steiner on micro life insurance demand in Ghana (2015: 26).  
Contract non-performance 
Discussing the reasons for purchasing insurance, the participants brought up the topic of 
contract non-performance in five FGDs. The risk of contract non-performance refers to 
the likelihood that an insurance company may not fulfill its contractual obligations 
because of insolvency, on-going disputes about claim eligibility, prolonged delay in 
claim settlement (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990) or any other reason. Within the 
empirical setting of this study, three different aspects of contract non-performance are 
brought forward. First, the participants do not trust that their claims will be paid at all:   
“Further, they do not pay as they promise.” (Barrier, Zukriya, Muslim) 
“We cannot trust that they will pay us back.” (Barrier, Valarmathi, Hindu) 
Second, they do not trust that their claims will be settled in a timely manner:  
“Huh! They will not pay it in time to be used for the funeral. It will take a very long 
time to process our claim and pay the money.” (Barrier, Sarwadikari, Hindu) 
“They do not give us the money immediately, even though we need it urgently.” 
(Barrier, Kannadhasan Subathradhevi, Hindu) 
Third, other households do not trust insurance providers or insurance agents as they 
experienced insurance frauds in past:  
“There came a person saying that he is from Ceylinco insurance. So, I paid him for 
insurance. But I could not find him the next time I searched for him. I do not know 
where he has gone (Laughs).” (Barrier, Naheswari, Hindu) 
“My opinion is that almost all the companies get our money by cheating us. For 
example, I [once] had insurance and I had been paying the premium for a few 
months. I think I paid about LKR 6,000 at that time and I was paying it to a boy 
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coming to collect that money. But, you know what happened? Once we inquired the 
insurance company about our payments, they said that there is no payment credited 
to our policy. So, I dropped from that.” (Barrier, Valarmathi, Hindu). 
“In addition, there are people who cheat us when selling the insurance. In the very 
beginning, they say that the insurance policy we purchased is for the whole family. 
But when one of our household members gets sick or whatever, once we ask for 
money, they say that the policy we purchased is only for us and you can get the 
money only if you face such situation. These types of cheaters are there.” (Barrier, 
Manjubashini, Hindu) 
These experiences and the fears of claim rejection, delayed settlements or frauds by 
insurance agents, further reduce the demand for voluntary micro life insurance products. 
This finding which emphasizes the importance of trust in future benefits is confirmed by 
a previous study on client perceptions of micro life insurance value in Ghana (Giesbert 
and Steiner, 2015: 24).     
Terms and conditions  
The demand barrier of insufficient or irregular income is closely related to the 
perception of the terms and conditions of the offered insurance products. The 
participants dislike the rather inflexible mode of premium payment: 
“We do not have enough income to pay. It is compulsory to pay the insurance 
premium every month. If we failed to pay, we will not be able to get any money, or 
at least the amount we paid earlier. So, when considering our income and the 
payment procedure, it is not feasible for us. So, we did not purchase it.” (Barrier, 
Nanthini, Hindu) 
The participants are aware of the benefits provided by the different insurance providers 
and the offered coverage is mentioned in seven FGDs as one of the main consumption 
reasons:  
“If we pay the premium every month, there will be no issue, it will help us in case 
of an emergency and sometimes it grants some money for the education of our 
children.” (Driver, Valarmathi, Hindu) 
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The linkage between insurance cover and borrowings is named only five times as a 
reason for uptake. This relatively low relevance indicates that micro insurance is rather 
sold as a stand-alone product in the region than as a credit-bundled product:   
“It came with the loan that we got for our business.” (Driver, Sumaana, Muslim) 
“We got the loan from Muslim Aid and insurance came with that.” (Driver, 
Zukriya, Muslim) 
At times, linking micro insurance with credit is perceived as a barrier to consumption 
because purchase of an insurance policy may not to be possible without borrowing.   
In a nutshell, the results of the FGDs indicate that next to social capital and religion, the 
household income situation is a key factor influencing life insurance consumption 
decisions. Furthermore, demand seems to exist if the terms and conditions reflect the 
needs of the target group and the products provide benefits for policyholders’ children. 
Previous negative experiences with an insurance provider or distributor in the region 
seem to keep people from buying micro life insurance. Additionally, the qualitative 
study indicates that the different level of trust in insurance might explain why micro life 
insurance is bought in the region.   
These results on other demand factors are helpful in defining the control variables of the 
quantitative study and placing the derived hypotheses in context.  
3.6 Chapter Conclusion 
Previous research has identified wealth, education, risk aversion and the usage of other 
financial services as main explanatory drivers of micro life insurance demand. 
Indicative evidence is provided for a life-cycle effect and a bequest motive. This 
qualitative study validates the central role played by wealth or income in driving or 
impeding insurance consumption. Moreover, it suggests that the demand for micro life 
insurance is influenced by social capital and religious denomination, thereby 
contributing to the development of alternative explanatory approaches. In detail, it 
provides strong evidence for an increased awareness of and understanding about micro 
insurance because of an information exchange among peers and further offers indicative 
evidence for an imitation effect. Furthermore, this study observes a negative attitude of 
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Muslims towards conventional micro life insurance which is caused by the religiously 
motivated prohibition of interest. The relevance of the other two explanatory 
approaches of mutuality and risk aversion is still to be examined by the quantitative 
study.   
After social capital and religion, the main demand factor appears to be the availability 
of financial resources required for regular premium payments. The product terms and 
conditions support micro life insurance consumption and consumers are motivated by a 
bequest motive. This research also links to the literature on contract non-performance. 
In our sample, insurance uptake is less likely if people are not confident in a future 
claims payment or timely claims settlement, or if they have been deceived before. 
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4 Quantitative Study 
4.1 Overview   
After establishing a theoretical reference framework and analyzing the possible 
empirical factors for micro insurance demand in the previous chapter, a household 
survey and a risk aversion experiment is to be carried out in this chapter, in order to test 
the relevance of social capital and religion for micro life insurance demand. The aim of 
this chapter is to demonstrate and explain the potential effects of these two demand 
factors. The novelty of this research work consists of a detailed discussion on the two 
demand factors, creating a deeper understanding and providing first quantitative 
evidence on their relevance based on a comprehensive new data set. In the analysis, the 
interactions with additional demand factors which were derived in the previous chapters 
are considered and put into context of the focus group results. The course of the 
quantitative study is divided into the following six parts that are described in the later 
sections: 4.2 Instrument design and pretest, 4.3 Operationalization, 4.4 Sampling 
strategy, 4.5 Data collection and preparation, 4.6 Sample description and summary 
statistics, and 4.7 Estimation strategy and 4.8 Results.   
4.2 Instrument Design 
4.2.1 Household Survey   
“To minimize response errors” the survey and its questions are designed “in accordance 
with best practices” (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 263). The household survey follows 
previous micro insurance demand research (Cole et al., 2013; Gaurav et al., 2011; Giné 
et al., 2007) and the outlined analytical demand factors framework. In August 2012, the 
author contacted five authors of four academic papers on micro insurance demand. She 
informed the authors about her research objective and her interest in the usage of their 
survey questionnaires for the reason of results comparability. Three of them shared their 
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questionnaires that have been used in a study of weather index insurance demand in 
India and of a composite health and funeral insurance product in Kenya9.  
In structuring the survey, the author grouped questions on the same topic. Therefore, the 
questionnaire is divided into six subsections:   
1. A first section covers socio-economic household characteristics and the concept of 
financial literacy. These questions are easy to answer and help to build rapport 
between the respondent and researcher (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 264).   
2. The second section questions about alternative risk management strategies and leads 
to the main topic of insurance consumption behavior. The questions are already 
strongly connected to the topic of interest and increase the participants 
understanding about the content of the survey (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 291).   
3. The third section covers the main topic of interest and includes questions about a 
households’ experience with insurance and its risk exposure. It ends with the risk 
aversion lottery. The lottery is introduced at this point to keep the participants 
engaged in the survey by changing the setting from a question-answer-approach to 
an active participation of the respondent (Prüfer and Rexroth, 2000: 4-5).    
4. A fourth section measures the concept of generalized trust and social networks.  
5. The fifth section captures different dimensions of religion and religiosity as 
commonly applied in international socio-economic surveys, e.g. the World Value 
Survey and the European Value Survey. This topic might be a sensitive topic to the 
participants making them feel uncomfortable. To reduce the risk of early 
termination it is placed towards the end (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 264).  
                                                
 
9 The author received the questionnaires used in the following studies: 
Cole, Shawn, Xavier Giné, Jeremy Tobacman, Petia Topalova, Robert Townsend, and James Vickery 
(2013). Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from India. American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics 2013, 5(1): 104–135. 
Dercon, Stefan, Jan Willem Gunning, and Andrew Zeitlin (2011). Demand for insurance under limited 
credibility: Evidence from Kenya. Working Paper.   
Gaurav, Sarthak, Shawn Cole, and Jeremy Tobacman (2011). Marketing Complex Financial Products in 
Emerging Markets: Evidence from Rainfall Insurance in India. Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 
XLVIII (Special Issue 2011): 150–162.  
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6. The last section questions about the household’s income and assets. This section is 
placed at the end because it might be a tedious activity for the participants.  
The full questionnaire is documented in Appendix 5: Household survey questionnaire. 
In the design and structure of the questionnaire, the author of this study aimed at 
keeping the motivation and concentration of the participants to answer all questions 
correctly. For this purpose, filter questions are used and participants are not required to 
respond to questions that do not apply for them (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 264). 
Also, filter questions are applied in a way that interviewers do not have problems with 
the order or sequencing of the questionnaire (Prüfer and Rexroth, 2000: 4-5).  
Further, in her question design the author considered the so-called “conventional 
wisdom” about optimal question design (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 264). She tried to 
formulate simple, specific questions using words the respondents are familiar with, e.g. 
non-vehicle insurance instead of non-motor insurance. Sentence structure is very 
simple, without double negations, and only one matter asked at a time. Response 
options are exhaustive and mutually exclusive if multiple answers are not intended. 
There are multiple answers possible when participants are questioned about their 
motivations, behaviors, opinions e.g. on insurance, savings or credits. In 16 cases the 
author decided to use the answer category “Other” in combination with an open answer. 
This avoids that participants chose an answer category that does not represent their 
opinion, attitude or situation, leading to a distortion of results. Next to these hybrids of 
closed and open end questions, the survey used closed end questions in majority to 
avoid difficulties in coding and results interpretation. On the topic of religion, two open 
questions are formulated because the author believed that literature and previous 
surveys could not provide for an exhaustive set of answer categories. However, because 
all the responses had to be translated from Tamil to English, she decided at last not to 
include any information from the open questions or answer categories in the data 
preparation and analysis.  
In 15 cases, rating scales are applied. Based on good practices in question design and 
the low literacy level of the participants the author decided for five-point Likert scales. 
In this case, points are more easy to verbalize than in lengthier scales enhancing 
respondents’ “clear understanding of the meanings of the points on the scale” (Krosnick 
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and Presser, 2010: 270). During the survey the three scales are applied with the 
following ranking categories:  
• Continuous scale of opinion: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, strongly disagree  
• Categorical scale of frequency: very often, often, occasionally, rarely, never  
• Categorical scale of importance: very important, important, moderately, a little 
important, not at all important.  
Even though previous methodological research on question design has proven that a 
“Don’t know” answer option does not improve measurement (Krosnick and Presser, 
2010: 282), respondents had the possibility to choose the answer category of “Don’t 
know” in three cases: In the case of the theoretical constructs of financial literacy and 
trust, questions are taken from previous surveys and well established in the literature. 
For results comparability, the author did not want to deviate from these practices. 
Asking about the trustworthiness of conventional micro insurance and Micro Takaful 
providers, a “Don’t know” option was offered to avoid a statement, even if the 
respondent does not have an opinion on the topic (avoidance of “non-attitude response 
error”).     
4.2.2 Risk Aversion Lottery  
Risk aversion is measured by an ordered lottery selection design according to 
Binswanger (1980). This measurement approach, developed for a research in rural 
India, is frequently used in field studies with low-income households (Turner et al., 
2014; Clarke and Kalani, 2012; Barr and Genicot, 2008). A simple lottery design 
ensures that participants with low levels of mathematical skills understand the game and 
the choices they make (Dave et al., 2010).  
In the Binswanger lottery setting each participant is asked to select one out of six binary 
choices to play, which gradually increase in expected payoff and riskiness (measured by 
standard deviation of expected payoff). In each option the participant either receives a 
high or a low payout with a probability of fifty percent. The low payoff decreases with 
the progress in options for selection whereas the high payoff increases. The participant’s 
final payoff (low or high) is determined by e.g. a coin-flip or a blind draw. This study 
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uses an adapted version of the Binswanger lottery as suggested by other researchers 
(Dave et al., 2010; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Barr and Genicot, 2008). Their 
experimental designs benefit from an expected payoff linear in risk, measured by 
standard deviation of expected payoff. Contrary to previous work the instructors used 
the term of “activity” in their communication with the participants instead of “lottery” 
or “game” and minimize the elements of a game of chance. Therewith, the author 
wanted to reduce the number of non-responders or possible biases by Muslim 
participants as gambling is not allowed in Islam.    
To control for an effect of payoff levels on risk aversion two rounds were conducted 
that varied in their payoffs. Participants received real monetary payouts. In the first 
round the maximum payoff represents an average informal worker’s daily wage in Sri 
Lanka. In the second round, the maximum payoff amounts to his average monthly 
wage. Therefore, stakes are substantial and participants are expected to reveal their real 
risk preferences (Dave et al., 2010; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008: 331). Due to 
budgetary constraints, the participants received the real payout only for one round, the 
first round. However, the participants did not know which round was paid out until the 
second round ended. 
The subjects of the risk aversion lottery are the same as the participants of the 
household survey as the experiment is an integral part of the survey. The experiment 
took place at the subject’s homes. The interviewers were responsible for the conduct of 
the experiment. They ensured that the subjects were not influenced in their choices by 
the presence of a third person. The interviewer carefully instructed the participants by 
explaining the written instructions orally including several examples. Each participant 
started with a hypothetical round to give him or her the opportunity to learn about the 
different choice options and to understand the game. Before the actual two rounds were 
played, every participant had the opportunity to ask any question to the interviewer.  
In each round, every participant was asked to select one out of six choices as presented 
in Figure 8. Every alternative yields either a high or a low pay off with a probability of 
50 percent as described above. To enhance the participants understanding each round 
and its six choices are visualized to the participants on a card board. This visualization 
was kindly provided by Abigail Barr who had used it in a previous field study in 
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Zimbabwe (Barr and Genicot, 2008) and was adapted to the Sri Lankan context in terms 
of payout amounts and currency by the author10.  
Figure 8: Risk aversion lottery – Visualization of choices 
Round 1                      Round 2 
      
Source: Adapted from Barr and Genicot (2008) 
The six options are labeled A to F. Every option shows a low amount of money 
(displayed in Sri Lankan bills) on a yellow background and the high payoffs on a blue 
background. The difference or variance between the low payoff and the high payoff 
increases with the progress. Option A is the safe option with no variance and a 
guaranteed payoff of LKR 140 (first round) or LKR 2.800 (second round). An 
extremely risk averse participant would choose this option. For the following options, 
                                                
 
10 In 2013 the author reached out to Abigail Barr and Daniel Clarke who had applied the risk aversion 
lottery design according to Binswanger in their studies and received their experimental procedures and 
visual aids for further usage: 
Barr, Abigail and Garance Genicot (2008). “Risk Sharing, Commitment and Information: An 
experimental analysis” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 6, No. 6: 1151–1185 
Clarke, Daniel and Gautam Kalani (2012). “Microinsurance Decisions: Evidence from Ethiopia”. 
Microinsurance Innovation Facility, Research Paper No. 19. International Labour Office, Geneva 
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expected return and its variance increase. Option E and F do not differ in their expected 
return but in their variance (Option F > Option E). Only a risk seeking person would 
choose option F. Further details on expected return, standard deviations and 
corresponding levels of risk aversion are displayed in Table 21 and 22. The intervals of 
constant relative risk aversion are assigned in analogy of the work of Dave et al. 
(2010)11 and displayed for comparison with other studies.   
Table 21: Lottery choices in Round 1 
 Low  
payoff 
Prob. High 
payoff 
Prob. Expected 
payoff 
Standard 
deviation 
Implied CRRA 
range11 
Option A 140 50% 140 50% 140 0 3,46 < r 
Option B 120 50% 240 50% 180 60 1,16 < r < 3,46 
Option C 100 50% 340 50% 220 120 0,71 < r < 1,16 
Option D 80 50% 440 50% 260 180 0,50 < r < 0,71 
Option E 600 50% 540 50% 300 240 0 < r < 0,50 
Option F 0 50% 600 50% 300 300 r < 0 
Source: adapted from Dave et al. (2010)  
                                                
 
11 Each lottery option is representing a range of risk aversion r. The limits of these ranges, where the 
participant is indifferent between two options, are found by equating the expected utility of the 
neighboring options under consideration. For example, given a 50 percent chance of a high payoff, the 
utilities of option B (low payoff LKR 120, high payoff LKR 240) and option C (low payoff LKR 100, 
high payoff LKR 340) are: 
 12 120$%&1 − ( + 12 240$%&1 − (+, & = 12 100
$%&1 − ( + 12 340$%&1 − (+/ &  
yielding an indifferent risk aversion of r = 1.16, which demarks the lower limit of option B and the 
upper limit of option C. The limits between the other options are determined analogously (Dave et al., 
2010). 
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Table 22: Lottery choices in Round 2 
 Low  
payoff 
Prob. High 
payoff 
Prob. Expected 
payoff 
Standard 
deviation 
Implied CRRA 
range 
Option A 2800 50% 2800 50% 2800 0 3,46 < r 
Option B 2400 50% 4800 50% 3600 1200 1,16 < r < 3,46 
Option C 2000 50% 6800 50% 4400 2400 0,71 < r < 1,16 
Option D 1600 50% 8800 50% 5200 3600 0,50 < r < 0,71 
Option E 1200 50% 10800 50% 6000 4800 0 < r < 0,50 
Option F 0 50% 12000 50% 6000 6000 r < 0 
Source: adapted from Dave et al. (2010)  
 
To determine the payoff of the selected option in each round the participant drew a ball 
blindly with replacement from a bag. The bag contained one blue and one yellow ball, 
representing a 50:50 chance. If the participant drew a blue ball she received the high 
payoff whereas the yellow ball was associated with the low pay off. The author opted 
for this approach as a coin-flip could have been associated with gambling leading to 
possible irritations with Muslim participants. Details on the conduct of the field 
experiment are also described in the instructions shared with the research assistants 
(Appendix 4: Risk aversion lottery instructions). 
4.2.3 Pretest of Instruments 
For an expert validation, the researcher shared a first draft of the questionnaire with a 
Sri Lankan consultant who had conducted household surveys for various international 
organizations before and is very familiar with the target group. He was also responsible 
for the organization of the data collection process. His expert advice helped to improve 
the target group orientation of the questionnaire and transferred international best 
practices in survey design to the local context. For example, answer categories to the 
question of education and risk experiences were adjusted, a question about caste 
affiliation deleted.  
Before proceeding with the final survey, the author pretested the questionnaire and the 
risk aversion lottery in the form of conventional pretesting (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 
296). The pretest aimed at receiving information and feedback on the duration or length 
of the questionnaire and its various sections, to identify difficulties in the processing of 
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the questionnaire related to the ordering of questionnaire, and to learn about ambiguous 
or misleading question wordings. Conventional pretesting usually involves a one-time 
test survey of the questionnaire after completing its design to a small sample of the 
population. The pretest interviews are conducted by interviewers in the field, under – as 
far as possible – the same conditions as the main survey. Interviewer are informed of 
the test character of the interviews, the respondents are not (Prüfer and Rexroth, 2000: 
14; Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 296). A key weakness of the conventional pretesting is 
its rather passive approach. Interviewer observes participants but do not actively inquire 
about participants’ reactions or behavior. Further, it is difficult to find out if participants 
understood the questions correctly (Prüfer and Rexroth, 1996: 98-99). However, as most 
of the questions have been used in similar settings (Cole et al., 2013; Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2011, Gaurav et al., 2011), the author decided to use this cost-efficient 
pretesting approach.  
In practice, the pretest was part of the interviewer training. Each interviewer could 
conduct the pretest questionnaire including the risk aversion lottery twice with 
participants from the target group. In total, 22 respondents participated in the pretest 
which fulfills the general recommendation of a pretest sample which is 10 to 200 
(Prüfer and Rexroth, 1996: 97). Due to the tight schedule of the field study and the 
limited time resources of the researcher, she evaluated the pretest results and especially 
the distribution of the answer categories for 15 out of the 22 questionnaires. Out of 
these 15 surveys, five participants are micro life insured. Further, participants of the 
pretest represent the three religions: Hinduism (six people), Islam (seven people), and 
Buddhism (two people).  
After the pretest a debriefing with the interviewer took place. For this debriefing an 
evaluation questionnaire was developed that focused on: (i) duration of the survey and 
its various sub-sections including the risk aversion lottery, (ii) clarity of the formulation 
of survey questions, understanding of scales and completeness of answer categories, (ii) 
understanding of the risk aversion lottery. The evaluation questionnaire was shared with 
the interviewers before the pretest survey took place to allow them to take notes on the 
length of the individual survey sections, observational anomalies and problems 
encountered. During the debriefing, the interviewers could share their experiences with 
each other, their supervisor and with the researcher in a group setting.   
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The results of the pretest evaluation and the interviewer’s feedback led to minor 
modifications of the questionnaire. Basically, the sequencing of answer categories was 
changed according to their frequency of occurrence during the pretest, further categories 
added if named several times under the answer category “Others”, and for some answer 
categories wording was sharpened. In the final survey, questions about insurance 
consumption differentiated between vehicle and non-vehicle insurance. The terms of 
vehicle and non-vehicle are used because respondents are more familiar with them, than 
with motor and non-motor.   
On average interviewers needed 70 minutes to complete the questionnaire and the risk 
aversion lottery. However, the length highly depended on the insurance status of the 
participants. The survey of non-policyholders on average lasted about 60 minutes in 
comparison to 80 minutes if households are insured. As the interviewers, did not discuss 
the length of the questionnaire negatively and participants neither seemed to lose 
concentration nor patience, there was no obvious need to shorten the questionnaire. In 
sum the final survey includes 92 questions.   
4.3 Operationalization of Variables   
To clarify the design of survey questions, this section describes how the various 
theoretical constructs applied to the quantitative study are operationalized and thus 
measured. The dependent variable ‘micro life insurance’ is in general defined as 
voluntary micro life insurance coverage and coded one if a household currently owns a 
micro life insurance policy that is not credit-linked. If the operationalization of the 
dependent variables deviates in one of the following analyses, it is explicated and 
explained.  
Measurement of the independent and control variables is explained in the following. 
Independent variables are defined as implied by the hypotheses and control variable as 
suggested by the analytical framework of micro life insurance demand factors (Section 
2.5) and the focus group results (Section 3.6). Social capital and religion are each 
measured by as set of independent variables to identify the various channels through 
which these two factors affect micro life insurance uptake. Social capital is measured in 
terms of its institutional form (membership in formal organization and generalized trust) 
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and function (awareness, trust-building, imitation, informal risk sharing). Religion is 
operationalized by the variables of religious denomination, interest, mutuality, and risk 
aversion. For details on the origin and development of these dimensions please refer to 
Section 2.6.1 for social capital and to Section 2.6.2 for religion. As discussed in Section 
2.6.3, the author is aware that measuring multiple of one theoretical concept might 
involve strong correlations between the underlying variables. Hence, during the data 
analysis process variance inflation factors are estimated to test for multi-collinearity. 
Group membership 
The variable ‘group membership’ is one of the two variable measuring for an 
institutional effect of social capital on micro life insurance consumption. The 
information if a household is associated to a formal social network is collected by the 
following question:  
In total, how many groups, associations or organizations 
does your household belong to12?  
 
_________________ 
The variable ‘membership’ then counts the number of reported memberships.  
Generalized trust  
Following the argument of Putnam (1993), social capital is further measured by the 
concept of generalized trust. The theoretical construct of generalized trust is difficult to 
measure. In the literature, there are two general approaches for the measurement of trust 
or more specifically generalized trust: (i) survey questions and (ii) experimental trust. 
To decide on the measurement approach of the present work, these two forms are 
discussed and evaluated in the light of the specifics of the present empirical study. 
                                                
 
12 Groups, associations or organizations are in a subsequent question defined as: village development 
society, women rural development society, religious society, savings group/association, agricultural 
association/fishery society, sports club, political party, others to be specified.  
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Within the usual survey question approach, the General Social Survey (GSS) 
generalized trust question is used: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” which allows 
for the following two answers “Most people can be trusted” or “You can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people”. The General Social Survey is a U.S. American nationwide 
survey gathering data on contemporary society in order to monitor and explain trends 
and constants in attitudes, behaviors, and attributes (NORC, 2016). The usage of this 
attitudinal question has a long history and is included in further standardized, global 
surveys like the Gallup World Poll and the World Values Survey, and frequently 
applied in academic studies (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Berggren and 
Bjornskov, 2011; La Porta et al., 1997a, Knack and Keefer, 1997). Some studies have 
slightly adopted the answer categories (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2013, 2009) or 
extended the set of survey questionnaires. Glaeser et al. (2000) are the first to use a trust 
index including the GSS question on fairness13 and helpfulness14. The trust index is 
calculated using the normalized average of the three questions.  
Others have argued that this generally applied attitudinal trust question from the 
General Social Survey is “unspecific”, “vague, abstract and hard to interpret” (Glaeser 
et al., 2000: 827, 812). For example, it is not clear to the respondent whom to trust 
(“most people”), in which situation or under which conditions (Bjornskov, 2006: 2). 
Secondly, economists prefer observed, revealed behavior with monetary incentives 
(Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009: 436) and favor the experimental approach of the trust 
game introduced by Berg et al. (1995). A trust game is a two-stage game, involving a 
“sender” and a “receiver”. The sender has a fixed amount of money she can send in total 
or partially to an anonymous recipient. The remaining amount can be kept by the 
sender. The experimenter usually triples the amount in the envelop before it is handed 
over to the receiver. The recipient can then decide on the share of money she/he returns 
                                                
 
13 “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if you got a chance, or would they 
try to be fair?” 
14 “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out 
for themselves?” 
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to the initial sender. The amount send is usually interpreted as an indicator for trust and 
the amount received as an indicator for trustworthiness (Johansson et al., 2009: 464).   
Such experimental studies on trust are often of methodological character testing how 
well the standard GSS trust question predicts experimental behavior. The first studies of 
this nature (Glaeser et al., 2000; Fehr et al., 2003) found that the GSS questions on trust, 
fairness and helpfulness are not related with trusting behavior of the trust game using 
samples from the U.S. and Germany. Based on these results they conclude that the 
survey questions are not a reliable measure for trust (assuming that the amount send in 
the trust game is a reliable indicator for trust). On the contrary Gächter et al. (2004) 
provide evidence from Russia that experimental results correlate with the GSS questions 
on fairness and helpfulness. Results on the reliability of the survey method remain 
ambiguous if samples are from developing country. In Bangladesh, Johannsson-
Stenman et al. (2013) do not find a strong relationship between stated trust and the 
amount send whereas Etang et al. (2012) report exactly the opposite results from 
Cameroon. Opponents of the trust experiment argue that it is not clear to which extend 
other factors affect the sender’s behavior in the trust game. Current research has shown 
an influence of reciprocity and altruism (Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006) and of an 
individual’s risk aversion (Karlan, 2005).   
Given the problems described in both measurement approaches of the theoretical 
concept of trust, a concentration on the survey method seems to be most appropriate for 
the present study. Survey data is easier and cheaper to collect. Also, generalized trust is 
just one out of six explanatory variables for an effect of social capital. In addition, the 
author considered the overall length of the survey and preferred to include an 
experimental measurement for the risk aversion variable which is a key concept in 
insurance. Consequently, the author will be cautious in not over interpreting the 
findings based upon the survey question (Alesina und La Ferrara, 2011).  
To operationalize the theoretical concept of generalized trust, the author included all 
three questions from the General Social Survey but decided during data preparation to 
focus on the trust question (Glaeser et al., 2000; Gächter et al., 2004; Etang et al., 
2012): 
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Trust: 
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
§ Most people can be trusted 
§ Can’t be too careful 
§ Don’t know 
Fairness:  
Do you think most people would try to take 
advantage of you if they got a chance or would 
they try to be fair?   
§ Would take advantage 
§ Would try to be fair 
§ Don’t know 
Helpful: 
 
Would you say that most of the time people try 
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking 
out for themselves? 
§ Try to be helpful 
§ Just look out for themselves 
§ Don’t know 
Creation of awareness and understanding 
The variable ‘creation of awareness’ is the first of four possible functions of social 
capital that might affect micro life insurance consumption. It estimates whether the 
dissemination of information on financial services through peers or social networks is 
relevant for micro life insurance consumption. Survey participants were asked:  
If you make a financial decision are there people 
outside your household you ask for advice, e.g. 
village leaders, elders or religious leaders? 
§ Yes 
§ No  
When people outside your household have to 
make financial decisions, do they come to you 
for advice? 
§ Yes 
§ No 
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The first question follows the question design by Bönte and Filipak (2012)15, set into the 
broader setting of financial decisions. A second question is added to cover for both 
ways of communication: receiving and sending information. The dummy variable 
‘information’ then equals one if a person turns to someone before making a financial 
decision or is consulted by others.  
Imitation 
The function of fostering imitative behavior is another role associated with social 
capital. If the adoption of micro life insurance is caused by an imitation of a peer’s 
decision, is measured by:  
Do you have friends, neighbors or relatives who 
do not live in your household that have insurance 
coverage? 
§ Yes, vehicle insurance 
§ Yes, non-vehicle insurance 
§ No 
The dummy variable ‘imitation’ is one if a peer has life or non-life micro insurance 
coverage. 
Trust building  
To test for a trust building effect of social capital through peer’s experience with micro 
life insurance the following question is included in the survey:  
Did anyone of them [friends, neighbors or 
relatives] receive a payment from the claim? 
§ Yes, vehicle insurance 
§ Yes, non-vehicle insurance 
§ No  
If the respondent could observe the benefits of micro insurance, the dummy variable 
‘trust building’ is one and zero otherwise. This measurement is close to the approach by 
Morsink (2012: 51). To study for a peer effect on micro catastrophe insurance she asked 
households if they knew people in their personal network who had experienced a claim.  
                                                
 
15 “Did you consult anybody outside your household before making savings decisions?” (p. 3403) 
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Informal risk sharing  
The final functional dimension of social capital is operationalized by estimating the 
effect of informal risk sharing on the consumption of micro life insurance. A 
comprehensive question on current risk coping strategies was included in the 
questionnaire.    
How do you currently cope with the 
financial consequences if those risks16 
occur?  
§ Use cash or savings 
§ Withdraw from business 
§ Borrow from friends, relatives, 
neighbors 
§ Borrow from employer or supplier 
§ Borrow from moneylender 
§ Borrow from microfinance institution 
§ Get additional job 
§ Reduce consumption 
§ Pledge valuables in pawnshop 
§ Sell valuables 
§ Insurance 
§ Receive grant from government, NGO 
§ Receive donation from friends, 
relatives, neighbors   
The dummy variable ‘informal risk sharing’ is coded one, if the respondent received 
financial support by a friend, relative or neighbor either by borrowing or by a donation 
and zero otherwise.  
                                                
 
16 The previous question had introduced the following risks to the respondents: sickness of household 
member, loss of employment, death of household member, accident of household member, permanent 
disability of household member, flood or heavy rain, draught, loss of livestock, fail in harvest, theft, 
fire, tsunami, war. 
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Previous studies additionally analyzed the role of remittance payments as a tool of 
informal risk sharing provided by family members (Giesbert et al., 2011). However, as 
remittances are usually paid on a regular basis and not specifically in cases of 
emergencies, remittances are not interpreted as a risk management tool in this study but 
as an income sources.  
Religion 
In the literature, two approaches are taken in operationalizing the theoretical construct 
of religion. A first group of studies uses religious denomination as an indicator (e.g. La 
Porta et al., 1997a; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Johansson-Stenman, 2009; Bjornskov, 
2006; Shu et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2011). A second group is interested in the 
influence of religion in general rather than in detecting difference between the various 
groups and studies the effect of religiosity. These studies consider single- or multi-item 
indicators or single- and multi-dimensional indices to measure for religiosity.  
Single-item indicators often refer to religious practices such as church attendance or to 
the self-assessed importance of religion in daily life (Berggren and Bjornskov, 2011). 
Using data from three waves of the World Values Survey (1981-1984; 1990-1993; 
1995-1997) Guiso et al. (2003) use three items to measure for religiosity: religious 
upbringing, frequency of church attendance and believe in God, as they are interested in 
the exogenous components of religion. Similar variables are employed by Noussair et 
al. (2013) to test for an effect of religion on risk aversion in the Netherlands: frequency 
of church attendance, belief in God, belief in specific Christian theological concepts and 
frequency of prayer outside of religious services (p. 169). Tan and Vogel (2008) opted 
to construct a multi-dimensional index to test for the overall relationship of religion (or 
better religiosity) on trust. The index captures three dimensions of religiosity: belief in 
theological concepts, religious experiences and rituals or religious practices as 
suggested by the methodological work of De Jong et al. (1976).   
Unlike the cited literature, the main interest of this research is to study for different 
motivations between members of various religious groups, and not for religiosity. 
Therefore, the standard measurement approach is followed and a dummy variable is 
defined for each of the following religious affiliations: Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism and 
Christianity dependent on the answer to the question:  
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Which of the following religious communities do 
you belong to? 
§ Muslim 
§ Hindu 
§ Buddhist 
§ Christian 
§ Catholic 
§ Other, specify ___________ 
The wording of this question is very like the last wave of the World Value Survey17.   
Interest 
To measure for an effect of the Islamic principle of riba or a prohibition of interest, the 
author used the two indicators of ‘interest on debt’ and ‘interest on savings’, that both 
reflect the attitude of the respondent towards this norm:   
Interest on debt  
Do you or any member of your household pay 
interest or a fee for borrowing from those 
sources18? 
§ Interest (%)  
§ Fee (fixed amount) 
§ Interest + Fee  
§ None 
Interest on savings  
Do you or any member of your household earn 
interest from any of your savings?   
§ Yes 
§ No 
These two questions are designed by the author of this study. The closest question to 
this measurement approach is a question from the Gallup World Poll when conducted in 
Muslim countries: “People in your country may or may not engage in the following 
                                                
 
17 “Do you belong to a religious denomination?” 
18 The previous question defined borrowings as formal and informal financial credits taken from other 
parties for one’s personal use including an agreement to repay the loan at a future time 
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actions. As far as you know, how many people in your country do each of the 
following: borrow money with interest, […]”. Based on these two questions the dummy 
variable ‘interest’ is one if the respondent does not have an interest-bearing savings 
product or loan and zero otherwise. 
Mutuality 
The dummy variable ‘mutuality’ reflects the respondents’ attitude towards insurance 
and its underlying principle of solidarity which is assumed to be particularly distinct 
among Muslims. The variable is coded based on the respondent’s agreement with the 
following statement:  
In your opinion, by buying non-vehicle 
insurance you support others who are in need. 
§ Strongly agree 
§ Agree 
§ Neither agree nor disagree 
§ Disagree 
§ Strongly disagree 
Risk aversion  
Previous research found that risk aversion correlates with a person’s religion (Noussair 
et al., 2013; Shu et al., 2012; Kumar et al., 2011; Barsky et al., 1997). Risk aversion 
estimated with an ordered lottery design is used to measure for risk aversion. Using the 
results of the two rounds, the author calculated a measure of risk aversion for each 
round using a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) function as in Binswanger, 1981. 
These values are further applied to the coding of the two risk aversion variables. Table 
23 and 24 show the distribution of risk aversion in the sample and the average CRRA, 
which was used for coding. The variable ‘risk aversion – small losses’ represents the 
results of the first round, while the variable ‘risk aversion – large losses’ results of the 
second round.  
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Table 23: Sample distribution of risk aversion in Round 1 
 Low  
payoff 
High 
payoff 
Expected 
payoff 
Standard 
deviation 
Implied CRRA 
range 
Average 
CRRA 
Fraction 
of 
subjects 
(%) 
Option A 140 140 140 0 3,46 < r 3,46 11,09 
Option B 120 240 180 60 1,16 < r < 3,46 2,31 20,33 
Option C 100 340 220 120 0,71 < r < 1,16 0,935 24,57 
Option D 80 440 260 180 0,50 < r < 0,71 0,605 30,43 
Option E 600 540 300 240 0 < r < 0,50 0,25 10,43 
Option F 0 600 300 300 r < 0 0 3,26 
Source: Adapted from Dave et al. (2010: 225)  
Note: Calculation of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is further described in Section 4.2.2 
Risk aversion lottery.  
Table 24: Sample distribution of risk aversion in Round 2 
 Low  
payoff 
High 
payoff 
Expected 
payoff 
Standard 
deviation 
Implied CRRA 
range 
Average 
CRRA 
Fraction 
of 
subjects 
(%) 
Option A 2800 2800 2800 0 3,46 < r 3,46 19,57% 
Option B 2400 4800 3600 1200 1,16 < r < 3,46 2,31 22,39% 
Option C 2000 6800 4400 2400 0,71 < r < 1,16 0,935 33,70% 
Option D 1600 8800 5200 3600 0,50 < r < 0,71 0,605 17,61% 
Option E 1200 10800 6000 4800 0 < r < 0,50 0,25 5,43% 
Option F 0 12000 6000 6000 r < 0 0 1,30% 
Source: Adapted from Dave et al. (2010: 225) 
Note: Calculation of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is further described in Section 4.2.2 
Risk aversion lottery. 
Income  
Acquiring precise information or an accurate estimation of a household’s annual income 
in a low-income setting is difficult. Therefore, the author of this study decided to 
decompose the income into various possible income sources: employment (permanent, 
temporary, self-employment), agricultural production, livestock breeding, social 
benefits or other government transfers, remittances, other types of income. For these 
various sources the survey requested the average monthly income and the number of 
months the household received income from this source during the past 12 months. The 
variable ‘income’ represents a household’s income between September 2012 and 
August 2013 calculated from the various income sources. As the study directly 
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estimates for an income effect, it does not apply the proxy variable of employment 
status used in previous micro life insurance demand studies (Bendig and Arun, 2016, 
Arun et al., 2012; Bendig and Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al, 2011).  
Wealth 
In a low-income setting wealth is difficult to measure in terms of monetary units. 
Therefore, the proxy of an index is used, which simply counts certain household assets 
without pricing them. The included household consumer durables are:  phone, TV, 
radio, stove, refrigerator, electric fan, electric water pump, a (non-) motorized vehicle 
and the two assets: house and land ownership. The asset index is then constructed using 
principal components analysis. For the individual i the asset index is defined as: 
 01 = 23 456%46763  
Where aik is the value of asset k for household i, 83, is the sample mean, sk, is the 
sample standard deviation, and fk are the weights associated with the first principal 
component. (O’Donnell et al., 2008: 77-78). This measurement approach is in line with 
previous micro (life) insurance demand studies (Cole et al., 2013; Giesbert et al., 2011).  
Premium 
Expected utility theory, empirical work on life insurance demand and focus group 
results indicate that the amount of premium paid is a relevant demand factor. This effect 
is related to the (perceived) fairness of the insurance premium, or to a household’s 
financial capacity. To be able to differentiate between the two aspects, respondents were 
asked: 
Do you think the amount your 
household pays for your insurance is a 
small amount of money, just the right 
amount of money or a lot of money 
compared to the benefits you receive? 
§ Little amount 
§ Just the right amount of money 
§ A lot of money 
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The variable ‘insurance premium’ focuses is coded along the three answer categories 
and a household’s financial capacity was measured with a second question: 
Over the past year, would you say your 
overall spending was less than, more 
than, or about equal to your income? 
§  Spending less than income 
§ Spending more than income 
§ Spending about equal to income 
§ Don’t know 
Lifecycle hypothesis: Age  
Following the current micro life insurance literature, the lifecycle hypothesis is 
measured by the variable of ‘age’. To receive correct information about a person’s age, 
the survey asked for the respondent’s birthday which allowed calculating the 
respondent’s age. Interestingly, it became obvious during the field study that some 
participants were not aware of their birthday but had to look up their national Identity 
card.  
Bequest motive: Age and ratio of young dependents  
Previous micro life insurance demand studies used the proxies of age and number of 
children to test for a bequest motive. In contrast, this study follows the approach by 
cross-country studies and calculates the ratio of young dependents. The variable ‘young 
dependency ratio’ is computed from the number of children over the total household 
size. The necessary information is collected by three basic, open questions:  
How many unmarried children do you have?  _________________ 
How many married children do you have? _________________ 
In total, how many people live in your household?    _________________ 
Education  
To measure for the educational level of the respondent a standard multiple-choice 
question is included in the survey:   
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What is the highest level of education 
you have achieved?  
§ Did not complete primary school 
(did not complete Grade 5) 
§ Primary school (up to Grade 5) 
§ Grade 10 
§ Ordinary Level 
§ Advanced Level 
The variable ‘education’ is then a categorical variable coded 0 if the respondent did not 
complete primary school, 1 if the responded finished primary school, 2 if the respondent 
finished grade 10 but not her Ordinary level, 3 if the respondent received the degree of 
Ordinary level and 4 if the respondent received the degree of Advanced level 
(equivalent to “Abitur”).    
Financial literacy  
Financial literacy refers to a person’s ability to make sound financial decisions based on 
her skills and knowledge about financial concepts and financial products. Micro 
insurance demand studies either use survey questions or an experimental design to 
measure for financial literacy and its effect on uptake (Cole et al., 2011; Dercon et al., 
2014; Cai et al., 2015).  
If a study aims at providing evidence for a positive effect of financial literacy activities 
on insurance uptake, usually the experimental approach is taken involving a treatment 
and a control group. In this setting the treatment group receives insurance literacy 
training or materials in contrast to the control group. The analysis of the data then 
focuses on differences in insurance uptake behavior of the two groups (Dercon et al., 
2014; Cai et al., 2015).  
The survey approach mainly draws from the work of Lusardi and Mitchel (e.g. 2006, 
2008). To the authors’ knowledge, Lusardi and Mitchell are the first to measure for 
financial literacy in a large-scale U.S. American study on retirement planning in 2004. 
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Their basic set of three questions captures the understanding of two rudimentary 
financial concepts: compound interest and inflation, as well as of risk diversification19. 
They include the understanding of risk diversification because it is crucial to make 
informed investment decisions. Moreover, an understanding of interest and inflation 
requires basic numeracy skills. In following academic studies in national and 
international surveys this operationalization is frequently applied, always adopted to the 
local context and many times complemented by further questions (Cole et al., 2013; Xu 
and Zia, 2012; Cole et al., 2011). In an investigation of financial literacy in India and 
Indonesia, Cole et al. (2013, 2011) slightly adapted the wording of the compound 
interest and inflation question by Lusardi and Mitchel (2008, 2006)20. They added a 
second, simpler question on the calculation on interest21 and modified the risk 
diversification question to the context of agricultural low-income households22.   
This study follows the established survey measurement approach of financial literacyas 
financial literacy is a control variable and not main variable of interest. A risk 
diversification question is not included, as the initial formulation by Lusardi and 
Mitchell requires an understanding of stocks and mutual funds inappropriate in the Sri 
Lankan setting, and the proposed alternative by Cole et al. (2011) is only applicable in 
                                                
 
19 Compound interest question: “Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% 
per year. After 5 years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to 
grow: more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102?” 
Inflation question: “Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation 
was 2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than 
today with the money in this account?” 
Risk diversification question: “Do you think that the following statement is true or false? ‘Buying a 
single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund’” 
20 Modified compound interest question: “Suppose you borrowed Rs. 100 at an interest rate of 2% per 
month. After 3 months, if you had made no repayments, would you owe more than, less than, or exactly 
Rs. 102?”  
Modified inflation question: “If you have Rs. 100 in a savings account earning 1% interest per annum, 
and prices for goods and services rise 2% over a one-year period, can you buy more, less, or the same 
number of goods in one year, as you could today?”  
21 “Suppose you need to borrow Rs. 500, to be repaid in one month. Which loan would be more attractive 
for you: Loan 1, which requires a repayment of Rs. 600 in one month; or Loan 2, which requires a 
repayment of Rs. 500 plus 15% interest?”  
22 “Is it safer to plant one single crop, or multiple crops?” 
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an agricultural context. Thus, only the understanding of interest and inflation is 
measured with the following questions:  
Interest:  
 
Suppose you borrowed LKR 10.000 from 
a money lender and the rate of interest or 
charge/fee was 2% per month. If you made 
no repayment for three months, how much 
would you owe? 
§ Less than LKR 10,200 
§ Exactly LRK 10,200 
§ More than LKR 10,200 
§ Don’t know 
Suppose you need to borrow LKR 50,000. 
Two people offer you a loan. One loan 
requires you pay back LKR 60,000 in one 
month. The second loan also requires you 
to pay back LKR 50,000 plus 15 percent 
interest or charge/fee in one month. Which 
loan would you prefer?   
§ LKR 60,000 in one month 
§ LKR 50,000 + 15% interest 
§ Don’t know 
Inflation   
Imagine that you saved LKR 10,000 in a 
saving account, and were earning an 
interest rate of 1% per year. If prices were 
increasing at a rate of 2% per year, after 
one year, would you be able to buy less 
than, more than, or exactly the same 
amount as today with the money in this 
account? 
§ Less than today 
§ Exactly as much as today 
§ More than today 
§ Don’t know 
Based on the answers provided to these questions the variable ‘financial literacy’ is 
defined, totaling up to the number of correct answers to the three questions.  
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Contract non-performance 
Theory and focus group discussion results indicated that the risk of contract non-
performance might reduce micro life insurance uptake in the Eastern Province of Sri 
Lanka. To measure for such an effect, respondents were asked to state their level of trust 
in a valid claims payout: 
How much do you trust in case that if an 
insured emergency happens to you, you 
will receive a payout from your insurance 
company? 
§ Very much 
§ Fairly 
§ Moderately 
§ A little 
§ Not at all 
Table 25 summarizes the definition of variables.  
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Table 25: Definition of variables   
Variable Description 
Membership Number of a household’s memberships in formal organizations.   
Generalized trust  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent says that most 
people can be trusted, 0 otherwise. 
Awareness / 
understanding 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a person turns to someone before 
making a financial decision or is consulted by others, 0 otherwise. 
Imitation  Dummy variable equal to 1 if a peer has insurance coverage, 0 
otherwise.  
Trust-building  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent observed a claims 
payout, 0 otherwise. 
Informal risk sharing Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent received financial 
support by a friend, relative or neighbor either by borrowing or by a 
donation and 0 otherwise. 
Hindu Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is Hindu, 0 otherwise.  
Muslim Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is Muslim, 0 
otherwise. 
Christian Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is Christian, 0 
otherwise. 
Buddhist  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is Buddhist, 0 
otherwise. 
Interest Dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent does not have an 
interest-bearing savings product or loan, 0 otherwise. 
Mutuality  Respondent’s agreement with the statement “In your opinion by 
buying non-vehicle insurance you support others who are in need” 
on a five-point Likert scale.  
Risk aversion  Average constant relative risk aversion. 
Young dependency ratio No. of unmarried children relative to the total number of household 
members.  
Age Age of respondent. 
Income Annual household income.  
Wealth Assets (phone, TV, radio, stove, refrigerator, electric fan, electric 
water pump, (non-)motorized vehicle, house, land ownership) 
owned by the household, index created by factor analysis. 
Premium Perception of the respondent on premium amount paid for 
insurance 
Education School-leaving qualification. 
Financial literacy  Financial literacy is the accumulation of correct answers to three 
financial literacy assessing questions. 
Contract non-performance Trust of the respondent in receiving a valid claims payout 
Source: Author’s own 
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4.4 Sampling Strategy  
For the quantitative study the author chose the same research areas as for the qualitative 
study: the two districts in the east of Sri Lanka: Trincomalee and Batticaloa as located 
in the following map in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Location of field study  
 
Source: Department of Census and Statistics (2014) 
These districts were chosen because of their religious diversity of Hindus, Muslims, 
Christians, and Buddhists and a supply of micro life insurance, both conventional and 
Takaful. In total, about 169,000 people are living in these two districts per the 
Department of Census and Statistics (2012). Out of this population about 97,000 people 
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are Hindu (58 percent), 65,000 Muslim (38 percent), 7,000 Christian (4 percent) and 
600 Buddhist (0 percent).  
Sampling and data collection was carried out in close cooperation with a local 
consulting firm and the non-governmental organization Muslim Aid. The latter runs a 
microfinance institution and offers Micro Takaful products in the divisions of: Muthur, 
Koralai Pattu West and Central, Manmunai Pattu or Araipattai and Manmunai South 
and Eruvil Pattu in the two districts of Trincomalee, Batticaloa since 2011. 
Sample size n is determined by from population size N and margin of error e: 
 9 = :$;:∙=> = $?@,BCC$;$?@,BCC∙C.CE> = 399  
This sample size in line with previous studies on micro life insurance demand in Ghana 
and Sri Lanka with a sample size of 330 participants and 350 (Giesbert et al., 2011; 
Bendig and Arun, 2011; 2016).  
To answer this studies research questions, two parameters or household characteristics 
are of interest when selecting the sample: (micro life) insurance ownership and religious 
affiliation. Therefore, the method of stratified sampling is applied with two strata: 
insurance status and religion. The first stratum is applied disproportional to the total 
population whereas the second stratum proportionally. At the time of research, less than 
7 percent of the Sri Lankan population had micro insurance (Microinsurance Network, 
2016). To be able to answer the research questions a minimum and comparable number 
of policyholders and non-policyholders is necessary which required a disproportional 
sampling. In total the research aimed at the following sampling distribution in Table 26: 
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Table 26: Sampling strategy 
 
Policyholder Non-Policyholder Sum 
% of 
Sample 
% of 
Population 
Hindu 114 114 228 57,3% 57,2% 
Muslim 76 76 152 38% 38,1% 
Buddhist 1 1 2 0,5% 0,0% 
Catholic 5 5 10 2,5% 2,4% 
Other Christian 4 4 8 2% 1,9% 
Total 200 200 400 100%  
Source: Author’s own 
The group of policyholders in proportion to their religious affiliation was selected from 
the customer base of the microfinance institutions.  
Non-policyholders were randomly selected from a list of village inhabitants provided by 
the village leaders. The choice of selected households from the village leader’s list was 
then cross-checked with the customer database of the microfinance institution. 
Households insured with the microfinance organization were replaced. To guarantee for 
an optimal sample size after data preparation and clearing the author decided to 
oversample and to collect in total information from 450 households.  
Participants had the option to decline their participation in the survey, but no household 
opted to do so. The households did not receive a monetary compensation for the survey 
itself, but the risk aversion lottery was incentivized. 
4.5 Data Collection and Preparation 
Interviewers were recruited locally. The team of interviewers consisted of ten students 
from Sri Lankan universities or colleges currently on semester break in their home 
villages. Prior to the data collection, the interviewer received a one-day training 
workshop. This training covered the topics of:  
• Research ethics  
• Introduction to and explanation of the research study and its objective 
• Role of a research assistant 
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• Introduction to and explanation of the questionnaire, its questions, answers and 
documentation needs  
• Interview process, e.g. presentation of possibilities to get in contact with the 
respondents, how to introduce yourself and the research  
The training further involved exemplary interviews and role-plays on the conduct of the 
survey questionnaire and the risk aversion lottery including a feedback and discussion 
round.    
Every day before the interviewers started with the survey, they met with their supervisor 
and the researcher to discuss on the difficulties in collecting data encountered the 
previous day. In addition, the author checked the filled questionnaires every night and 
provided feedback on observed inconsistencies in the response patterns or missing data 
of the previous day’s questionnaires. She further checked for the distribution of the 
payouts in the context of the risk aversion lottery.  
The household survey took place between September 2nd and September 20th in 2013. In 
the area of Muthur the data was collected until September 7th and in the district of 
Batticaloa from September 10th to 13th. Interviewers visited the different households 
during daytime. If household members were not present, the household was revisited.  
Due to the low literacy level of the participants the survey was interviewer-administered 
instead of self-administered. Interviewers read out the questions and if applicable the 
answer categories to the participants. This procedure may increase the risk of social 
desirability response base (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 285). However, it seemed the 
most appropriate manner for collecting data from the target group. Further, research 
indicates that concentration of the participants lasts longer in interviewer-administered 
surveys increasing data quality (Krosnick and Presser, 2010: 292). Due to the basic 
conditions of the survey setting, the data was collected by pen-paper method.  
At the beginning of the data collection process the author joined one of the interviewers 
to get a better understanding of the respondents and to quality control the data collection 
process. However, in some cases her attendance let to the presence of third persons 
increasing the risk of response errors. Therefore, and due to further difficulties with the 
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local authorities she stopped her direct participation. Appendix 7 provides some 
impressions from the household survey.  
As the household survey data was collected by paper-pencil method, the data had to be 
digitalized and prepared for data analysis using a software. The author scanned all 464 
questionnaires for digitalization. The software Remark office was then used to extract 
the data from the digital files and to automatically transform the data into an Excel-
based data matrix to be later uploaded into Stata. This automated process was chosen to 
reduce data entry errors, i.e. typing errors. However, the Remark office software can 
automatically extract ticked boxes but not handwritten numbers or words. Hence, the 
author manually added the information on: age, number of children and dependents, 
answers to the questions measuring for financial literacy, name of the insurance 
companies, number of memberships in formal social networks, income and number of 
livestock, and the reference information to the interviewee and interviewer. Further, the 
software returned some errors in reading the files that were manually corrected by 
adding the missing information from the hardcopy. This full process of data entry 
turned out to be much more time-consuming than expected. Therefore, the author 
decided to drop further information that she would have had to enter manually, and 
either provided little additional information: duration of the interview, size of land 
owned by the participator answers to open questions on the motivation to attend 
religious services or to pray. In addition, she did not enter any information that 
conflicted with data privacy: name of the participant, address of the participant (Döring 
and Bortz, 2006: 589). In total the raw data included 339 variables.   
Before she extracted the data and uploaded it into Stata the author checked the data of 
the individual questionnaires for overall completeness. One questionnaire was dropped 
because of too many missing values. In this case, four pages of the questionnaire were 
missing.   
Next, the author uploaded the data into Stata and applied the designed code plan that 
follows the structure and content of the questionnaire. She named and labeled the 
variables and applied values to the individual answer categories.   
To further to secure the quality of the data she checked the data for plausibility of the 
given answers, missing data and for outliers (Döring and Bortz, 2016: 589-591). The 
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plausibility of the data was checked against: (i) consistency of answers, (ii) the range of 
values, and the (iii) frequency distribution of the variables. To ensure the consistency of 
an interviewee’s answers the author cross-checked that responses conditional on a 
certain status are only considered if the condition is fulfilled. For example, responses 
that are related to insurance ownership are replaced by missing value (.n = not 
applicable) if the person is uninsured but provided an answer by accident. Further 
details on this process can be found in the respective Stata do-file. The minimum and 
maximum values of the different variables are in the predetermined range and hence it 
can be assumed that no data entry errors occurred on this. The frequency distribution of 
the variables is in line with the expectations of the author without any observed 
anomalies.  
An analysis of missing values identified several variables not to be included in the data 
analysis because the number of missing values is substantial: trust-building (n = 348), 
premium (n = 226) and contract non-performance (n = 354). The author believes that 
these errors are caused by the questionnaire order and instructions to the interviewer. 
Interviewers might have perceived these questions as not to be applicable to the survey 
participants. For further variables missing values could be replaced by an answer 
category without affecting the informative value of the variable, i.e. if the household 
does not use any financial product a missing value for the variable interest can be 
substituted by the category of no interest payment. Further details are described in the 
corresponding Stata do-file.  
At last the author checked for outliers. Using four standard measures for identifying 
outliers she by deleted three cases. The detailed procedure is documented in the 
respective Stata do-file.  
4.6 Sample and Summary Statistics  
After eliminating missing values and outliers, the complete sample includes 424 
households out of 464 responses. In the sample, there are 212 Muslim households (50 
percent), 173 belong to the religion of Hinduism (40 percent), 34 are Christian (8 
percent), and only 5 respondents are Buddhist (2 percent). In sum, the sample 
distribution deviates slightly from the population distribution. Therefore, the author 
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decided to introduce sampling weights to ensure that the results are at least 
representative for the areas under study. The details on sampling weights are reported in 
the corresponding Stata do-file.  
As presented in Table 27, total 174 households out of 424 currently have a micro 
insurance policy, whereas 250 are not covered by any kind of insurance. As 159 
households in the sample (37.5 percent) have health insurance, it can be inferred that the 
households are most likely to have health insurance, if they are insured. In comparison, 
29.5 percent or 125 of the participants have accident coverage and 25.2 percent or 108 
households have life insurance. Only 26 households or 6 percent have vehicle 
insurance. It can also be concluded that several participants are protected against 
multiple risk. On average an insured respondent has 2.4 kinds of coverage.  
Table 27: Micro insurance coverage of the sample  
 No. of households Percentage 
Health  159 37.5% 
Accident 125 29.5% 
Life  108 25.4% 
Vehicle 26 6.0%  
Source: Author’s own  
Out of the 108 life insured households, a credit life product is held by 52 households. In 
these cases, the borrower is obliged to take up insurance coverage provided by the 
microfinance institution from where she would like to borrow. These cases of credit-
motivated micro life insurance uptake are not the focus of this study in general as this 
research aims to identify intrinsic demand factors. The total number of voluntary micro 
life insurance policyholders included in this sample amounts to 56. Further detailing the 
micro life insurance ownership based on religious denomination, the author finds that 
out of 56 voluntary micro life insurance households in the data set, 34 are Hindus, 13 
are Muslims, 8 are Christians, and only 1 is Buddhist. Overall, both forms of micro life 
insurance, conventional and Takaful are almost equally demanded and multiple policy 
ownership is possible as the total number of Takaful and conventional policies is 60 for 
56 households. However, as the sampling strategy did not further distinguish between 
conventional micro insurance and Micro Takaful ownership, Muslims exclusively 
purchased Family Micro Takaful and Christians bought conventional products. In total, 
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voluntary Family Micro Takaful coverage is bought by 13 Muslims, 18 Hindus, and 1 
Buddhist. Whereas, voluntary conventional micro life insurance is purchased by 20 
Hindus, 7 Christians, and only 1 Buddhist. Credit-linked micro life insurance is bought 
by 32 Hindus, 14 Muslims, and 6 Christians. Interestingly, the people who have 
mandatory insurance products are more likely to have two policies than voluntarily 
insured people. In addition, for credit life products the percentage of Takaful products 
exceeds the share of conventional products. Hindus are more likely to have Family 
Micro Takaful coverage, whereas the uptake of either form of insurance is the same for 
Muslims. These numbers clearly show how life insurance ownership is impacted by the 
underlying credit uptake. Figure 10 summarizes the sample distribution dependent on 
micro life insurance status and religious denomination.  
Figure 10: Sample distribution of micro life insurance ownership and religion 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
Note: In some cases, subtotals presented for mandatory and voluntary micro life insurance 
coverage are not equal to the sum across the subcategories of Takaful and conventional. Totals 
are presented in brackets. Differences are caused by participants who have both kinds of 
insurance forms or if data did not allow for determining any insurance form.  
Table 28 reports the summary statistics of the explanatory variables for the full sample, 
including micro life insurance policyholders as well as non-policyholders. As suggested 
by the young dependency ratio of 0.49, an average respondent’s household comprises of 
two children and two adults, which is in line with the average household size of 3.9 in 
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the Eastern Province (Department of Census and Statistics, 2014: 5). An average 
participant is about 40 years old and earns an average annual income of LKR 223,690 
(approx. EUR 1,245.63), translating to LKR 18,640 per month (approx. EUR 103.80). 
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Table 28: Summary statistics – Micro life insured and non-insured households (voluntary take-up)   
 Full sample Voluntary life insured Non-voluntary life insured P-Value of 
Variable Mean Std. dev.  Mean (2) Std. dev.  Mean (3) Std. dev t-test (2) – (3) 
Socio-economic characteristics         
Income 225.4021 163.6685 305.8832 232.4072 213.1549 147.1103 0.0001*** 
Wealth 0.0288 1.6354 0.7372 1.6072 -0.0790 1.6147 0.0005*** 
Ratio of young dependents 0.4943  0.2652 0.744 0.2221 .4974 0.2713 0.5467 
Age  40.4859 10.4849 37.1429 10.3123 40.9946 11.0056 0.0143** 
Education 2.0735 1.0619 2.2407 1.1645 2.0489 1.0455 0.2155 
Financial literacy  1.2429 0.9276 1.1607 0.8692 1.2554 0.9367 0.4772 
Social capital         
Membership 0.8679 0.9804 1.1071 1.1549 0.8315 0.9476 0.0499** 
Generalized trust 0.5354 0.4993 0.5000 0.5045 0.5407 0.4990 0.5699 
Awareness / understanding  0.7217 0.4489 0.6607 0.4778 0.7310 0.4441 0.2755 
Imitation  0.3208 0.4673 0.6071 0.4928 0.2772 0.4482 0.0000*** 
Trust-building 0.1262 0.3325 0.2364 0.4288 0.1098 0.3128 0.0082*** 
Informal risk sharing  0.6887 0.4636 0.4821 0.5042 0.7201 0.4496 0.0003*** 
Religion         
Interest  0.5425 0.4988 0.7500 0.4369 0.5109 0.5006 0.0008*** 
Mutuality  2.3821 1.2586 3.2500 1.3108 2.2500 1.1983 0.0000*** 
Risk aversion – Small losses 1.3188 1.0429 1.3671 1.1159 1.3115 1.0327 0.7103 
Risk aversion – High losses 1.6176 1.1080 1.6204 1.1170 1.6171 1.1081 0.9834 
Observations 424  56  368   
Source: Author’s own calculation; Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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According to the National Household Income and Expenditure Survey from 2012/2013, 
this accounts to about two thirds of the mean monetary household income in the Eastern 
Province (LKR 27,477 / month or LKR 329,724 annually) and is slightly below the 
median annual income (Department of Census and Statistics, 2015). As displayed in 
Table 29, the surveyed households pertain to the lower income groups, following the 
national classification of income groups. The households with a mean monthly income 
of about LKR 21,273 (approx. EUR 118.46) belong to the poorest 40 percent and are 
low to mid income groups. For comparison, the lowest income group (20 percent of the 
cumulative population) receives a mean household monthly income of LKR 10,245 
(approx. EUR 57.05) (Department of Census and Statistics, 2014: 5). The below 
average income situation of the survey participants is also confirmed by a slightly 
negative asset endowment index.  
Table 29: Breakdown of household income 2012/13 
 Household income quintile 
2012/2013 Lowest Low-mid Middle Mid-upper Upper 
 1st quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Mean household 
income per month 
(LKR) 
10,245 21,273 30,944 45,569 121,368 
Mean household 
income per month 
(approx. EUR) 
57.05 118.26 172.31 253.75 675.84 
Share of income (%) 4.5% 9.3% .13.5% 19.9% 52.9% 
Cumulative share of 
income (%) 
4.5% 13.7% 27.2% 47.1% 100% 
Source: Adapted from Department of Census and Statistics (2014: 5) 
The average respondent’s level of financial literacy is rather low. Out of three questions, 
only average 1.24 correct answers are given by the participants. Mean values of the 
characteristics related to social capital show that the average respondent belongs to 0.87 
formal organizations and about half of the respondents from the sample believe that 
“most people can be trusted” (54 percent), whereas the others opt for the statement that 
“generally speaking you cannot be too careful in dealing with people” (46 percent). 
Almost 72 percent of the sampled households have exchanged information with their 
peers on insurance, meaning that they have either consulted their friends, relatives or 
neighbors for advice or given advice to them. The analysis reveals that 32 percent of the 
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respondents know someone who has purchased insurance. Moreover, it is observed that 
69 percent of the respondents usually borrow from their friends, relatives or neighbor if 
they are facing an unexpected event which affects their financial situation.  
Concerning the demand factor of religion and potential explanations for an effect of 
religious denomination on micro life insurance consumption, the descriptive statistics 
show that more than half of the respondents (54 percent) currently pay interest on their 
borrowings or receive interest payments on their savings. On average, respondents do 
not acknowledge the mutual character of insurance because they do not perceive 
insurance as a form of institutionalized solidarity. Instead, they are more likely to 
disagree with the statement that by purchasing insurance “others in need are supported” 
(the mean value of a 5 point Likert is 2.35, whereby the value of 2 correspondents to 
“disagree” and the value 3 to “neither agree nor disagree”). On average, the respondents 
are severely risk averse.  
When directly questioned about their lack of insurance coverage, most of the non-
policyholders state that they cannot afford the regular insurance premium payment (127 
responses). Religious reasons (93 responses) are ranked second, followed by a lack of 
information about insurance (36 responses). Furthermore, the survey participants do not 
trust in the performance of the insurers. They believe that processes take long or 
insurers do not settle claims (19 responses).  
4.7 Model and Estimation Strategy  
To determine the effect of social capital and religion on the consumption of micro life 
insurance the following binary probit model is estimated:  
 !"#$%	'"()* = , + ./ ∙ 1%#"2'	#23"42'* + 56 ∙ $)'"7"%8* + 9 ∙ :* + ;* 
where ‘micro life’ is an indicator for voluntary micro life insurance coverage of 
respondent ‘i’. ‘social capital’ is a vector of variables hypothesized to affect micro life 
insurance uptake: generalized trust, membership in formal social networks, awareness/ 
understanding, imitation, trust-building and informal risk sharing. ‘religion’ is a vector 
of variables explaining for an effect of religion on micro life insurance consumption: 
interest, mutuality, risk aversion. The vector of control variables X includes: ratio of 
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young dependents, age, income, wealth, education, financial literacy. ε is the 
independent error term.  
Since the model makes use of several explanatory variables, multicollinearity might be 
an issue. To check for multicollinearity among the independent variables the author 
calculated pairwise correlation coefficients. Regarding the two concepts of social capital 
and religion, the correlation between the various levels of social capital as well as the 
relationship are of special interest. As reported in Table 30, the correlation between the 
various dimensions of social capital are weak for most of the variables. One exception is 
the modest linear relationship between a peers’ insurance uptake and peer’s claims 
experience (r = 0.5304). This correlation is explainable by the fact that a peers’ claims 
experiences is dependent on her decision to uptake insurance. Therefore, the variable 
‘trust building’ which is measured by a peer’s positive claims experiences is excluded in 
the final model and the ‘trust-building’ hypothesis is not further considered.    
Table 30: Correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r) and dimensions of social capital 
 Membership Generalized 
Trust 
Awareness Imitation Trust-
building 
Informal 
Risk 
Sharing 
Membership 1.0      
Generalized 
Trust 
-0.1363 1.0     
Awareness 0.1490 -0.1070 1.0    
Imitation 0.0924 -0.1340 0.0889 1.0   
Trust 
building 
0.1033 -0.1081 0.1242 0.5304 1.0  
Informal risk 
sharing 
-0.0609 0.1649 -0.0660 -0.1824 -0.0671 1.0 
Source: Author’s own 
Further variables with a modest correlation are education and financial literacy (r = 
0.3846), peers’ insurance uptake and the principle of mutuality (r = 0.3922), income and 
wealth (r = 0.4410). Because of the correlation between income and wealth, the author 
decided to include wealth but not income in the model which is in line with the 
theoretical statements of expected utility theory and previous empirical studies (i.e. 
Bendig and Arun, 2016; Giesbert et al., 2011). The author further decided to include the 
more specific variable of financial literacy instead of education. Even though a modest 
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correlation exists between the two variables of peer’s insurance uptake (‘imitation 
effect’) and the principle of solidarity both variables are part of the final model. In 
contrast to the other described correlations, the relationship is not obvious. In addition, 
multicollinearity was checked for by calculating variance inflation factors (Wooldridge, 
2009: 99) that are reported in Appendix 7. The variance inflation factor (VIF) shows the 
extent to which the variance of the coefficient estimate is inflated by multicollinearity. 
VIFs of the explanatory variables range from 1.05 to 1.70, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue. Literature suggests that multicollinearity is a problem if 
VIFs are larger than 10 (Williams, 2015). Results 
To account for the requirements of the remaining eight hypotheses on sample 
composition and dependent variable, and considering the actual sample after data 
collection, the author decided to test for the effects of social capital and religion by 
segregated models. While sample compositions and dependent variables differ across 
these models, the set of explanatory and control variables is kept constant across all 
models to allow for an overall conclusion. For each analysis, group comparison tests are 
conducted first, followed by probit regressions. Group comparison tests aim to 
understand the data set and identify strong correlations with the main variables of 
interest. Afterwards, multivariate probit regressions allow simultaneous estimation of 
potential effects. For the interpretation of estimation results, average marginal effects 
are presented in the following. Firstly, this section reports the results explaining the 
effects of social capital on the demand for micro life insurance (Section 4.8.1). 
Secondly, it shares the findings on the role of religion on micro life insurance demand 
(Section 4.8.2).   
4.7.1 Social Capital and Micro Life Insurance Demand  
This section tests the remaining five hypotheses on the effects of social capital on micro 
life insurance demand. Based on previous theoretical and empirical research, the author 
identified two forms and four functions through which social capital might affect micro 
life insurance consumption among low-income households in the Eastern Province of 
Sri Lanka including: (i) membership in formal social networks, (ii) generalized trust, 
(iii) creation of awareness and understanding, (iv) imitation of consumption behavior, 
(v) trust-building, and (vi) informal risk sharing. As indicated in the previous section, 
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the author decided not to test the ‘trust-building’ hypothesis to avoid multicollinearity 
problems. Correlations between the variables measuring the concepts of trust-building 
and imitation are substantial. On the one hand, the author expects to observe a positive 
influence of a household’s membership in formal social networks and generalized trust, 
as well as of the creation of awareness and understanding and the imitation effect. On 
the other hand, the author projects a negative effect of informal risk sharing strategies.  
4.7.1.1 Descriptive Results on Social Capital  
This section discusses the summary statistics before putting forward the multivariate 
probit analyses which test the five hypotheses related to social capital. In the following, 
Table 28 on page 171 reports a summary of the statistics where column (1) reports mean 
values and standard deviation of the individual characteristics for the entire sample. 
Column (2) of the table presents mean values and standard deviation for the sub-sample 
of voluntary micro life insurance policyholders and Column (3) reports mean values and 
standard deviation for the sub-sample of non-policyholders, including households with 
credit-life insurance. Lastly, Column (4) shows p-values of the Wald Test for the 
differences between policyholders and non-policyholders of voluntary micro life 
insurance.  
In line with the ‘membership hypothesis’, households with voluntary micro life 
insurance are significantly more likely to belong to a formal social network on average, 
compared to uninsured households. The results also support the ‘imitation effect 
hypothesis’. More than half of the micro life insured households know someone who 
has purchased insurance; a substantially larger share compared to the uninsured 
households. The descriptive statistics also indicate a negative relationship between 
informal risk sharing and micro life insurance consumption. Uninsured low-income 
households are markedly more likely to borrow from their friends, relatives or 
neighbors in times of need. The descriptive statistics neither provide strong evidence for 
an effect of generalized trust on micro life insurance demand nor for an awareness 
creation effect by peers as the differences between policyholders and non-policyholders 
are not significant. Interestingly, the two variables of awareness and imitation show an 
opposite effect which further emphasizes their mutual independency. 
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The young dependency ratio indicates that an average life insurance policyholder has 
more children than a non-policyholder and is four years younger compared to a non-
policyholder. Both results are comparable to the numbers reported by Bendig and Arun 
(2016). In their study on micro insurance demand in Sri Lanka, the policyholders (life 
and non-life) are two years younger than the uninsured and usually have a slightly 
larger family (p. 212). In the present study, an average household with micro life 
insurance is significantly wealthier than the uninsured household. This result is also in 
line with the previous results from Sri Lanka (Bendig and Arun, 2016: 212) and further 
supports the influence of affordability. An insured household earns an annual income of 
LKR 306,000 (approx. EUR 1,703.98). A policyholder is slightly more likely to have a 
marginally higher educational degree, though still left school after Grade 10. 
Interestingly though, the policyholders are less financially literate than the non-
policyholders. This result is striking because the policyholders more frequently use 
conventional financial products, hence are expected to be more familiar with basic 
financial concepts. However, according to t-tests, the differences in education and 
financial literacy between insured and uninsured respondents do not seem to be 
significant. On the contrary, the principle of mutuality seems to significantly support the 
decision to buy insurance. On a five point Likert-scale, the mean score of individuals 
that agree with the statement “by buying non-vehicle insurance, you support others who 
are in need” is higher for the insured than the uninsured. The insured respondents are 
slightly less risk averse in smaller and larger losses, as per the t-test results.  
To sum up, the descriptive statistics indicate three channels through which social capital 
might impact micro life insurance consumption among low-income households in the 
Eastern Province of Sri Lanka: membership in formal social networks, imitation of peer 
consumption behavior, and informal risk sharing. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
generalized trust does not seem to determine micro life insurance consumption. Also, 
there is no descriptive evidence for a creation of awareness of or understanding about 
insurance by peers. Other relevant demand factors could be age, wealth, the principle of 
mutuality, and the usage of conventional, interest-bearing, microfinance products. The 
following multivariate analysis further relates these findings to each other and checks 
for interdependencies between the various independent variables.  
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4.7.1.2 Regression Results on Social Capital  
To estimate the effects of social capital on micro life insurance demand, a probit model 
is run. This analysis follows the general estimation strategy outlined in Section 4.7, 
where the dependent variable ‘micro life’ is assigned a value of ‘one’ if the household is 
currently covered by a voluntary micro life insurance. The sample includes the full data 
set of 424 households. In the entire sample, only 56 households have voluntary micro 
life insurance, whereas 368 households are not covered by voluntary micro life 
insurance. The following Table 31 presents the average marginal effects23 of the probit 
model in the specified equation.  
                                                
 
23 Average marginal effect presents the outcome of a one-unit change for each of the explanatory variable 
on the probability of owning a micro life insurance policy. 
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Table 31: Probit model results of voluntary micro life insurance uptake  
  Variable ME Control 
variables 
ME Social 
Capital 
ME Full 
Model 
Socio-economic characteristics    
Wealth 0.0368***  0.0355*** 
 (0.0122)  (0.0117) 
Young dependency ratio 0.00317  0.00663 
 (0.0707)  (0.0740) 
Age -0.00226  -0.000440 
 (0.00184)  (0.00172) 
Financial literacy -0.0159  -0.00936 
 (0.0211)  (0.0203) 
Social capital    
Membership  0.0545*** 0.0302 
  (0.0207) (0.0195) 
Generalized trust  0.0484 0.0493 
  (0.0427) (0.0405) 
Awareness/ Understanding  -0.0914** -0.146*** 
  (0.0448) (0.0447) 
Imitation   0.203*** 0.0997** 
  (0.0420) (0.0416) 
Informal risk sharing  -0.116*** -0.0714* 
  (0.0430) (0.0390) 
Religion    
Interest 0.109**  0.113** 
 (0.0442)  (0.0447) 
Mutuality 0.0708***  0.0655*** 
 (0.0148)  (0.0165) 
Risk aversion – Small losses                0.00453  0.00408 
 (0.0189)  (0.0176) 
Risk aversion – Large losses -0.0172  -0.0183 
 (0.0188)  (0.0181) 
Observations 306 306 306 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Presented above in Table 31, the results show that social capital plays an important role 
in the decisions to purchase life insurance among low-income households. However, the 
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effects are mixed. Insurance consumption by peers serves as a reference for others’ 
uptake (‘imitation effect’) and supports micro life insurance uptake, whereas an 
information exchange with peers on insurance (‘creation of awareness and 
understanding’) and informal risk sharing reduces the probability to insure. In contrast 
to the hypotheses, the form of social capital, measured as membership in formal social 
networks and generalized trust, does not influence micro life insurance uptake. It is the 
actions facilitated by social networks that matter for micro life insurance uptake, not 
their institutional character. A result further supported by the very correlations between 
these variables. The counterintuitive negative awareness effect might be a reflection of 
negative word-of-mouth existing in the area under study, as indicated during the focus 
group discussions. In line with the predictions of this study, the data provide evidence 
for a positive imitation effect. The households that know of a friend, relative or 
neighbor who has life insurance, are significantly more likely to be insured themselves. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution as the direction of causality is 
not clear. It could be the case that the insured respondent recommended insurance to her 
friends or vice versa. Regression results also confirm the ‘informal risk sharing’ 
hypothesis. The households that informally support each other in times of need are 
significantly less likely to be life insured.  
Used as control variables in this study, both age and young dependency ratio which 
measure a life cycle effect and a bequest motive respectively show the expected sign. 
As reported in previous studies, age is negatively associated with life insurance 
ownership and the number of young dependents in relation to the total household size 
has a positive relationship (Giesbert et al., 2011). However, this study cannot provide 
conclusive evidence for a life cycle effect as both correlations are statistically 
insignificant. This result is also in accordance with the previous findings from Sri Lanka 
(Bendig and Arun, 2016). Wealthier households are significantly more likely to buy 
micro life insurance which is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical 
literature (Bendig and Arun, 2016; Giesbert et al., 2011). Interestingly, the respondents’ 
level of financial literacy has a negative coefficient, in contrast to previous studies on 
agriculture micro insurance demand which observed a positive relationship. In this 
sample, it might be the case that the more financial literate households are able to assess 
the benefits of the offered voluntary micro life insurance products, reaching the 
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conclusion that they are of minor value to them. In addition, the unexpected outcome 
might be caused by the applied measurement approach of financial literacy which is not 
specific to insurance. Instead, it covers the basic principles of interest and inflation. 
However, the reasons for this unexpected outcome are not further investigated as the 
effect is not significant. 
The usage of conventional, interest-bearing microfinance products strongly supports 
micro life insurance uptake. The households that either pay interest for their loans or 
receive interest on their savings are more likely to have a life insurance policy. This 
effect might be related to the rejection of interest payments in Islam, but it may also 
indicate an ability to access financial services, a better understanding of financial 
products, or successful cross-selling by financial institutions. The following section, 
which discusses the role of religion in supporting or hindering micro life insurance 
demand, further elaborates this finding. Another important and novel insight brought 
forward by the empirical study reveals that the idea of mutuality significantly affects the 
decision to purchase life insurance. According to the results, people who perceive life 
insurance as a mean to support others in need have a higher preference for life insurance 
consumption. How this results relates to a person’s religion is discussed in the next 
section. Against expectations, the level of risk aversion does not significantly influence 
micro life insurance consumption. According to the underlying expected utility model 
of life insurance demand, risk aversion should positively influence consumption. 
Nevertheless, the results of the previous studies are not conclusive on the relationship 
either. Bendig and Arun (2016) observed a positive effect in Sri Lanka, whereas 
Giesbert et al. (2011) found a negative relationship. However, their results are not fully 
comparable to this research because they measured risk aversion based on the self-
reports of the survey participants.  
4.7.2 Religion and Micro Life Insurance Demand 
This section investigates if and how the religion of Islam in comparison to Hinduism 
impacts the demand for micro life insurance in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. As 
discussed earlier, literature review results suggest three channels through which the 
religion of Islam might affect micro life insurance consumption, including (i) 
prohibition of interest, (ii) mutuality, and (iii) risk aversion. Regarding these 
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hypotheses, it is necessary to differentiate between two forms of insurance: Takaful and 
conventional insurance. Takaful, as explained before, is a form of insurance that 
specifically addresses the objections of Islamic scholars against conventional insurance. 
It is a mutual form of insurance which avoids the involvement of interest. Life insurance 
is termed Family Takaful and non-life insurance General Takaful respectively. In the 
area under study, the insurer Amana Takaful offers Family Micro Takaful products that 
cover up to five family members against death, permanent disability, accident, hospital 
cash and medication in hospital as described in Section 1.6.3. In contrast, conventional 
insurance refers to the common retail insurance practices in industrialized countries. In 
this study, conventional micro life insurance and its Sharia-compliant equivalent, 
Family Micro Takaful, are considered. Due to the sample requirements for the 
hypotheses and the actual data set, the author decided to test the three hypotheses by 
four separate analyses, using two different probit models and three varying samples. 
This approach is further explained in the following and Table 32 provides an overview 
of the various independent variables and samples used. 
To test the interest hypothesis24, the sample should ideally comprise of conventional, 
non-credit linked micro life insurance policyholders and non-policyholders of Islamic 
belief. Interestingly, as the initial sampling strategy did not further stratify the cluster of 
micro life insurance policyholders, the group of Muslims insured with conventional, 
non-credit life products turn out to be non-existent. Consequently, the author decided to 
consider the policyholders of voluntary and credit life products in her analysis and 
adapted her estimation strategy. This sample consists of 108 households, whereby 27 
belong to the religion of Islam, 66 to Hinduism, 14 to Christianity, and 1 to Buddhism. 
Still only 13 Muslims are found to be covered by conventional micro life insurance, 
leading to a very small sample size that does not allow a comprehensive regression 
analysis. Instead the author argues that if the interest variable measures a religiously 
motivated rejection of interest-bearing products by Muslims, an effect of this variable 
                                                
 
24 The ‘interest hypothesis’ states that “the involvement of riba in conventional insurance negatively 
affects conventional micro life insurance uptake among Muslims.  
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should not be observed on Takaful uptake by Muslims or Hindus as well as on overall 
insurance demand by Hindus. Consequently, the author used two analyses: the first 
analysis identifies the demand factors for (i) Family Micro Takaful and the second 
analysis investigates the (ii) demand behavior among Hindus.  
The sample used to analyze (i) Family Micro Takaful uptake consists of 73 covered 
households and 351 non-Family Micro Takaful insured households, whereby the 
dependent variable i is ‘one’ if the household has a valid Family Micro Takaful policy, 
credit-linked or noncredit-linked coverage. For the second analysis (ii), the sample 
consists of 66 micro life insured and 106 non-life insured Hindus. The dependent 
variable i includes Hindus with micro life insurance policies. The latter includes 
voluntary and credit life products as well as conventional micro life insurance and 
Family Micro Takaful coverage.  
In a next step, using a comparison of the consumption patterns of Muslims and Hindus, 
it is analyzed if mutuality or risk aversion explains a religiously motivated difference in 
micro life insurance consumption. The focus on these two religious groups is caused by 
the small number of Christians and Buddhists in the data set. Separate probit models are 
estimated using the equation introduced in Section 4.7) for each religion. In these 
analyses, the dependent variable i is one if the respondent’s household has voluntary or 
credit life insurance coverage, either conventional or Takaful. The first sample (iii) is 
restricted to 27 Muslim policyholders and 185 Muslim non-policyholders, leading to 
212 households in total. The second sample (iv) comprises of 66 Hindus with micro life 
insurance and 106 Hindus without micro life insurance, adding up to172 Hindus in total.  
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Table 32: Overview of independent variables and samples 
Analysis Hypothesis Independent 
Variable 
Sample 
(i) Interest Family Micro Takaful (voluntary 
and credit life) 
Muslims, Hindus, 
Christian, Buddhist 
(ii) Interest Family Micro Takaful and 
Conventional (voluntary and credit 
life) 
Hindus 
(iii) Mutuality/Risk aversion Family Micro Takaful and 
Conventional (voluntary and credit 
life) 
Muslims 
(iv) Mutuality/Risk aversion Family Micro Takaful and 
Conventional (voluntary and credit 
life) 
Hindus 
Source: Author’s own 
 
4.7.2.1 Descriptive Results on Religion  
Interest and micro life insurance demand  
Table 33 presents mean values of households with and without Family Micro Takaful as 
well as the results from a Wald-test. On average, a conventional microcredit or 
microsavings product is used by 73 percent of the Family Micro Takaful members, 
compared to 50 percent of the non-members. The difference of 23 percentage points is 
significant at the one percent level. This result contrasts with the author’s expectations. 
She assumed that the demand for Takaful products should not be related to the usage of 
interest-bearing credits or savings, if the religion of Islam causes Muslims to reject 
conventional financial products. The observed significant effects could also indicate that 
the variable ‘interest’ might not measure the religiously motivated rejection of interest 
payments, but rather a household’s access to and usage of financial products or its 
creditworthiness.  
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Table 33: Summary statistics – Demand of Family Micro Takaful   
Variable Family Takaful 
insured  
mean 
Non Family 
Takaful insured 
 mean 
P-value of 
t-test 
 (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
Socio-economic characteristics    
Young dependency ratio 0.4824 0.4968 0.6736 
Age  35.8630 41.4473 0.0001*** 
Wealth 0.9650 -0.1659 0.0000*** 
Financial literacy  1.3562 1.2194 0.2521 
Social capital     
Membership 1.1370 0.8112 0.0098*** 
Generalized trust 0.4795 0.5470 0.2935 
Awareness/ Understanding  0.6712 0.7322 0.2914 
Imitation  0.5205 0.2792 0.0001*** 
Informal risk sharing  0.6164 0.7037 0.1436 
Religion     
Interest  0.7260 0.5043 0.0005*** 
Mutuality  3.1918 2.2137 0.0000*** 
Risk aversion – Small losses 1.3448 1.3134 0.8155 
Risk aversion – High losses 1.6632 1.6081 0.6993 
Observations  73 351 424 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Turning to the second analysis, Columns (1) to (4) of Table 34 present summary 
statistics and t-test results for the sub-sample of Hindus with or without micro life 
insurance either in the form of conventional insurance products of Family Takaful. An 
interest-bearing credit or savings product is held by 74 percent of Hindus with life 
insurance, compared to 68 percent of those without life insurance. Based on the Wald-
test results, the difference of 6 percentage points is insignificant. This finding is 
consistent with the author’s hypothesis that the Hindu participants’ insurance 
consumption is independent of their usage of interest-bearing financial services. 
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Table 34: Summary statistics – Differences in religion and insurance ownership  
Variable Hindu Life 
insured 
Hindus 
Not life 
insured 
Hindus 
P-value 
of t-test 
Muslim 
 
Life 
insured  
Muslims 
Not life 
insured 
Muslims 
P-value 
of t-test 
P-value 
of t-test 
P-value 
of t-test 
 (1) (2) (3) (2) – (3) (5) (6) (7) (1) – (5)  (6) – (7) (2) – (6) 
Socio-economic characteristics            
Young dependency ratio 0.4415 0.4689 0.4254 0.1954 0.5341 0.5204 0.5402 0.0003*** 0.7265 0.2767 
Age  37.2486 35.8939 38.1604 0.1551 43.0613 38.8889 43.68 0.0000*** 0.0342** 0.1600 
Wealth 0.2994 0.9788 -0.1333 0.0000*** -0.2919 0.5822 -0.4195 0.0002*** 0.0016*** 0.2199 
Financial literacy  1.2139 1.1970 1.2170 0.8999 1.2877 1.4815 1.2595 0.4442 0.2071 0.1683 
Social capital            
Membership 1.0173 1.0910 0.9811 0.4841 0.70258 0.8148 0.6865 0.0000*** 0.4894 0.2602 
Generalized trust 0.4798 0.4697 0.4811 0.8847 0.6178 0.4815 0.6378 0.0000 0.1194 0.9188 
Awareness  0.6763 0.7424 0.6321 0.1347 0.7453 0.5926 0.7676 0.7358 0.0516* 0.1561 
Imitation  0.5087 0.6818 0.4057 0.0004*** 0.1321 0.3704 0.0973 0.8924 0.0001*** 0.0052*** 
Informal risk sharing  0.5491 0.5758 0.5377 0.6282 0.8396 0.7037 0.8595 0.0011*** 0.0008*** 0.2550 
Religion            
Interest  0.6994 0.7424 0.6792 0.3806 0.3821 0.7407 0.3297 0.0078*** 0.0395** 0.9867 
Mutuality  2.8728 3.4394 2.5189 0.0000*** 1.8113 2.4074 1.7243 0.1294 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 
Risk aversion – Small losses 1.3651 1.5044 1.2824 0.1793 1.3347 1.0523 1.3758 0.0000*** 0.1417 0.0652* 
Risk aversion – High losses 1.6083 1.6476 1.5772 0.6933 1.6205 1.7385 1.6033 0.0000*** 0.5578 0.7362 
Observations 173 66 106 172 212 27 185 385 212 93 
Source: Author’s own calculation  
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As the results of these two comparisons are contradictory, the author decided to further 
investigate the sub-sample of Muslims who are more likely to be covered by Family 
Micro Takaful. The results are presented in Columns (5) to (7). Interestingly, interest-
bearing products are used by 33 percent of Muslim non-policyholders and 74 percent of 
Muslim policyholders. In addition, the difference of 35 percentage points between 
Hindu and Muslim non-policyholders in the usage of conventional banking services is 
significant at the one percent level. Overall lower acceptance and usage of interest-
bearing financial services among Muslims might indicate that uptake of conventional 
micro life insurance is hindered by the interest prohibition of Islam. However, the 
author refrains from further testing these sub-sample results by a regression analysis 
because of the small sample size, comprising of only 27 Muslim policyholders.  
In sum, the descriptive statistics on the ‘interest’ variable are mixed. The data on Family 
Micro Takaful consumption indicates a potential measurement failure of the theoretical 
concept of interest. Whereas, the results on insurance uptake by Hindus supports the 
initial interest hypothesis. The results from regression analyses may provide additional 
insights.  
Mutuality and micro life insurance demand 
The descriptive results of the characteristics of Muslims and Hindus are presented in 
Table 34. Using a Wald-test, the author finds that Muslim micro life insurance 
policyholders are significantly more likely to perceive insurance as an institutionalized 
form of mutuality, compared to non-policyholders. Although, most households state that 
they disagree with the statement that by “buying non-vehicle insurance you support 
others who are in need”. Interestingly and in contradiction to the hypotheses, Hindus are 
more likely to agree with the above-cited statement than Muslims and the difference 
between insured Muslims and Hindus is significant. In general, mutuality seems to be a 
factor determining micro life insurance uptake by Hindus as well. The differences in 
mutuality between Hindu policyholders and non-policyholders are significant at the one 
percent level. Overall, the mutual characteristic of micro life insurance seems to support 
its uptake with a varying degree depending on a person’s religion. However, in general 
mutuality seems not to be a differentiating characteristic of Muslims and Hindus.  
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Risk aversion and micro life insurance demand 
Mean values and t-test results presented in Table 34 show that the degrees of risk 
aversion of Muslims and Hindus are similar. Both groups can be classified as severely 
risk averse. However, the results on risk aversion vary between the two loss sizes 
investigated in this study. Hindus are slightly more risk averse to smaller losses and 
Muslims to larger losses. However, the differences are not significant. Comparing the 
characteristics of the policyholders and non-policyholders from each religious group 
separately, the Wald-test does not identify risk aversion as an explanatory factor for 
insurance coverage. The differences between policyholders and non-policyholder are 
insignificant for both groups. In sum, the summary statistics do not provide a rationale 
for a religiously motivated effect of risk aversion on micro life insurance consumption. 
In fact, there is no indication of any effect of risk aversion on insurance uptake among 
low-income households, neither Muslims nor Hindus.   
Referring back to possible differences in generalized trust among various religious 
groups as discussed in Section 2.6.2, it can be concluded from the descriptives that in 
the area under study there is no such relationship.  
4.7.2.2 Regression Results on Religion  
Interest and micro life insurance demand  
Building upon the previous results, demand drivers and barriers for the uptake of (i) 
Family Micro Takaful are estimated using the probit model equation introduced in 
Section 4.7 (p. 161). Table 35 reports the average marginal effects. The results show 
that the ‘interest’ variable significantly increases the probability of taking up Family 
Micro Takaful at the 10 percent level, a result in line with the descriptive statistics 
which do not support the author’s hypothesis.  
The second probit model (ii) estimates the factors that determine the demand for micro 
life insurance, conventional or Takaful, among Hindus. Table 35 presents average 
marginal effects. Again, the usage of conventional microfinance products significantly 
supports micro life insurance consumption.   
To sum up the descriptive statistics and regression results, the data set weakly supports 
a religiously motivated effect of interest on micro life insurance consumption. However, 
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the analysis is limited in its estimation approach and the results indicate that the 
measurement of the ‘interest’ construct might not be without ambiguity.   
Table 35: Probit model results of Family Micro Takaful, and micro life insurance uptake of 
Hindus and Muslims  
Variable Marg. Effects                  
Family Takaful 
Marg. Effects                  
Hindus 
Marg. Effects                  
Muslims 
Socio-economic characteristics    
Young dependency ratio 0.0398 0.260 -0.0120 
 (0.0845) (0.185) (0.0717) 
Age -0.00499*** -0.00453 -0.00281* 
 (0.00185) (0.00351) (0.00167) 
Wealth  0.0659*** 0.0839*** 0.0150 
 (0.0132) (0.0200) (0.0134) 
Financial literacy (0.0217) -0.0119 0.0266 
 0.0228 (0.0389) (0.0218) 
Social capital     
Membership 0.0125 0.0239 0.0137 
 (0.0198) (0.0347) (0.0201) 
Generalized trust 0.0343 0.111 -0.0188 
 (0.0424) (0.0684) (0.0391) 
Awareness/ Understanding  -0.139*** -0.114 -0.129*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0824) (0.0392) 
Imitation 0.0401 0.160** 0.124*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0733) (0.0451) 
Informal risk sharing -0.00860 0.0779 -0.116*** 
 (0.0446) (0.0755) (0.0429) 
Religion    
Interest 0.0830* 0.134* 0.119*** 
 (0.0456) (0.0785) (0.0425) 
Mutuality 0.0734*** 0.0988*** 0.0383** 
 (0.0164) (0.0313) (0.0176) 
Risk aversion – Small losses -0.0107 0.0215 -0.0398** 
        (0.0191) (0.0333) (0.0193) 
Risk aversion – Large losses -0.0179 -0.0338 0.0172 
        (0.0186) (0.0334) (0.0151) 
Observations 424 183 226 
Source: Own calculation 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
190 
Mutuality and micro life insurance demand 
Average marginal effects of the probit analysis are presented in Table 35. The 
estimation of the demand factors for micro life insurance among (iii) Muslims and (iv) 
Hindus show that the underlying ‘mutuality’ principle of insurance significantly 
supports the demand for both religious groups. This result contradicts the developed 
‘mutuality’ hypothesis which assumes the solidarity character of insurance to be a 
demand driver related only to the religion of Islam and its favor for mutual schemes. 
Considering effect size and level of significance, the mutuality principle is of even 
higher importance for Hindus compared to Muslims. The effect size for Hindus is 
almost three times larger and results are significant at the one percent level, compared to 
a five percent level for Muslims. Overall, evidence for the ‘mutuality’ hypothesis is 
weak, although the results establish the mutuality character of insurance as a demand 
factor. Nonetheless, the results do not provide strong evidence that this consumption 
motivation is related to the religion of the consumer. It is a demand factor which is 
associated with both of the religious groups. The ‘mutuality’ hypothesis is rejected as 
mutuality does not seem to be a differentiating factor for the insurance purchase 
decision of Muslims and Hindus. As in the indicated in Section 2.6., mutuality might 
rather measure for social capital and its dimension of collection action instead of 
religion.  
Risk aversion and micro life insurance demand 
According to the probit results and reported average marginal effects in Table 35, risk 
aversion does significantly determine micro life insurance consumption for (iv) Hindus. 
For (iii) Muslims, a partial negative effect of risk aversion is observed for small losses. 
As the results for the group of Muslims are inconsistent at both levels of risk aversion, 
the ‘risk aversion’ hypothesis can neither be rejected nor accepted.  
4.8 Chapter Conclusion 
This quantitative study contributes to the body of literature by exploring two factors that 
influence the demand for micro life insurance: social capital and religion. The study 
stands out compared to previous research in the following ways. First, it can explain 
how social capital affects micro life insurance uptake. Second, it establishes the 
relevance of the mutuality principle and indicates an effect of insurers’ reputation on the 
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uptake of micro life insurance. Third, it is the first micro life insurance demand study 
that uses a lottery design to measure risk aversion, instead of relying on survey 
questions. The outcome of this distinct approach is a more differentiated analysis on the 
role of risk aversion and a need for further research. Fourth, it proves a different 
demand behavior of Muslims and Hindus, even though the differences seem not to be 
related to their religion but to their general living conditions.    
In an effort to explain the role of social capital, the regression results identify three 
channels through which social networks influence micro life insurance consumption in 
the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka: (i) a positive imitation effect where insurance 
ownership by peers increases the probability of being insured with micro life insurance; 
(ii) a negative effect of information exchange about micro insurance among peers; and 
(iii) a crowding out effect of informal risk sharing mechanisms. The study cannot find 
evidence that supports an impact of the following two forms of social capital in the 
decisions to buy micro life insurance: formal social networks or generalized trust. 
Hence, it can be concluded that, in the context of micro life insurance the actions 
facilitated by social capital are of importance but not its institutional form.  
Moreover, this study identifies three channels from the literature through which the 
religion of Islam might affect micro life insurance consumption: (i) involvement of 
interest in conventional products, (ii) the principle of mutuality, and (iii) risk aversion. 
This quantitative study cannot provide clear evidence for a religious background of any 
of the three channels. The data set does not allow the author to directly test the ‘interest’ 
hypothesis and the auxiliary estimation strategy does not provide conclusive results. To 
provide evidence for an effect of interest prohibition in Islam on conventional insurance 
consumption, the author combined the results of a micro life insurance demand model 
(voluntary and credit-linked products) for Hindus with the results from a Family Micro 
Takaful demand model. As the usage of interest-bearing credits or savings supports 
Takaful uptake and life insurance demand among Hindus is positively influenced by 
conventional banking products, she concluded that the ‘interest’ variable might not be a 
religiously motivated demand factor for micro life insurance consumption. The author 
recognizes that the quality of the operationalization of the interest concept might be 
weak and instead measuring a household’s access to financial services. Despite this 
measurement issue, it can be observed from descriptive statistics that Muslims 
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preferably decide for Takaful, instead of conventional products and Muslim non-
policyholders are significantly less likely to accept interest payments. Interestingly, the 
underlying principle of mutuality in insurance is one of the main drivers of life 
insurance demand. Contrary to the author’s expectations, it cannot be related to religion 
as it significantly influences the uptake for both religious groups and for both insurance 
forms. Instead it might rather measure for a collection action dimension of social 
capital. There is no conclusive evidence related to the ‘risk aversion’ hypothesis. 
Hindus and Muslims do not either significantly or consistently differ in their degrees of 
risk aversion. While Hindus are more risk averse to large losses, Muslims are more risk 
averse to small losses. Even though there is no evidence for a significant difference in 
risk aversion between the two religious groups, there is weak evidence for an effect of 
risk aversion on a Muslim’s micro life insurance demand as risk aversion to small losses 
significantly reduces their uptake. These results lead to the conclusion that overall, the 
‘risk aversion’ hypothesis cannot be confirmed.  
Even though the variables of ‘interest’, ‘mutuality’, and ‘risk aversion’ cannot explain 
the significant differences in micro insurance demand between Muslims and Hindus, the 
control variables support the assumption of differentiating consumption reasons. For 
Hindus, economic well-being in terms of asset endowment significantly supports micro 
life insurance uptake, while insurance demand is very much influenced by peer effects 
among Muslims. Information exchange with peers and informal risk sharing greatly 
reduces their consumption. On average, Muslims are more likely than Hindus to turn to 
their social networks for financial assistance in times of need, whereas the uptake 
decision of a peer is a supporting factor for both religious groups. In general, Hindus are 
three times more likely to have a peer with insurance, compared to Muslims. Overall, 
the demand among both groups differs owed to the role of age, wealth, information 
exchange and informal risk sharing. This leads to the conclusion that the differences in 
insurance demand of Hindus and Muslims are in general not religiously motivated. The 
wealth effect might relate to a better economic status of Hindus compared to Muslims in 
the region, as shown by the descriptive statistics. Similarly, the negative effect of 
information exchange on insurance might be due to a bad word of mouth, an issue 
which was raised during the focus group discussion by Hindus mainly. Only the 
enhanced informal risk sharing between Muslims might be related to their religion. 
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Returning to the general research objective of understanding the main demand factors of 
micro life insurance products, this study identifies wealth, the usage of conventional 
microfinance products and the social network effects of: awareness creation, imitation 
behavior, and informal risk sharing as well as the idea of mutuality and as key demand 
factors. 
For the uptake of voluntary micro life insurance, the results are consistent across 
various models as presented in Table 31. To further check the robustness of the results, 
linear probability models are estimated and reported in Appendix 8. The marginal 
effects obtained from logit estimates are identical in terms of effect direction and level 
of significance. Effect sizes are also found to be very similar. To avoid omitted variable 
bias, the study included the main explanatory variables from previous empirical studies 
as control variables.   
After applying the four quality criteria of quantitative research as outlined in Section 
1.5.2 to this study, the author concludes that her works performs well in terms of 
reliability and objectivity, whereas internal validity is limited in three aspects: (i) 
statistical inference validity for the observed ‘imitation effect’, (ii) external validity 
related to the non-probabilistic sample, and (iii) construct validity for the ‘interest’ 
variable. With respect to the statistical inference validity and the results interpretation of 
an ‘imitation effect’, potential concerns are related to reverse causality. As this study 
uses a cross-sectional data set, it is not clear if the respondents bought the micro life 
insurance policy before or after their peers did. Only in the first case, a positive 
‘imitation effect’ could be attributed to the demand decision of the respondents, whereas 
it is rather a peer referral effect in the latter case. On the one hand, external validity is 
supported by the conduct of the field study. On the other hand, this study required a 
non-probabilistic sample because micro insurance penetration in Sri Lanka is 6.9 
percent by now (Microinsurance Network, 2016), which affects the transferability of the 
results to another context. Regarding construct validity, the results indicate that the 
‘interest’ variable could measure for access to financial services, instead of the religious 
principle of prohibition of interest. Results of the quantitative study are further limited 
in that some of the micro life insurance products available in the area under study 
include personal accident and minor health benefits which could support the uptake of 
these products as well.  
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5 Conclusion  
This research analyzes the effects of social capital and religion on the demand of micro 
life insurance. Both demand factors have received little attention in the academic 
literature so far although they appear important in the setting of societies in developing 
countries. Therefore, the aim of this work is to determine the role of the two factors and 
to understand the mechanisms through which they operate. By using a mixed method 
approach, the author finds strong and conclusive evidence for the impact of social 
capital on micro life consumption and indicative proof for an effect of the Islamic 
principle of interest prohibition (riba) on conventional micro life insurance uptake by 
Muslims. The main results of this study are also summarized in Figure 11.   
At the beginning of the thesis, an analytical framework, which was derived from the 
literature structures previous academic results on the demand of micro life insurance 
and identifies research gaps. This analytical framework also serves as the research 
model for this work. Considering further literature, the author deduced nine hypotheses 
with the objective to possibly explain for the relevance of social capital and religion on 
micro life insurance consumption. A qualitative study served the purpose of confirming 
the empirical relevance of the two influencing factors, sharpening the understanding of 
the hypotheses and embedding them in the local context. To estimate the effects of 
social capital and religion quantitatively, the hypotheses were then tested by regression 
analysis using data from an on-site survey and from a risk aversion lottery conducted in 
the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka in 2013. 464 households participated in the survey, 
out of which 424 responses were included in the final sample. 
All in all, this research finds that it is not the institutional form of social capital 
measured as membership in formal social networks or generalized trust that determines 
micro life insurance consumption, but a peer’s purchasing decision. Both the qualitative 
and quantitative studies provide evidence that people imitate their peer’s consumption 
behavior. Evidence for a crowding-out effect of formal micro life insurance by informal 
risk sharing is provided by the quantitative study. The results on the effect of an 
information exchange about insurance between family members, friends or neighbors 
are found to be mixed. During the focus group discussions, people referred to 
information exchanges with their peers on insurance as a supporting factor in their 
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consumption decision as it raises the awareness of insurance or increases their insurance 
understanding. However, the quantitative analysis revealed an opposite effect. This 
significantly negative influence of a peer exchange might be explainable by a negative 
word-of-mouth prevailing in the region, as indicated during some of the focus group 
discussions. It might also be an indication of a negative attitude towards micro life 
insurance among Muslims, as is enforced by peers. Interestingly, the negative 
information exchange effect is much stronger for the sub-sample of Muslims and the 
uptake of Takaful. Lastly, the contrasting results on information exchange found in the 
quantitative and qualitative study could also be related to the different samples. Focus 
group participants are all females whereas in the household survey 25% participants are 
male and 75% are female. However, according to T-test results, gender differences in 
awareness creation for micro life insurance are not significant.  
The topic of interest and how it affects micro life insurance consumption among 
Muslims is studied in detail for the first time in this study. Unfortunately, the negative 
relationship suggested by the literature and the qualitative findings could not be tested 
in the quantitative study in an adequate manner. The sample of the quantitative study 
suggests that low-income Muslims prefer Family Takaful products and are less likely to 
use conventional microfinance services. Even though the study could not achieve its 
aim of providing a sound and comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms through 
which religion influences micro life insurance consumption by quantitative data, it can 
provide qualitative evidence for the relevance of interest. Future research with a more 
precise sampling and measurement approach might provide better insights into the role 
of interest in influencing the insurance consumption among Muslims. This research also 
discovered the central role of the mutual character of insurance in a person’s decision to 
insure, independent of her religion but possibly attributable to a person’s social capital. 
It further suggests that the topic of risk aversion is much more complex and worth a 
thorough investigation in future research as differences in risk aversion are observed 
between the amounts at stake. This study also confirms the importance of wealth for 
micro life insurance ownership. 
In sum, this study benefited from the mixed method approach. A peer imitation effect in 
consumption is supported by the results from both of the studies, whereas the 
quantitative findings on a negative awareness creation effect by social networks are 
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only explainable with the results from the qualitative study. At last, only the qualitative 
study is able to provide reliable information about an effect of the prohibition of interest 
(riba) on micro life insurance uptake among Muslims because of an imprecise sampling 
strategy and construct definition in the quantitative study. Besides, the qualitative study 
hinted at two more demand factors that might be of interest for future research: the 
terms and conditions of a product and more interestingly, contract non-performance. 
The latter effect could not be tested quantitatively in this research due to large numbers 
of missing values caused by misleading interviewer instructions.   
Figure 11: Overview of findings 
 
Source: Author’s own illustration 
Previous studies on micro life insurance identified wealth, education, risk aversion, and 
the usage of other financial or insurance services as main explanatory factors for micro 
life insurance demand. Additionally, indicative evidence is provided for a life-cycle 
effect and a bequest motive (Bendig and Arun, 2016; Arun et al., 2012; Bendig and 
Arun, 2011; Giesbert et al., 2011). Compared to previous work, this research stands out 
by providing evidence for a crowding-out effect of informal risk sharing and by 
introducing three more topics to the micro life insurance demand literature: imitative 
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consumption behavior in the context of social capital, the role of interest related to the 
religion of Islam, and mutuality. While in the case of weather insurance, Cai et al. 
(2015) provide empirical evidence for an effect of knowledge acquisition through social 
networks, but not for an imitative behavior effect. This study shows the opposite. 
Related to this finding, this research creates consciousness that information flows 
between peers are not always in favor of insurance uptake. In general, this study is the 
first academic work to the best of the author’s knowledge that can explain how social 
capital affects micro life insurance uptake. In addition, it is first in establishing the 
relevance of the mutuality principle for life insurance consumption among low-income 
households.   
From the findings of this research, several practical implications for the development of 
micro insurance markets can be drawn. The results call for joint industry and public 
sector efforts to educate the target groups on the value of insurance and consumer 
rights. Currently people consult with their peers on insurance consumption, and a 
negative word-of-mouth seems to heavily influence the demand. However, insurers 
could also leverage on the information exchange between peers by communicating 
positive insurance experiences to the communities, i.e. claims settlements, or using 
community advocates. Together with the observed behavior of consumption imitation it 
might increase uptake. Main take-away for regulators is that operations in accordance 
with Islamic principles could play a significant role in increasing micro life insurance 
penetration. Also, mutual schemes might be very well accepted by the target group. 
They are closer to the prevailing informal risk sharing practices and serve the notion of 
solidarity. Hence, regulatory frameworks could provide guidance for the sound 
operation of Takaful and mutual schemes. The results on contract non-performance 
emphasize the importance of sound industry practices and consumer protection 
guidelines to be initiated by the regulators and supported by insurance associations. 
Insurance providers and distributors are encouraged to offer affordable demand-oriented 
products as the economic situation is still a main demand barrier, and low-income 
households do evaluate the benefits and terms of the offered products. 
  
  
198 
Bibliography 
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2002): Who Trusts Others? In: Journal of 
Public Economics, Vol. 85, 207-234.  
Archer, Simon, Rifaat A.A. Karim and Volker Nienhaus (2009): Business Models in 
Takaful and Regulatory Implications, in: Simon Archer, Rifaat A.A. Karim and 
Volker Nienhaus (Eds.): Takaful Islamic Insurance. Concepts and Regulatory 
Issues, 9-30. Hoboken, NJ, Wiley. 
Arena, Marco (2008): Does Insurance Market Activity Promote Economic Growth? A 
Cross-country Study for Industrialized and Developing Countries, in: Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, Vol. 75, 921-946.   
Arun, Thankom, Mirko Bendig and Shoba Arun (2012): Bequest Motives and 
Determinants of Micro Life Insurance in Sri Lanka, in: World Development, Vol. 
40, 1700-1711.  
Ashraf, Nava, Iris Bohnet and Nikita Piankov (2006): Decomposing Trust and 
Trustworthiness, in: Experimental Economics, Vol. 9, 193-208. 
Asian Development Bank (2006): Sri Lanka: Microinsurance Sector Development. 
http://www.adb.org/publications/developing-microinsurance-sector-sri-lanka 
[23.10.2015]. 
Ayub, Muhammad (2007): Understanding Islamic Finance. Wiley Finance Series. 
Chichester, Wiley. 
Babbel, David F. (1981): Inflation, Indexation, and Life Insurance Sales in Brazil, in: 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 48, 111-135. 
Bakar, Mohd D. (2009): Shari'ah Principles Governing Takaful Models, in: Simon 
Archer, Rifaat A.A. Karim and Volker Nienhaus (Eds.): Takaful Islamic Insurance. 
Concepts and Regulatory Issues, 31-45. Hoboken, NJ, Wiley. 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Arun G. Chandrasekhar, Esther Duflo and Matthew O. Jackson 
(2013): The Diffusion of Microfinance, in: Science, Vol 341, 363-370. 
  
199 
Barbour, Rosaline (2014): Quality of Data Analysis, in: Uwe Flick (Ed.): The SAGE 
Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis, 496-509. Los Angeles, SAGE 
Publications. 
Barbour, Rosaline (2007): Doing Focus Groups. Los Angeles, SAGE Publications.  
Barr, Abigail and Garance Genicot (2008): Risk Sharing, Commitment and Information: 
An experimental analysis, in: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 
6, 1151-1185. 
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball and Matthew D. Shapiro (1997): 
Preference Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach 
in the Health and Retirement Study, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, 
537-579. 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2007): Finance, Inequality, and 
the Poor, in: Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 12, 27-49. 
Beck, Thorsten and Ian Webb (2003): Economic, Demographic, and Institutional 
Determinants of Life Insurance Consumption Across Countries, in: World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 17, 51-88. 
Bekkin, Renat I. (2007a): Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation, 
in: Arab Law Quarterly, 21, 3-34. 
Bekkin, Renat I. (2007b): Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation, 
in: Arab Law Quarterly, 21, 109-134. 
Bekkin, Renat I. (2007c): Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation, 
in: Arab Law Quarterly, 21, 251-268. 
Bendig, Mirko and Thankom Arun (2016): Uptake of Multiple Microinsurance 
Schemes: Evidence from Sri Lanka, in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 
Vol. 41, 205-224. 
  
200 
Bendig, Mirko and Thankom Arun (2011): Microfinancial Services and Risk 
Management: Evidences from Sri Lanka, in: Journal of Economic Development, 
Vol. 36, 97-126. 
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe (1995): Trust, Reciprocity, and Social 
History. Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 10, 122-142.  
Berggren, Niclas and Christian Bjornskov (2011): Is the Importance of Religion in 
Daily Life Related to Social Trust? Cross-Country and Cross-State Comparisons, 
in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 80, 459-480.  
Berry-Stölzle, Thomas and Jianren Xu (2015): Local Religious Beliefs and Insurance 
Companies’ Risk-Taking Behaviors. Working Paper. http://www.wriec.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/3C1_Berry-St%C3%B6lzle.pdf [18.12.2015]. 
Biener, Christian, Martin Eling, Andreas Landmann and Maria Isabel Santana (2014): 
Contract Nonperformance Risk and Ambiguity in Insurance Markets. Working 
Paper. https://bus.wisc.edu/~/media/bus/knowledge-expertise/academic-
departments/asrmi/events/2014-2015/ambiguity-paper_biener-eling-landmann-
santana_2015-april-2015-presentation.pdf?la=en [18.12.2015]. 
Billah, Masum M. (1998). Islamic Insurance: Its Origins and Development, in: Arab 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 13, 386-422. 
Binswanger, Hans B. (1981): Attitudes Toward Risk: Theoretical Implications of an 
Experiment in Rural India, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 91, 867-890.  
Binswanger, Hans B. (1980): Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in 
Rural India. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, No. 3: 395-407. 
Bjornskov, Christian (2006): Determinant of Generalized Trust: A Cross-Country 
Comparison, in: Public Choice, Vol. 130, 1-21. 
Bönte, Werner and Ute Filipiak (2012): Financial Literacy, Information Flows, and 
Caste Affiliation: Empirical Evidence from India, in: Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 36, 3399-3414. 
  
201 
Boucher, Steve and Matthieu Delpierre, (2014): The Impact of Index-Based Insurance 
on Informal Risk-Sharing Arrangement, INSTEAD Working Papers. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2613425 [17.12.2015]. 
Brau, James C., Craig Merrill and Kim B. Staking (2011): Insurance Theory and 
Challenges Facing the Development of Microinsurance Markets, in: Journal of 
Developmental Entrepeneurship, Vol. 16, 411-440.  
Browne, Mark J. and Kihong Kim (1993): An International Analysis of Life Insurance 
Demand, in: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 60, 616-634. 
Bryman, Alan, Saul Becker and Joe Sempik (2008): Quality Criteria for Quantitative, 
Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research: A View from Social Policy, in: 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology, Vol. 11, 261-276.  
Bryman, Alan (2001): Social Research Methods. Oxford, Oxford University Press.  
Cai, Jing, Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2015): Social Networks and the 
Decision to Insure, in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 7, 
81-108. 
Campbell, Donald T. (1957): Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social 
Settings, in: Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 54, 297-311. 
Campbell, Richie (1980): The Demand for Life Insurance: An Application of the 
Economics of Uncertainty, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 35, No. 5, 1155-1172.  
Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Jeffrey Carpenter (2008): Behavioural Development 
Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World, in: Journal of 
Development Studies, Vol. 44, 311-338.  
Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2014): Sri Lanka Socio-Economic Data 2014. 
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/10_pub/_docs/statistics/other/ 
Socio_Econ_Data_2014_e.pdf [20.12.2016] 
  
202 
Chang, Chun Ping and Aziz N. Berdiev (2013): Natural Disasters, Political Risk and 
Insurance Market Development, in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 
Vol. 38, 406-448.  
Chen, Pei-Fen, Chien-Chian Lee and Chi-Feng Lee (2012): How Does the Development 
of the Life Insurance Market Affect Economic Growth? Some International 
Evidence, in: Journal of International Development, 24, 865-893.  
Chuang, Yating and Laura Schechter (2015): Social Networks in Developing Countries, 
in: Annual Review of Resource Economics, Vol. 7, 1-23. 
Chui, Andy C.W. and Chuck C.Y. Kwok (2009): Cultural Practices and Life Insurance 
Consumption: An international Analysis Using GLOBE Scores, in: Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 19, 273-290.  
Chui, Andy C.W. and Chuck C.Y. Kwok (2008): National Culture and Life Insurance 
Consumption, in: Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 39, 88-101.  
Churchill, Craig (2006): What is Insurance for the Poor? In: Craig Churchill (Ed.): 
Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance Compendium (12-24). Geneva, Munich Re. 
Churchill, Craig (2002): Trying to Understand the Demand for Microinsurance, in: 
Journal of International Development, Vol. 14, 381-387. 
Clarke, Daniel and Gautam Kalani (2012): Microinsurance Decisions: Evidence from 
Ethiopia, in: Microinsurance Innovation Facility, Research Paper No. 19. Geneva, 
International Labour Office. 
Cohen, Monique and Jennefer Sebstad (2006): The Demand for Microinsurance, in: 
Craig Churchill (Ed.): Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance Compendium (25-
44). Geneva, Munich Re. 
Cohen, Monique and Jennefer Sebstad (2005): Reducing the Vulnerability: The 
Demand for Microinsurance, in: Journal of International Development, Vol. 17, 
397-474.  
  
203 
Cole, Shawn (2015): Overcoming Barriers to Microinsurance Adoption: Evidence from 
the Field, in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 90, 1-21. 
Cole, Shawn, Xavier Giné, Jeremy Tobacman, Petia Topalova, Robert Townsend and 
James Vickery (2013): Barriers to Household Risk Management: Evidence from 
India, in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 5, 104-135.  
Cole, Shawn, Thomas Sampson and Bilal Zia (2011): Prices or Knowledge? What 
Drives Demand for Financial Services in Emerging Markets? In: Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 66, 1933-1967. 
Coleman, James S. (1990): Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press.  
Cox, James C. (2004): How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity, in: Games and Economic 
Behavior, Vol. 46, 260-281. 
Creswell, John W. and Vicki L. Plano Clark (2006): Designing and Conducting Mixed 
Methods Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications.  
Creswell, John W. (2009): Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed 
Methods Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications. 
Dave, Chetan, Catherine Eckel, Cathleen Johnson and Christian Rojas (2010): Eliciting 
Risk Preferences: When is Simple Better? In: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 
41, 219-243.  
de Janvry, Alain, Vianney Dequiedt and Elisabeth Sadoulet, (2014): The Demand for 
Insurance Against Common Shocks, in: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 
106, 227-238. 
de Jong, Gordon F., Joseph E. Faulkner and Rex H. Warland (1976): Dimensions of 
Religiosity Reconsidered: Evidence from a Cross-Cultural Study, in: Social Forces, 
Vol. 54, 866-889. 
  
204 
Department of Census and Statistics (2014): Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey Annual 
Report – 2014. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/samplesurvey/ 
LFS_Annual%20Report_2014.pdf [20.12.2016].  
Department of Census and Statistics (2015): Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey 2012/13 - Final Report. http://www.statistics.gov.lk/HIES/  
HIES2012_13FinalReport.pdf [20.12.2016]. 
Dercon, Stefan, Ruth Vargas Hill, Daniel Clarke, Ingo Outes-Leon and Alemayehu 
Seyoum Taffesse (2014): Offering Rainfall Insurance to Informal Insurance 
Groups: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia, in: Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 106, 132-143. 
Dercon, Stefan, Jan Willem Gunning, Andrew Zeitlin, Claudia Cerrone and Simone 
Lombardi (2012): Health Insurance Participation: Experimental Evidence from 
Kenya, in: Microinsurance Innovation Facility, Research Paper No. 10. Geneva, 
International Labour Office. 
Dercon, Stefan and Luc Christiaensen (2011): Consumption Risk, Technology Adoption 
and Poverty Traps: Evidence from Ethiopia, in: Journal of Development 
Economics, Vol. 96, 159-173. 
Doherty, Neil A. and Harris Schlesinger (1990): Rational Insurance Purchasing: 
Consideration of Contract Nonperformance, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 105, 243-253.  
Doherty, Neil A. (1984): Portfolio Efficient Insurance Buying Strategies, in: Journal of 
Risk and Insurance, Vol. 51, 205-224. 
Döring, Nicola and Jürgen Bortz (2016): Forschungsmethoden und Evaluation in den 
Sozial- und Humanwissenschaften. Berlin, Springer-Verlag.   
Eckel, Catherine and Philip Grossman (2008): Forecasting Risk Attitudes: An 
Experimental Study Using Actual and Forecast Gamble Choices, in: Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 68, 1-17.  
  
205 
El-Gamal, Mahmoud. A. (2006): Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Eling, Martin, Shailee Pradhan and Joan T. Schmit (2014): The Determinants of 
Microinsurance Demand, in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 39, 
224-263. 
Erlbeck, Anja (2010): Microtakaful – Insuring the Low-Income People in Accordance 
with the Islamic Law. Diploma Thesis, University of Cologne. 
Etang, Alvin, David Fielding and Stephen Knowles (2012): Are Survey Measures of 
Trust Correlated with Experimental Trust? Evidence from Cameroon, in: Journal of 
Development Studies, Vol. 48, 1813-1827.  
Fafchamps, Marcel and Susan Lund (2003): Risk-Sharing Networks in Rural 
Philippines, in: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 72, 261-287.  
Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, Bernhardt von Rosenbladt, Jürgen Schupp and Gert G. 
Wagner (2003): A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness 
by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys, in: IZA 
Discussion Paper, No. 715.  
Feyen, Erik, Rodney Lester and Roberto Rocha (2011): What Drives the Development 
of the Insurance Sector: An Empirical Analysis Based on a Panel of Developed and 
Developing Countries, in: The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
5572.  
Fischer, Stanley (1973): A Life Cycle Model of Life Insurance Purchases, in: 
International Economic Review, Vol. 14, 132-152.  
Gächter, Simon, Benedikt Herrman and Christian Thöni (2004): Trust, Voluntary 
Cooperation, and Socio-Economic Background: Survey and Experimental 
Evidence, in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 55, 505-531.  
Gaurav, Sarthak, Shawn Cole and Jeremy Tobacman (2011): Marketing Complex 
Financial Products in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Rainfall Insurance in 
India, in: Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 48, 150-162. 
  
206 
Gallup (2010): Religiosity Highest in World's Poorest Nations. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/ religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx 
[26.02.2017]. 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (2009): Security 
at little cost – Microinsurance in Financial Systems Development. BMZ Position 
Paper Microinsurance – a field of activity for German development policy. 
https://www.bmz.de/en/publications/archiv/type_of_publication/strategies/konzept1
79.pdf [04.02.2017]. 
Giesbert, Lena and Susan Steiner (2015): Client Perceptions of the Value of 
Microinsurance. Evidence from Southern Ghana, in: Journal of International 
Development, Vol. 27, 15-35.  
Giesbert, Lena, Susan Steiner and Mirko Bendig (2011): Participation in Micro Life 
Insurance and the Use of Other Financial Services in Ghana, in: Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, Vol. 78, 7-35.  
Giné, Xavier, Dean Karlan and Muthoni Ngatia (2013): Social Networks, Financial 
Literacy and Index Insurance. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21814 [17.12.2015]. 
Giné, Xavier, Robert Townsend and James Vickery (2008): Patterns of Rainfall 
Insurance Participation in Rural India, in: The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 
22, 539-566. 
Glaeser, Edward L., David I. Laibson, Jose A. Scheinkman and Christine L. Soutter 
(2000): Measuring Trust, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, 811-
846. 
Granovetter, Mark S. (1973): The Strength of Weak Ties, in: American Journal of 
Sociology, Vol. 787, 1360-1380.  
Grootaert, Christiaan, Deepa Narayan, Veronica Nyhan Jones and Michael Woolcock 
(2004): Measuring Social Capital: An Integrated Questionnaire, in: World Bank 
Working Paper, No. 18.  
  
207 
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales (2003): People’s Opium? Religion and 
Economic Attitudes, in: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 50, 225-282.  
Harwood, Tracey G. and Tony Garry (2003): An Overview of Content Analysis, in: The 
Marketing Review, Vol. 3, 479-498. 
Hassan, M. Kabir and Mervyn K. Lewis (Eds.) (2007): The Handbook of Islamic 
Banking. Cheltenham, Elgar. 
Hina, Connie G., Christopher G. Lomboy and Emmanuel C. Torrente (2009): Demand 
Study of Microinsurance in the Philippines. http://www.microinsurance.ph/data/ 
uploads/reports/Demand%20Study%20of%20Microinsurance%20in%20the%20 
Philippines.pdf [23.10.2015]. 
Hofstede, Gert, Gert J. Hofstede and Michael Minkov (2010): Culture and 
Organizations: Software of the Mind. McGraw-Hill Education. 
Holt, Charles A. and Susan K. Laury (2002): Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, in: 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 92, 1644-1655. 
Hussels, Stephanie, Damian Ward and Ralf Zurbruegg (2005): Stimulating the Demand 
for Insurance, in: Risk Management and Insurance Review, Vol. 8, 257-278. 
Huber, Stefan (2007): Aufbau und strukturierende Prinzipien des Religionsmonitors, in 
Religionsmonitor 2008. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh.   
IAIS and CGAP Working Group on Microinsurance (2007): Issues on Regulation and 
Supervision of Microinsurance. http://www.iaisweb.org/page/supervisory-
material/issues-papers/file/34275/issues-paper-in-regulation-and-supervision-of-
microinsurance-june-2007 [05.08.2016]. 
IAIS (2012): Application Paper on Regulation and Supervision supporting Inclusive 
Insurance Markets. http://www.iaisweb.org/page/supervisory-material/application-
papers/file/34110/application-paper-on-regulation-and-supervision-supporting-
inclusive-insurance-markets [05.08.2016]. 
  
208 
IBSL (2016): Insurance Companies. http://www.ibsl.gov.lk/insurance-companies.html 
[10.12.2016]. 
Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1998): Introduction to the Economics of Religion, in: Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 36, 1465-1495. 
Iqbal, Munawar (2007): A Guide to Islamic Finance. London, Risk Books. 
IFSB and IAIS (2006): Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takaful (Islamic 
Insurance). http://www.ifsb.org/docs/takaful_2006.pdf [19.12.2016]. 
Johansson-Stenman, Olaf, Minhaj Mahmud and Peter Martinsson (2013): Trust, Trust 
Games and Stated Trust: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh, in: Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, Vol. 95, 286-298.  
Johansson-Stenman, Olaf, Minhaj Mahmud and Peter Martinsson (2009): Trust and 
Religion: Experimental Evidence from Rural Bangladesh, in: Economica, Vol. 76, 
462-485.  
Jowett, Matthew (2013): Do Informal Risk Sharing Networks Crowd Out Public 
Voluntary Health Insurance? Evidence from Vietnam, in: Applied Economics, Vol. 
35, 1153-1161.  
Kamali, Mohammad H. (2008): Shari'ah Law: An Introduction. Oxford, Oneworld 
Publications. 
Karlan, Dean S., Robert D. Osei, Isaac Osei-Akoto and Christoper Udry (2012): 
Agricultural Decisions After Relaxing Credit and Risk Constraints. NBER Working 
Paper, No. 18463. http://www.nber.org/papers/w18463 [17.12.2015]. 
Karlan, Dean S. (2005): Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and 
Predict Financial Decisions, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 95, 1688-
1699. 
Knack, Stephan and Philipp Keefer (1997): Does Social Capital Have an Economic 
Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 112, 1251-1288.  
  
209 
Khorshid, Aly (2004): Islamic Insurance: A Modern Approach to Islamic Banking. 
Islamic Studies Series. London, RoutledgeCurzon. 
Kremer, Michael and Edward Miguel (2007): The Illusion of Sustainability, in: 
Quarterly Journal of Economis, Vol. 122, 1007-1065. 
Krippendorff, Klaus H. (2003). Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology. 
Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications, 2nd edition. 
Krosnick, Jan and Stanley Presser (2010): Question and Questionnaire Design, in: Peter 
Marsden and James Wright (Eds.): Handbook of Survey Research. Bingley, 
Emerald.  
Krueger, Richard A. and Mary Anne Casey (2009): Focus Groups: A Practical Guide 
for Applied Research. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications, 4th edition. 
Kuckartz, Udo (2014): Mixed Methods. Wiesbaden, Springer Fachmedien.  
Kumar, Alok, Jeremy K. Page and Oliver G. Spalt (2011): Religious Beliefs, Gambling 
Attitudes, and Financial Market Outcomes, in: Journal of Financial Economics, 
102, 671-708. 
Kunreuther, Howard C. (1996): Mitigating Disaster Losses Through Insurance, in: 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 12, 171-187. 
Kunreuther, Howard C., Mark V. Pauly and Stacey McMorrow (2013): Insurance and 
Behavioral Economics. New York, Cambridge University Press.  
Kwon, W. Jean (2007): Islamic Principle and Takaful Insurance: Re-evaluation, in: 
Journal of Insurance Regulation, Vol. 26, 53-81. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(1997a): Trust in Large Organizations, in: The American Economic Review, Vol. 
87, 333-338. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(1997b): Legal Determinants of External Finance, in: Journal of Finance, Vol. 54, 
1131-1150. 
  
210 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(1998): Law and Finance, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, 1113-1155. 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(2000): Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, in: Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 58, 3-27.  
Landmann, Andres, Björn Vollan and Markus Frölich (2012): Insurance versus Savings 
for the Poor: Why One Should Offer Either Both or None, in: IZA Discussion 
Paper, No. 6298. 
Lanka Microfinance Practitioners Association, 2013: LMFPA News Bulletin March 
2013. http://www.microfinance.lk/newsletters/MarchEnglish.pdf [14.12.2016]. 
Lewis, Frank D. (1989): Dependents and the Demand for Life Insurance, in: American 
Economic Review, Vol. 79, 452-467.  
Liamputtong, Pranee (2011): Focus Group Methodology: Principles and Practice. 
London, SAGE Publications. 
Liu, Yanyan and Robert J. Myers (2014): The Dynamics of Microinsurance Demand in 
Developing Countries Under Liquidity Constraints and Insurer Default Risk, in: 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 83, 121-138. 
Lloyd's (2009): Insurance in Developing Countries: Exploring Opportunities in 
Microinsurance (Lloyd's 360° Risk Insight). 
http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/5CFE7CAF-0075-415C-B0F2-
BEBF0323059E/0/Microinsurancereport_Nov2009.pdf [16.12.2009]. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia Mitchell (2008): Planning and Financial Literacy: How 
Do Women Fare? In: American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 
98, 413-417. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia Mitchell (2006): Financial Literacy and Planning: 
Implications for Retirement Wellbeing. Working Paper.  
  
211 
Maertens, Annemie and Christopher B. Barrett (2013): Measuring Social Networks’ 
Effects on Agricultural Technology Adoption, in: American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 95, 353-359. 
Malshe, Avinash and Ravipreet S. Sohi (2009): What Makes Strategy Making Across 
the Sales-Marketing Interface More Successful? In: Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, Vol. 37, 400-421.  
Matul, Michal, Aparna Dalal, Ombeline De Bock and Wouter Gelade (2013): 
Microinsurance Demand: Determinants and Strategies, in: Enterprise Development 
and Microfinance, Vol. 24, 311-327. 
Mayers, David and Clifford W. Smith (1983): The Interdependence of Individual 
Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance, in: Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 91, 304-311.  
Mayring, Philipp (2010): Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken. 
Weinheim, Basel, Beltz Verlag, 11th edition.  
McCord, Michael J. and Katie Biese (2016): The Landscape of Microinsurance in 
Africa 2015. http://www.microinsurancecentre.org/resources/documents/ 
the-landscape-of-microinsurance-in-africa-2015.html [05.08.2016]. 
McCord, Michael J. and Katie Biese (2015): The Landscape of Microinsurance in Latin 
America and the Caribbean: A Changing Market. 
http://www.microinsurancecentre.org/resources/documents/the-landscape-of-
microinsurance-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-a-changing-market.html 
[05.08.2016]. 
McCord, Michael (2006): The Partner-Agent Model: Challenges and Opportunities, in: 
Craig Churchill (Ed.): Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance Compendium (357-
377). Geneva, Munich Re. 
  
212 
Microinsurance Network (2016): The Landscape of Microinsurance in Sri Lanka in 
2016. 
http://www.microinsurancenetwork.org/sites/default/files/Landscape%20of%20mic
roinsurance%20in%20Sri%20Lanka%202016.pdf [12.12.2016]. 
Mobarak, Ahmed M. and Mark Rosenzweig (2012): Selling Formal Insurance to the 
Informally Insured. Working Paper. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2009528 [17.12.2015]. 
Morgan, David L. (1997): The Focus Group Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE 
Publications.  
Morgan, David L. (1996): Focus Groups, in: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 22, 
129-152.  
Mossin, Jan (1968): Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, in: Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 76, 553-568. 
Morsink, Karlijn (2012): Weathering the Storm: The Demand for and Impact of 
Microinsurance. Dissertation, University of Twente.  
Munshi (2003): Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the US Labor 
Market, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, 549-599.  
Mukherjee, Premasis, Arman Oza, Lisa Chassin and Rupalee Ruchismita (2014): The 
Landscape of Microinsurance in Asia and Oceania 2013. 
http://www.microinsurancecentre.org/resources/documents/market-
development/http-bit-ly-1k4dbya.html [05.08.2016]. 
Muslehuddin, Mohammad (1969): Insurance and Islamic Law. New Delhi, Adam 
Publishers & Distributors. 
Morduch, Jonathan (1995): Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing, in: 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9, 103-114. 
  
213 
Narayan, Deepa and Lant Pritchett (1997): Cents and Sociability: Household Income 
and Social Capital in Rural Tanzania, in: Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 47, 871-897.  
Newhouse, David L., Pablo Suarez-Becerra and Dung T.T. Doan (2016): Sri Lanka - 
Poverty and Welfare: Recent Progress and Remaining Challenges, in: World Bank 
Working Paper, No. 103281. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/996911467995898452/pdf/103281-WP-
P132922-Box394864B-PUBLIC-poverty-and-welfare-021216-final.pdf 
[04.12.2016]. 
NORC, 2016: About the General Social Survey. http://gss.norc.org/About-The-GSS 
[04.12.2016]. 
Noussair, Charles N., Stefan T. Trautmann, Gijs van de Kuilen, Nathanael Vellekoop 
(2013): Risk Aversion and Religion, in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 47, 
165-183. 
O’Donnell, Owen, Eddy van Doorslaer, Adam Wagstaff and Magnus Lindelow (2008): 
Analyzing Health Equity Using Household Survey Data: A Guide to Techniques 
and their Implementation. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
Obaidullah, Mohammed (2005): Islamic Financial Services. Jeddah, Scientific 
Publishing Centre. 
Oster, Emily and Rebecca Thornton (2012): Determinants of Peer Effects in Menstrual 
Cup Take-up, in: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 10, 1263-
1293.  
Outreville, Francois J. (1996): Life Insurance Markets in Developing Countries, in: 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 63, 263-278.  
Outreville, Francois J. (2013): The Relationship between Insurance and Economic 
Development: 85 Empirical Papers for a Review of the Literature, in: Risk 
Management and Insurance Review, Vol. 16, 71-122. 
  
214 
Park, Hoon, Stephen F. Borde and Y. Choi (2002): Determinants of Insurance 
Pervasiveness: A Cross-National Analysis, in: International Business, Vol. 11, 79-
96.  
Prüfer, Peter and Margrit Rexroth (2000): Zwei-Phasen-Pretesting, ZUMA-
Arbeitsbericht 2000/08, Mannheim, ZUMA.  
Prüfer, Peter and Margrit Rexroth (1996): Verfahren zur Evaluation von Survey-Fragen: 
Ein Überblick, in: ZUMA-Nachrichten, Vol. 39, 95-116. 
Putnam, Robert D. (1993): Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.  
Putnam, Robert D. (2000): Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.  
Putnam, Robert D. (2001): Social Capital: Measurement and Consequences, in: John F. 
Helliwell (Ed.): The Contribution of Human and Social Capital to Sustained 
Economic Growth and Well-Being, 117-135. Ottawa, Ontario, Human Resources 
Development Canada. 
Rahman, Abdel (1979): Banking and Insurance, in: Economic Doctrines of Islam, Vol. 
4. London, Muslim Schools Trust. 
Rothschild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz (1976): Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, in: Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, 629-649.  
Schlesinger, Harris and Neil A. Doherty (1985): Incomplete Markets for Insurance: An 
Overview, in: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 52, 402-423.  
Schlesinger, Harris (1994): Zur Theorie der Versicherungsnachfrage, in: Zeitschrift für 
die Gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, Vol. 83, 113-136. 
Schoon, Natalie (2009): Islamic Banking and Finance. London, Spiramus Press.  
  
215 
Sebstad, Jennefer, Monique Cohen and Elizabeth McGuiness (2006): Guidelines for 
Market Research on the Demand for Microinsurance. 
http://www.microinsurancenetwork.org/groups/guidelines-market-research-
demand-microinsurance [23.10.2015]. 
Sen, Subir and S. Madheswaran (2013): Regional Determinants of Life Insurance 
Consumption: Evidence from Selected Asian Economies, in: Asian-Pacific 
Economic Literature, Vol. 27, 86-103.  
Shavell, Steven (1979): On Moral Hazard and Insurance, in: Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 93, 541-562.  
Shu, Tao, Johan Sulaeman and P. Eric Yeung (2012): Local Religion Beliefs and 
Mutual Fund Risk-Taking Behaviors, in: Management Science, Vol. 58, 1779-
1796. 
Siddiqi, Mohammad N. (1985): Insurance in an Islamic Economy, in: Islamic Economic 
Series, Vol. 10. Leicester, The Islamic Foundation. 
Swiss Re (2016): World Insurance in 2015: Steady Growth Amid Regional Disparities, 
in: sigma. http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma_3_2016_en.pdf 
[23.10.2015]. 
Swiss Re (2010): Microinsurance - Risk Protection for 4 Billion People, in: sigma. 
http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma6_2010_en.pdf [20.12.2016]. 
Tan, Jonathan and Claudia Vogel (2008): Religion and Trust: An Experimental Study, 
in: Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 29, 832-848.  
Teddlie, Charles and Abbas Tashakkori (2009): Foundations of Mixed Methods 
Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences. Thousand Oaks, CA, SAGE Publications. 
Townsend, Robert (1994): Risk and Insurance in Village India, in: Econometrica, Vol. 
62, 539-591. 
  
216 
Townsend, Robert (1983): Financial Structure and Economic Activity, in: American 
Economic Review, Vol. 73, 895-911.  
Turner, Ginger, Farah Said and Uzma Afzal (2014): Microinsurance Demand After a 
Rare Flood Event: Evidence From a Field Experiment in Pakistan, in: The Geneva 
Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 39, 201-223. 
Udry, Christopher (1994): Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical 
Investigation in Northern Nigeria, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 61, 495-
526.  
Wahab, Abdul R.A., Mervyn K. Lewis and M. Kabir Hassan (2007): Islamic Takaful: 
Business Models, Shariah Concerns, and Proposed Solutions. Thunderbird 
International Business Review, Vol. 49, 371-396. 
Ward, Damian and Ralf Zurbruegg (2002): Law, Politics and Life Insurance 
Consumption in Asia, in: The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Vol. 
23, 395-412. 
Wasaw, Bernard and Raymond D. Hill (1986): Determinants of Insurance Penetration: 
A Cross-Country Analysis, in: Bernard Wasaw and Raymond D. Hill (Eds.): The 
Insurance Industry in Economic Development, 160-176. New York, New York 
University Press. 
Wiedmaier-Pfister, Martina, Brigitte Klein and Hendrik Denker (2009): Security at 
Little Cost: Microinsurance in Financial Systems Development, in: BMZ Position 
Paper, Strategies No. 179. 
Williams, Richard (2015): Multicollinearity. 
https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l11.pdf [29.10.2016]. 
Wilkinson, Sue (1998): Focus Group Methodology: A Review, in: International Journal 
of Social Research Methodology, Vol. 1, 181-203.  
Wilson, Rodney (2007): Concerns and Misconceptions in the Provision of Takaful, in: 
Sohail Jaffer (Ed.): Islamic Insurance. Trends, Opportunities and the Future of 
Takaful (72-85). London, Euromoney Books. 
  
217 
Wipf, John, Dominic Liber and Craig Churchill (2006): Product Design and Insurance 
Risk Management, in: Craig Churchill (Ed.): Protecting the Poor. A Microinsurance 
Compendium (146-173). Geneva, Munich Re. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2009): Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach. 
Cengage Learning, 4th edition. 
World Bank (2016): Measuring Social Capital. http://www.worldbank.org/socialcapital 
[04.12.2016]. 
World Bank (2015): Sri Lanka - Country Snapshot, in: World Bank Working Paper, No. 
100118. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/589271468184775424/pdf/100118-WP-
PUBLIC-Box393225B-SriLanka-country-snapshots.pdf [05.12.2016]. 
 World Bank (2014): Global Findex. 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/globalfindex [05.12.2016]. 
 Xu, Lisa and Bilal Zia (2012): Financial Literacy around the World: An Overview of 
the Evidence with Practical Suggestions for the Way Forward. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 6107.  
Yaari, Menahem E. (1965): Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the 
Consumer, in: Review of Economic Studies, 32, 137-150.  
Zak, Paul J. and Stephen Knack (2001): Trust and Growth, in: Economic Journal, Vol. 
111, 295-321.  
Zelizer, Viviana R. (1979): Morals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in 
the United States. New York, Columbia University Press.  
Zhang, Licheng, Hong Wang, Lushang Wang, William Hsiao (2006): Social Capital and 
Farmer’s Willingness-to-Join a Newly Established Community-Based Health 
Insurance in Rural China, in: Health Policy, Vol. 76, 233-242. 
Zietz, Emily Norman (2003): An Examination of the Demand for Life Insurance, in: 
Risk Management and Insurance Review, Vol. 6, 159-191. 
  
218 
Appendix 
  
  
219 
Appendix 1: Glossary of Islamic Terms 
Ahadith Sayings and action of the Prophet  
Aqibah Consequences 
Ayat A verse of Quran 
Bai Salam Sale in which payment is made in advance by buyer and delivery of goods is deferred by seller 
Fahish Excessive gharar 
Fiqh Corpus of Islamic jurisprudence 
Gharar Uncertainty in business transactions 
Halal Everything lawful or permitted by Shariah 
Haram Everything unlawful or prohibited by Shariah 
Ijma Legal reasoning based on consensus by Islamic scholars 
Istihsan Entailing individual preference 
Istislah Legal reasoning in public interest 
Kafala Guarantee 
Maysir Game of chance 
Mudarabah Commercial contract of equity financing and profit-sharing 
Qiyas Legal reasoning by analogy 
Quran Holy book of Muslims 
Riba Excess 
Riba al-buyu Riba in sales contracts 
Riba al-fadl Form of riba al-buyu; exchange at different quantity 
Riba al-nasiah Riba in debt 
Riba al-nisa Form of riba al-buyu; exchange at different point in time 
Sharia Islamic law 
Sunnah Second source of Islamic law; consists of ahadith 
Ta’awun Mutuality 
Tabarru Donation 
Takaful Islamic Insurance based on Tabarru and Ta’awun 
Ulama Islamic scholars 
Urf Custom 
Wakalah Commercial contract of agency 
Yasir Minor gharar 
Source: Author’s own 
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Appendix 2: Focus Group Discussion Guides – Customers and Non-Customers 
 
Focus Group Discussion Guide - Customers 
 
Welcome 
• Welcome address (thank you for coming…)  
• My name is … and this are my colleagues … who will assist me today in 
conducting this discussion   
• We work for an international research project from the University of Cologne in 
Germany.  
• This research project is trying to understand your motivation and reasons to 
purchase insurance (not to purchase insurance). 
• Today we have invited people that have a microinsurance contract and we are 
very much interested why you decided to buy a policy. Thank you very much 
for showing up here. You will help us to understand purchasing decisions in a 
better way.  
• Your participation in this focus group discussion is purely voluntary.  
• There are no right or wrong answers in this discussion, we will simply be 
discussing your views, opinions and experiences, so please feel comfortable 
to say what you honestly feel. 
• Details of the discussion and your names will be kept strictly confidential. The 
information we receive today will be used only for research purpose.  
• During the discussion <name of assistant> will be taking notes and reminding 
me if I forgot to ask something. However, so that you have to worry about 
getting every word down on paper, we would also like to tape record our 
discussion. Please do not be concerned about this, the recording will remain 
completely confidential and will only be used for this research project. Is 
everyone comfortable with recording this discussion? [ensure that everyone 
consents to recording]  
• We would like to spend about 60 to 90 minutes with you. Are there any 
questions before we start? Let us begin…  
• Introduction round: As a first step, we should introduce ourselves. If you could 
tell us your name and what you do for living. 
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 Core Question Probe Question Purpose 
 Introductory Question: Questions about risk   
1. • What are the risks you or your household faces in your 
daily life? 
• What are the risks you or your household faces in your 
business?  
• Could you bring those risks in an order according to 
their likeliness of occurrence? 
[Def. risk: the chance or possibility of a loss due to 
someone or something that is out of your control] 
• Did you experience something unexpected in 
the past that needed a large amount of 
money? What happened?   
• What risks are the most common? How often 
do they occur? 
• Identify different risks  
• Clarify how often household is 
affected by those risks (frequency) 
 
2. • How do those risks affect your household? • What are the consequences for you or your 
household if those risk or unexpected events 
happen?  
• How do they influence your financial situation?  
• Could you rank the risks according to their 
financial impact?  
• How do they influence your social life?   
• Identify which risk has the highest 
financial impact on a household  
• Identify if household faces social 
consequences  
3. • How do you manage with the financial consequences of 
those risks?  
 
• Do you make preparations for those 
unexpected events? If yes, could you tell them 
to me? E.g. do you save?   
• How do you raise the extra money? E.g. do 
you have friends, family or neighbors that 
support you? Can you borrow from someone? 
Do you sell valuables? 
• Is it difficult for you to raise extra money? 
Why/Why not?  
• Learn about current risk 
management strategies and 
cluster if they are active 
(“minimizing risk exposure, making 
financial preparation before risk 
occurred”) or reactive strategies 
(“dealing with the consequences 
after risk occurred”)  
 Transitory Question: Questions about insurance understanding / perception   
4. • In your opinion, what is the idea of insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• What do you understand by the word 
insurance? 
• What does insurance mean to you? 
• Can you explain how insurance works? 
• Clarify understanding of insurance  
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5. • In your opinion, what do you like about insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
 
• What are the advantages? What do you like 
about it best? 
• Why do you think these are advantages? 
• Does it help you in dealing with your 
household’s risks? Please, explain  
• Clarify perception and value of 
insurance  
• Clarify perception and value of 
insurance  
6. • In your opinion, what do you dislike about insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• What are the disadvantages and limitations? 
What do you like about it? 
• If the insurance could be adapted to your 
needs and preferences, how should it be?  
7. • Are there any negative sayings about insurance? If yes, 
please explain 
 
8. • Could you tell me the difference between insurance and 
Islamic insurance (Takaful)?  
• What is the idea of Islamic insurance / 
Takaful?  
• What are the advantages / benefits of the 
Islamic insurance? What do you like about 
Islamic Insurance / Takaful?  
• What are the disadvantages / limitations of 
Islamic insurance? What do you dislike about 
Islamic Insurance / Takaful? 
• Clarify understanding of Islamic 
insurance / Takaful  
 Key Questions – Questions about demand drivers / barriers; motivation   
9. • How would you describe a typical person that has 
insurance? [Information: by insurance I mean 
conventional not Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• If you compare a person that has insurance 
and a person who does not have, how are they 
different?   
• Gender, age, family situation, religion, 
education, income, job?  
• Does she have a lot of experience with credit 
or savings? 
• Is she a more religious person? 
• Is she a person that likes to take risk?     
• Is she a person that trusts others more?  
• Does she have many friends or family 
members that can help her in an emergency?  
• Is she more exposed to risks? 
• Stereotype policyholder insurance 
10. • How would you describe a typical person that has 
Islamic insurance / Takaful? 
• What are the characteristics of a person that 
buys Islamic Insurance / Takaful?  
• Stereotype policyholder Islamic 
insurance / Takaful  
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• Gender, age, family situation, religion, 
education, income, job  
• Is she a more religious person? 
• Does she ask a religious leader for advice?  
• Does she have a lot of experience with credit 
or savings? 
• Is she a person that likes to take risk?     
• Is she a person that trusts others more?  
• Does she have many friends or family 
members that can help her in an emergency?  
• Is she more exposed to risks? 
 
11. • In your opinion, how is the person buying insurance 
different from the person buying Islamic insurance / 
Takaful?  
 • Check for different stereotype 
policyholders of Islamic insurance  
/ Takaful and insurance 
12. • Do you have insurance?  
• Do you have Islamic insurance / Takaful?  
• Who is providing you the insurance cover?  
• What are you insured against?  
• Identify if people use insurance or 
Islamic insurance / Takaful 
• Identify product they have  
13. • What motivated you to buy insurance or Islamic 
insurance / Takaful? 
 
• What are the reasons you have insurance or 
Islamic insurance / Takaful? Please, explain 
reasons 
• What made you buy this particular insurance or 
Islamic insurance / Takaful? Please, explain 
reasons 
• Clarify motivation of people to buy 
insurance or Islamic insurance / 
Takaful 
14. • Tell me, how did or does your religion influence your 
decision to insure? 
 
• Is it important for you that insurance is offered 
by a Muslim company? Why/why not? 
• Is it important for you that your insurance is an 
Islamic Finance product? Why/why not? 
• Are there religious reasons why you cannot 
buy insurance? Please, explain 
• Did you consult your religious leader before 
you decided to buy or not to buy an insurance 
product? Why/why not? 
• If yes, what did he tell you and how did it 
influence your decision? 
• Clarify role of religion in decision-
making to buy insurance  
  
224 
Appendix 3: Focus Group Discussion Guides – Customers and Non-Customers 
 
Closure  
• Before we close I would like to ask everybody to give a final statement on 
what he/she thinks is the most important reason for people to  
o buy (not to buy) insurance  
o buy Islamic insurance / Takaful 
• In summary, [moderator provides short summary of major demand drivers and 
barriers]  
o for insurance and  
o Islamic insurance / Takaful  
• We conducted this group discussion to learn about your perception of 
insurance and Islamic insurance / Takaful and your motivation to buy or not to 
buy insurance or Islamic insurance / Takaful. Have we missed anything? Is 
there anything that we should have talked about but didn’t?  
• Thank you very much 
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Focus Group Discussion Guide – Non-customers 
 
Welcome 
• Welcome address (thank you for coming…)  
• My name is … and this are my colleagues … who will assist me today in 
conducting this discussion   
• We work for an international research project from the University of Cologne in 
Germany.  
• This research project is trying to understand your motivation and reasons to 
purchase insurance (not to purchase insurance). 
• Today we have invited people that do not have a microinsurance contract and 
we are very much interested why you decided to buy a policy. Thank you very 
much for showing up here. You will help us to understand purchasing 
decisions in a better way.  
• Your participation in this focus group discussion is purely voluntary.  
• There are no right or wrong answers in this discussion, we will simply be 
discussing your views, opinions and experiences, so please feel comfortable 
to say what you honestly feel. 
• Details of the discussion and your names will be kept strictly confidential. The 
information we receive today will be used only for research purpose.  
• During the discussion <name of assistant> will be taking notes and reminding 
me if I forgot to ask something. However, so that you do not have to worry 
about getting every word down on paper, we would also like to tape record our 
discussion. Please do not be concerned about this, the recording will remain 
completely confidential and will only be used for this research project. Is 
everyone comfortable with recording this discussion? [ensure that everyone 
consents to recording]  
• We would like to spend about 60 to 90 minutes with you. Are there any 
questions before we start? Let us begin…  
• Introduction round: As a first step, we should introduce ourselves. If you could 
tell us your name and what you do for living. 
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 Core Question Probe Question Purpose 
 Introductory Question: Questions about risk   
1.  • What are the risks you or your household faces in 
your daily life? 
• What are the risks you or your household faces in 
your business?  
• Could you bring those risks in an order according to 
their likeliness of occurrence?  
[Def. risk: the chance or possibility of a loss due to 
someone or something that is out of your control] 
• Did you experience something unexpected in 
the past that needed a large amount of money? 
What happened?   
• What risks are the most common? How often 
do they occur? 
• Identify different risks  
• Clarify how often household is 
affected by those risks (frequency) 
 
2. • How do those risks affect your household? • What are the consequences for you or your 
household if those risk or unexpected events 
happen?  
• How do they influence your financial situation?  
• Could you rank the risks according to their 
financial impact?  
• How do they influence your social life?   
• Identify which risk has the highest 
financial impact on a household  
• Identify if household faces social 
consequences  
3. • How do you manage with the financial consequences 
of those risks?  
 
• Do you make preparations for those 
unexpected events? If yes, could you tell them 
to me? E.g. do you save?   
• How do you raise the extra money? E.g. do 
you have friends, family or neighbors that 
support you? Can you borrow from someone? 
Do you sell valuables? 
• Is it difficult for you to raise extra money? 
Why/Why not?  
• Learn about current risk 
management strategies and 
cluster if they are active 
(“minimizing risk exposure, 
making financial preparation 
before risk occurred”) or reactive 
strategies (“dealing with the 
consequences after risk 
occurred”)  
 Transitory Question: Questions about insurance understanding / perception   
4. • In your opinion, what is the idea of insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• What do you understand by the word 
insurance? 
• What does insurance mean to you? 
• Can you explain how insurance works? 
• Clarify understanding of insurance  
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5. • Are you aware of any organization offering insurance 
products?  
• What do you know about the organization? 
• What do you know about the insurance 
product?  
• Clarify awareness of insurance  
6. • In your opinion, what do you like about insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
 
• What are the advantages? What do you like 
about it best? 
• Why do you think these are advantages? 
• Does it help you in dealing with your 
household’s risks? Please, explain  
• Clarify perception and value of 
insurance  
• Clarify perception and value of 
insurance  
7. • In your opinion, what do you dislike about insurance? 
[Information: by insurance I mean conventional not 
Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• What are the disadvantages and limitations? 
What do you like about it? 
• If the insurance could be adapted to your 
needs and preferences, how should it be?  
8. • Are there any negative sayings about insurance? If 
yes, please explain 
 
9. • Could you tell me the difference between insurance 
and Islamic insurance (Takaful)?  
• What is the idea of Islamic insurance / Takaful?  
• What are the advantages / benefits of the 
Islamic insurance? What do you like about 
Islamic Insurance / Takaful?  
• What are the disadvantages / limitations of 
Islamic insurance? What do you dislike about 
Islamic Insurance / Takaful? 
• Clarify understanding of Islamic 
insurance / Takaful  
 Key Questions – Questions about demand drivers / barriers; motivation   
10. • How would you describe a typical person that has 
insurance? [Information: by insurance I mean 
conventional not Islamic insurance / Takaful] 
• If you compare a person that has insurance 
and a person who does not have, how are they 
different?   
• Gender, age, family situation, religion, 
education, income, job?  
• Does she have a lot of experience with credit 
or savings? 
• Is she a more religious person? 
• Is she a person that likes to take risk?     
• Is she a person that trusts others more?  
• Does she have many friends or family 
members that can help her in an emergency?  
• Is she more exposed to risks? 
• Stereotype policyholder insurance 
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11. • How would you describe a typical person that has 
Islamic insurance / Takaful? 
•  What are the characteristics of a person that 
buys Islamic Insurance / Takaful?  
• Gender, age, family situation, religion, 
education, income, job  
• Is she a more religious person? 
• Does she ask a religious leader for advice?  
• Does she have a lot of experience with credit 
or savings? 
• Is she a person that likes to take risk?     
• Is she a person that trusts others more?  
• Does she have many friends or family 
members that can help her in an emergency?  
• Is she more exposed to risks? 
• Stereotype policyholder Islamic 
insurance / Takaful  
12. • In your opinion, how is the person buying insurance 
different from the person buying Islamic insurance / 
Takaful?  
 • Check for different stereotype 
policyholders of Islamic insurance  
/ Takaful and insurance 
13. • What are the reasons you do not have insurance? 
• What are the reasons you do not have Islamic 
insurance / Takaful?  
 
• In which circumstances would you see yourself 
taking out insurance?  
• If the insurance was to be adapted to your 
particular needs and preferences what should it 
be?  
• Clarify motivation of people not to 
buy insurance or Islamic 
insurance / Takaful 
14. • Tell me, how did or does your religion influence your 
decision to insure? 
 
• Is it important for you that insurance is offered 
by a Muslim company? Why/why not? 
• Is it important for you that your insurance is an 
Islamic Finance product? Why/why not? 
• Are there religious reasons why you cannot 
buy insurance? Please, explain 
• Did you consult your religious leader before 
you decided to buy or not to buy an insurance 
product? Why/why not? 
• If yes, what did he tell you and how did it 
influence your decision? 
 
• Clarify role of religion in decision-
making to buy insurance  
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Closure  
• Before we close I would like to ask everybody to give a final statement on 
what he/she thinks is the most important reason for people to  
o buy (not to buy) insurance  
o buy Islamic insurance / Takaful 
• In summary, [moderator provides short summary of major demand 
drivers and barriers]  
o for insurance and  
o Islamic insurance / Takaful  
• We conducted this group discussion to learn about your perception of 
insurance and Islamic insurance / Takaful and your motivation to buy or 
not to buy insurance or Islamic insurance / Takaful. Have we missed 
anything? Is there anything that we should have talked about but didn’t?  
• Thank you very much 
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Appendix 3: Exemplary Visual Aid Used in Focus Group Discussion 
 
         
Source: Author’s own 
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Appendix 4: Risk Aversion Lottery Instructions 
 
INTERVIEWER READOUT: The activity you are about to take part in is linked to 
the survey you are just completing, but it does not involve me asking questions in the 
way we have done before. Instead, it involves two tasks. In each of those tasks you will 
be asked to choose one option out of six choices. The choice you make in one of the 
tasks determines the amount of money you will get at the end to take home. However, 
you will not know until the very end if your earnings of the first or second task are 
going to determine your pay. So, you need to take all decisions seriously. There are no 
“right” or “wrong” decisions. Choose the option that feels best for you. The decisions 
will help the research team to understand how people in Sri Lanka feel about risky 
situations and that, in turn, will help to design high-quality insurance products that suits 
Sri Lankans like you best. This is how this activity will be carried out:  
• After this introduction, I will describe the first task to you. The task involves a 
set of six choices of which you must choose one. I will write down your choice.  
• The outcome of your choice is determined by blind draw. I have one blue and 
one yellow ball with me, which you will be put in this little back.  
• I’m going to mix the bag and ask you to make a blind choice.  
• The color of the ball you choose determines the outcome of your choice. I will 
take note of your choice as well.  
• Next, I will describe the second task to you which is very similar to the first one.  
• Again, I will write down your choice and you must make another draw 
determining the outcome of the second task.  
In both tasks, you will end up with an amount of money. But remember you will only 
receive one of those two amounts to take home. After you have completed both tasks 
we will find out which one of the two tasks determines your pay-out.  
You will receive your pay-out after we have finished the questionnaire.  
Let us now work through a couple of examples and you will have a chance to ask 
questions. It is important to you and to me that you understand the decisions you are 
making. So, please listen carefully. Once I feel that you understand, we will start the 
first task. 
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TASK 1: DETAILED EXPLANATION    
Take a look at this card (presented at below). It shows six options labeled A to F  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: point and count, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].  
Every option shows a low amount of money, which is presented on a yellow 
background and a high amount of money, which is presented on a blue background. The 
difference between the low amount of money (yellow background) and high amount of 
money (blue background) increases with the numbering. You will either earn the low or 
high amount of money of the option you chose. Whether you will earn the low or high 
amount of money from that option is going to be determined by another blind decision 
of yours.   
Let me explain to you what I mean by “blind decision of yours”. I have one yellow and 
one blue ball with me. One of us can put both balls in the little bag. I will mix the bag 
and then, you should take one of the balls out of the bag. If you choose the blue ball, 
you earn the amount of money shown on the blue side of the picture. If you choose the 
yellow ball, you receive the amount of money shown on the yellow side of the picture.  
But remember, you will only take home the amount you earn in one of the two tasks. 
After we have finished both tasks, I will hand an envelope to you that tells us which one 
of your outcomes will be paid out in cash.   
Before we go any further, what do you think is more likely, that you find the blue ball 
or the yellow ball?  
[INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: Correct answer – neither, they are equally likely. If 
they got it wrong, explain correct answer to them.] 
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: While teaching the task, refer to the card all the 
time. Point to the appropriate images on the card and make sure that the interviewee is 
looking, seeing, and concentrating.] 
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So, if you decide on option B and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 240. 
If you decide on option B and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 120. 
So, if you decide on option C and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 340. 
If you decide on option C and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 100. 
So, if you decide on option D and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 440. 
If you decide on option D and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 80. 
So, if you decide on option E and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 540. If 
you decide on option E and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 60. 
So, if you decide on option F and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 600. If 
you decide on option F and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 0. 
If you decide on option A and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 140. If 
you decide on option A and then you choose the yellow ball in you receive LKR 140. 
So, in option A you receive LKR 140 whatever happens.  
So, now let us work through some examples together. 
First, imagine that you choose D. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one of 
the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how much? 
[Correct answer is LKR 80 (LKR 440)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 440 (LKR 80).] 
Second, imagine that you choose F. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one 
of the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how 
much? [Correct answer is LKR 0 (LKR 600)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 600 (LKR 0).] 
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Third, imagine that you choose A. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one of 
the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how much? 
[Correct answer is LKR 140 (LKR 140)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 140 (LKR 140).] 
Fourth, imagine that you choose C. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one of 
the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how much? 
[Correct answer is LKR 100 (LKR 340)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 340 (LKR 100).] 
Fifth, imagine that you choose E. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one of 
the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how much? 
[Correct answer is LKR 60 (LKR 540)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 60 (LKR 540).] 
At last, imagine that you choose B. Then you take out a ball [get them to take out one of 
the balls out of the little bag]. You took out a yellow (blue) one so you earn how much? 
[Correct answer is LKR 120 (LKR 240)]  
And what if you took out a blue (yellow) one, how much would you earn then? [Correct 
answer is LKR 240 (LKR 120).] 
 
TASK 1: DECISION-MAKING  
Now, it is time for you to make your choice. Which option do you choose, A, B, C, D, 
E, or F?  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Record the answer in the questionnaire.] 
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To determine your possible earnings from this task I would like to ask you to a blindly 
choose one of two balls.  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Please ask the participant to put the a yellow and a 
blue ball in the bag or if she is reluctant to, do it yourself, mix the balls, and let the 
participants take out one ball]   
Please, choose one of balls and take it out from the bag.  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: After participant has decided, please record the 
color of the ball in the questionnaire.] 
Congratulations, from this task you would earn ________ LKR  
[INTERVIEWR INSTRUCTION: Please, tell the amount of money that corresponds to 
the choice of the participant and the color of the ball. Record the outcome in the 
questionnaire.] 
Now, let’s move on to the Second task.  
 
TASK 2: DETAILED EXPLANATION   
Again, we ask you to choose one option out of six. But this time the amount of money 
you might earn is higher.  
Take a look at this card (presented at below) and I will explain the different choices to 
you. 
So, if you decide on option B and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 4,800. 
If you decide on option B and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 2,400. 
So, if you decide on option C and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 6,800. 
If you decide on option C and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 2,000. 
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So, if you decide on option D and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 8,800. 
If you decide on option D and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 1,600. 
So, if you decide on option E and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 
10,800. If you decide on option E and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 
1,200. 
So, if you decide on option F and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 
12,000. If you decide on option F and you choose the yellow ball you receive LKR 0. 
If you decide on option A and then you choose the blue ball you receive LKR 2,400. If 
you decide on option A and then you choose the yellow ball in you receive LKR 2,400. 
So, in option A you receive LKR 2,400 whatever happens.  
 
TASK 2: DECISION MAKING   
Now it is time for you to make your choice. Which option do you choose, A, B, C, D, E, 
or F?  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Record the answer in the questionnaire.] 
To determine your possible earnings from this task I would like to ask you to a blindly 
choose one of two balls.  
 [INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Please ask the participant to put the a yellow and a 
blue ball in the bag or if she is reluctant to, do it yourself, mix the balls, and let the 
participants take out one ball]   
Please, choose one of balls and take it out from the bag.  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: After participant has decided, please record the 
color of the ball in the questionnaire.] 
From this task, you would earn ________ LKR  
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[INTERVIEWR INSTRUCTION: Please, tell the amount of money that corresponds to 
the choice of the participant and the color of the ball. Record the outcome in the 
questionnaire.] 
 
PAY-OUT  
Now, let’s find out which amount of money you receive to take home. I have an 
envelope here that contains a card which states the number of the task that determines 
your pay out. Have a look!  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Please, hand envelope to the participant and ask 
participant to show the card to you.] 
 
Congratulations, from this activity you earned _______ LKR  
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: name the amount of the first task;  
INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: due to budget constraints, we will always pay-out 
the earnings of the first task, but never give this information to the participant!].  
I will pay the amount to you after we have completed the questionnaire.  
 
 
  
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
RELIGION AND RISK MANAGEMENT –  
INFLUENCE OF ISLAM ON INSURANCE DEMAND OF  
LOW INCOME PEOPLE IN SRI LANKA 
 
 
My name is __________. I’m a research assistant and we are conducting a study with re-
searchers from University of Cologne, Germany. The purpose of this study is to understand 
how you and your household manage your risks and what motivates you to purchase insur-
ance.  
 
If any member of your household has an insurance policy, I would like to talk to that person. 
If no one in your household is insured, I would like to talk to the person of your household 
that is responsible for making the households’ financial decisions.  
 
In the study, you will be asked to answer a series of questions about yourself and your house-
hold. To learn about your living conditions I will ask you some general questions about your 
household and your economic situation. We would like to understand how you manage risks, 
e.g. dealt with the chance or possibility of a loss due to someone or something that is out of 
your control. Hence, I will ask you about your savings, credits and insurance coverage. To 
understand your motivation to buy or not to buy insurance we are going to ask you about your 
exposure to risks, your attitude on religion and your trust in others. Next to those questions, I 
would like to give you a simple task which will help us in understanding your risk behavior 
better. In this task you can earn some money.   
 
Your participation in this survey will take approximately one hour. Your participation in this 
study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or your data at any time 
without any penalty to you. You may decline to answer any question. Please also remember 
there are no right or wrong answers and only your honest opinions are important for us.  
 
Your data will be kept completely confidential. It will be combined with the information 
from other respondents and used to develop adequate insurance services for you. Those re-
sults may be made available to other researchers, again without any personally identifiable 
information.  
 
If you have any questions about the study, please ask me.  
 
 
Do you want to Participate in the survey?   
 
 Yes [PLEASE CONTINUE WITH SECTION A] 
 
 No [END] 
 
University of Cologne 
 
Department of Risk Management and Insurance 
Albertus-Magnus-Platz 
50923 Cologne, Germany 
2 
Number of Interview [filled by Anja]       
 
SAMPLING INFORMATION  
 
Name of respondent   ______________________________________________ 
 
Address of respondent  ______________________________________________ 
 
Name of village / urban township ______________________________________________ 
 
Region     Rural    
      Urban 
 
Name of Grama Niladhari Divison ______________________________________________ 
 
Name of Divisional Secretariat   Muthur   
      Kaluwanjikkudi  
      Arayampathi   
      Koralaipattu Central    
      Koralaipattu West  
      Attulugama 
  
Name of district („Disa“)   Trincomalee   
      Batticaloa     
      Kalutara 
 
Name of province    Eastern   
      Western 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION [filled by interviewer] 
 
Date of Interview   . .2013 
  
Interview lasted   __________ Minutes 
 
Name of Interviewer    ______________________________________________ 
 
Interviewer number     
 
Number of Interview of Interviewer  
 
3 
 
A. GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
   1) GENDER [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: Please tick box by yourself]   
    Female 
    Male 
 
   2) What is your birthday? (Day/month/year)       - -  
 
    [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: please calculate age and state   years]  
 
   3) What is your family status? 
   Married    
   Widowed   
   Separated   
   Divorced    
   Single  
 
   4) What is your household position? 
   Head of household 
   Spouse of head of household  
   Other, specify _____________________________________ 
 
   5) How many unmarried children do you have?     
 
   6) How many married children do you have?     
 
   7) In total, how many people live in your household?     
 
   8) Which of the following religious communities do you belong to?  [INTERVIEWER 
INFORMATION: do not read out the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned by 
the respondent.] 
   Muslim   
   Hindu   
   Buddhist    
   Christian  
   Catholic  
   Other, specify:              
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   9) What is the employment status of the household head? [INTERVIEWER INFORMA-
TION: multiple answers possible] 
   Employed (private or government) 
   Self-employed  
   Temporary worker / Casual laborer 
   Agriculture  
   Livestock breeding  
   Unemployed 
   Other, specify ____________________ 
 
   10) What is the employment status of the spouse? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: mul-
tiple answers possible] 
   Employed (private or government) 
   Self-employed  
   Temporary worker / Casual laborer 
   Agriculture  
   Livestock breeding  
   Unemployed 
   Other, specify ____________________ 
 
   11) What is the highest level of education you have achieved? [INTERVIEWER INFOR-
MATION: multiple answers possible] 
   Did not complete primary school (did not complete Grade 5) 
   Primary school (up to Grade 5)  
   Grade 10 
   Ordinary Level 
   Advanced Level 
   Religious Qualification 
   Vocational training 
   Diploma 
   Bachelor 
   Master 
   Other, specify:             
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B. MATH AND FINANCIAL SKILLS 
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: I would like to ask you some questions about your under-
standing of financial decisions and some simple math calculations.; INTERVIEWER IN-
FORMATION: respondents are allowed to use pen and paper but mobile phone is not al-
lowed.] 
 
   1) How much is 35 + 82?      
        Don’t know   
   2) Suppose you want to buy a bag of rice that costs 37 LKR. You only have 100 LKR. 
How much change will you get?  
          LKR   
         Don’t know   
 
   3) What is 3 multiplied by 6?     
         Don’t know 
[INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: please do not change the wording of the next question. 
The purpose of the question is to find out about math skills. If you use easier terms to explain 
the question the answers of two respondents are not comparable.] 
 
   4) What is one-tenth of 400?    
         Don’t know   
   5) Suppose you borrowed LKR 10.000 from a money lender and the rate of interest or 
charge/fee was 2% per month. If you made no repayment for three months, how much 
would you owe? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: For data comparability do not tell 
the interest of 200 LKR to the participants]    
   Less than LKR 10,200 
   Exactly LRK 10,200 
   More than LKR 10,200 
   Don’t know 
 
   6)  Suppose you need to borrow LKR 50,000. Two people offer you a loan. One loan re-
quires you pay back LKR 60,000 in one month. The second loan also requires you to 
pay back LKR 50,000 plus 15 percent interest or charge/fee in one month. Which loan 
would you prefer?   
   LKR 60,000 in one month 
   LKR 50,000 + 15% interest 
   Don’t know 
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   7) Imagine that you saved LKR 10,000 in a saving account, and were earning an interest 
rate of 1% per year. If prices were increasing at a rate of 2% per year, after one year, 
would you be able to buy less than, more than, or exactly the same amount as today with 
the money in this account? 
   Less than today 
   Exactly as much as today 
   More than today 
   Don’t know 
 
   8) Over the past year, would you say your overall spending was less than, more than, or 
about equal to your income?  
   Spending less than income 
   Spending more than income 
   Spending about equal to income 
   Don’t know 
 
C. ALTERNATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: Now I would like to ask you some questions about financial 
services that your household uses. By financial services I mean your savings and credits.] 
 
   1) Do you or any member of your household currently have a bank account (“general sav-
ings account”)? 
    Yes     
    No   [→ please go to Q3] 
 
   2) What are the three main reasons you or any member of your household have this bank 
account? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple answers possible; do not read 
out the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned by the respondent.] 
    Save money for emergency needs 
    Save money to buy household assets  
    Save for dowry 
   Save for children  
   Gain access to loan 
   Transfer money 
   Pay bills  
    Being asked by employer for salary transfer 
   Earn interest / return 
   Security reasons, keep money safe  
    Other, specify _______________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
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   3)  Do you or any member of your household do any of the following kinds of savings? 
[INTERVIER INFORMATION: multiple answers possible] 
   Jewelry, silver or gold 
   Land 
   Saving cash at home 
   Savings with savings group or savings association 
   Savings with microfinance institution 
   Savings with post office 
   No savings [→ please go to Question 7] 
 
   4) Do you or any member of your household earn interest from any of your savings? 
    Yes   
   No   [→ please go to Question 5] 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   5) What do you or any member of your household do with the interest? 
    Withdraw and spend for consumption 
    Withdraw and donate 
    Do not withdraw / Reinvest 
    Other, specify ___________________ 
 
   6) What are the three main reasons you or any member of your household have those sav-
ings? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple answers possible; do not read out 
the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned by the respondent.] 
   Save for emergency needs   
    Save to buy household assets  
    Save for dowry  
   Save for education of children    
   Security reasons, keep money safe  
   Gain access to loan 
   Earn interest / return    
    Other, specify _______________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: Now I would like to ask you some questions about your debt. 
With debt I mean money you borrowed from another party. In other words, debt includes all 
the formal and informal financial credits you have taken from other parties for your personal 
use and have an agreement between you and the other party to repay the loan at a future time.]  
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   7)  Do you or any other member of your household currently have outstanding debt for any 
purpose? 
    Yes  
    No   [→ please go to Question 10] 
 
   8)  What is the primary use that was actually made of this debt? [INTERVIEWER IN-
FORMATION: multiple answers possible; do not read out the responses indicated here. 
Tick as mentioned by the respondent.] 
   Business expenditure, e.g. buying business supplies / inputs    
   Investment expenditure, such as building or renovating a house, buying land  
  To purchase animals or livestock 
   Consumption expenditure, such as food, personal items, travel     
    Schooling of children 
    Emergency need, e.g. hospitalization  
    Repay other debt 
   Party, traditional ceremony, funeral  
    Other, specify _________________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   9) Do you or any member of your household pay interest or a fee for borrowing from those 
sources? 
    Interest (%)  
     Fee (fixed amount)  
    Interest + Fee  
     None 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   10) Have you or any member of your household experienced that a loan application of yours 
was denied? (If never apply for the loan, it is “Not applicable to respondent” 
    Yes 
    No   
      Not applicable to respondent 
 
   11) If your household has an emergency and need financial support are there people outside 
your household you can ask for financial support?  
    Yes    
    No    
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   12) Have you or any member of your household received any financial support from people 
outside your household in the last year? 
    Yes     
    No     
 
   13) Have you or any member of your household given any financial support to people out-
side your household during the last year? 
    Yes 
    No    
 
 
D. INSURANCE DEMAND 
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: I would like to ask you some questions about your under-
standing and familiarity with insurance. By insurance I mean an agreement in which you 
make periodic payments in exchange for a payment that you receive in the event of a future 
loss, such as death or accident or in case of sickness.] 
 
   1)  Have you or any member of your household had insurance coverage in the past?  
    Yes, still have  
    Yes, in the past but not now    
    No  [→ please go to Q13] 
 
   2)  What is the name of the insurance company?  _______________________________ 
 
   3) What is or was the insurance for? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple answers 
possible; do not read out the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned] 
   Health/Sickness, e.g. hospitalization, medication 
   Accident / Disability 
   Death 
   Vehicle (motorbike, tricycle)  
   Other, specify _____________________ 
     Don’t know 
    Not applicable to respondent  
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   4) What are the three main reasons you or the other household members have or had insur-
ance? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple answers possible; do not read out 
the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned by the respondent.] 
   To have protection in case of emergency 
   To live without worry 
   The agent was a good sales person 
   Having insurance is prestigious 
   To help others who are in need 
   Insurance came together with my credit (Compulsory)  
   Mandatory to have insurance for vehicle  
   Other, specify ___________________________  
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   5) What was the main criterion you or any member of your household decided on a specif-
ic insurance product? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple answers possible] 
   Agent 
   Product features 
   Islamic Insurance 
   Premium / price 
   Service quality 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   6) Do you think the amount your household pays for your insurance is a small amount of 
money, just the right amount of money or a lot of money compared to the benefits you 
receive?  
   Little money 
   Just the right amount of money  
   A lot of money 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   7)  How did you or any member of your household become acquainted with insurance?  
   Insurance agent  
   Muslim Aid 
   Advertisement  
   Friend, relative, neighbor  
   Other, specify ___________________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
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   8) Have you or any member of your household ever made a claim? [INTERVIEWER IN-
FORMATION claim: a request for payment of an insured loss] 
    Yes 
    No  [→ please go to Q10] 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   9) Have you or any member of your household receive any payment from the claim? 
    Yes     
    No    
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   10) [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: skip this question if household still has insurance]  
  Why are you or any member of your household not insured anymore? [INTERVIEWER 
INFORMATION: multiple answers possible; do not read out the responses indicated 
here. Tick as mentioned by the respondent.] 
   I cannot raise money for premium  
   I cannot raise money for premium on a monthly basis   
   Insurance came together with my credit and I don’t have a credit at the moment 
   Insurance was mandatory for vehicle and I don’t have vehicle at the moment 
   I can manage emergencies by myself 
    My religion does not allow me to buy insurance 
   Insurance agents are too far from where I live  
   Insurance agent is not available anymore  
   Insurance is to expensive    
   Product is not worth it for me   
   Insurance did not pay benefits  
   Not at risk anymore 
    Other, specify __________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
  
   11) How much do you trust in that case that if an insured emergency happens to you, you 
will receive a payout from your insurance company? 
  Very    Fairly  Moderately A little  Not at all 
 Much                  
  1   2   3   4   5    
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   12) In case no insured emergency happens to you this year, do you expect to receive money 
from your insurance company?  
    Yes     
    No    
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   13) [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: skip this question if household has purchased in-
surance]  You said no member of your household ever had insurance. Why has your 
household never bought insurance? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: multiple an-
swers possible; do not read out the responses indicated here. Tick as mentioned by the 
respondent.] 
   I would need more information about insurance 
   I cannot raise money for premium  
   I cannot raise money for premium on monthly basis  
   I can manage emergencies myself 
    There’s not need to worry in advance and budget for emergency 
   In case of emergency God takes care about me 
   Religious reasons 
   Insurance is for rich people 
   Insurance is too expensive 
   Insurance agents are too far from where I live 
   It’s a long process to realize a claim  
   Insurers do not pay benefits 
   I don’t trust insurers 
   Insurers are not stable financially and can go bankrupt easily 
   No need for insurance  
   Other, specify ________________________________________ 
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
[INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: Please ask the following questions to ALL participants  
of the study] 
 
   14) Do you have friends, neighbors or relatives who do not live in your household that have 
insurance coverage? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: if respondent has friend with 
vehicle and non-vehicle insurance please tick both boxes]  
    Yes, vehicle insurance 
    Yes, non-vehicle insurance 
    No  [→ please go to Q17] 
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   15) Did anyone of them made a claim? [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: claim: a request 
for payment of an insured loss]    
     Yes, for vehicle insurance 
    Yes, for non-vehicle insurance 
     No    
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   16) Did anyone of them receive a payment from the claim?  
     Yes, from vehicle insurance 
    Yes, from non-vehicle insurance 
     No    
    Not applicable to respondent  
 
   17) In your opinion, by buying vehicle insurance you support others who are in need.  
 Strongly   Agree       Neither Agree Disagree Strongly 
 Agree           nor Disagree   Disagree  
  1   2   3   4   5    
           
 
   18) In your opinion, by buying non-vehicle insurance you support others who are in need.  
 Strongly   Agree       Neither Agree Disagree Strongly 
 Agree           nor Disagree   Disagree  
  1   2   3   4   5    
           
 
   19) If you make a financial decision are there people outside your household you ask for 
advice, e.g. village leaders, elders or religious leaders?  
     Yes 
     No    
 
   20) Did you consult your religious leader for advice on buying insurance? 
     Yes  
     No    
 
   21) When people outside your household have to make financial decisions do they come to 
you for advice?  
     Yes  
     No    
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   22) Have you heard about Islamic Finance?  
     Yes  
     No  
 
   23) How important is it for you that your insurance is an Islamic Finance product?  
 Very  Important Moderately A little  Not at all 
 important     important important         
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
   24) In your opinion is an Islamic insurance company more trustworthy than a non-Islamic 
insurance company?  
     Yes  
     No    
    Don’t know    
 
 
E. RISK   
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: I would like to ask you some questions about the risks you 
and your household members face. By risk I mean the chance or possibility of a loss due to 
someone or something that is out of your control.] 
 
   1) How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks?  
 Very much Avoid risks Neither avoid Willing to   Very much willing  
 avoid risks   nor take risks take risks to take risk  
  1   2   3   4   5    
           
 
   2) Which risk has your household / a member of your household been affected by during 
the last three years?  
   Sickness of household member    
   Loss of employment  
   Death household member   
   Accident of household member 
   Permanent disability of household member   
   Flood or heavy rain      
   Draught   
   Loss of livestock  
   Fail in harvest  
   Theft 
   Fire  
   Other, specify  __________________ 
   None 
 
15 
   3) Which event has your household / a member of your household been affected by during 
the last three years?  
   Religious / cultural festival 
   Child Birth  
   Wedding     
   Death of household member   
   Girl attaining age (puberty)   
   Housewarming  
   Alms giving     
   None 
   
   4) If you think of those risks and events, could you name the three risks or events that had 
the highest impact on your household financial situation during the last three years?   
   Sickness of household member    
   Loss of employment  
   Death household member   
   Accident of household member 
   Permanent disability of household member   
   Flood or heavy rain      
   Draught   
   Loss of livestock  
   Fail in harvest  
   Theft 
   Fire  
   Religious / cultural festival 
   Child Birth  
   Wedding     
   Girl attaining age (puberty)   
   Housewarming  
   Alms giving     
   Other, specify  __________________ 
   None 
 
INTERVIEWR READOUT: Now, I am going to present you a number of risks that could 
happen to you and your household members. I would like to ask you to rank those risks. 
Please only rank the risks you think at least one your household members could be affected 
by.  
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   5) The first ranking should reflect how likely you think it is that this risk might happen to 
at least one of your household members during the next three years. The risk that you 
think is most likely to happen to your household should be ranked first. [INTERVIEW-
ER INFORMATION: Please write down the number according to the ranking position.]  
   Sickness of household member    
   Loss of employment  
   Death household member   
   Accident of household member 
   Permanent disability of household member   
   Flood or heavy rain      
   Draught   
   Loss of livestock  
   Fail in harvest  
   Theft 
   Fire  
   Tsunami 
   War 
   Other, specify  __________________ 
   None 
 
   6) The second ranking should reflect how you evaluate the impact of a risk on your house-
holds’ financial situation. The risk that has the highest impact on your households’ fi-
nancial situation should be ranked first. [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: Please 
write down the number according to the ranking position.]   
   Sickness of household member    
   Loss of employment  
   Death household member   
   Accident of household member 
   Permanent disability of household member   
   Flood or heavy rain      
   Draught   
   Loss of livestock  
   Fail in harvest  
   Theft 
   Fire  
   Tsunami 
   War 
   Other, specify  __________________ 
   None 
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   7) How do you currently cope with the financial consequences if those risks occur? Please 
rank your answers according to your behavior. The action you do first should be ranked 
first. Please only rank the activities would you do.  
 
   Use cash or savings 
   Withdraw from business   
   Borrow from friends, relatives, neighbors 
   Borrow from employer or supplier  
   Borrow from moneylender 
   Borrow from microfinance institution 
   Get additional job  
   Reduce consumption   
   Pledge valuables in pawnshop 
   Sell valuables, e.g. jewelry, livestock or agricultural products   
   Insurance  
   Receive grants from Government, NGO  
   Receive donation from friends, relatives, neighbors 
   
INTERVIEWR READOUT: Now, I would like to give you a simple task which will help me 
in understanding your risk behavior better. INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Please use sep-
arate instructions at this point .but document the decision of the participant and here:   
 
   8) Task 1: Option  
   A 
   B 
   C 
   D 
   E  
   F 
 
   9)  Task 1: Draw  
   Low pay out (yellow token) 
   High pay out (blue token)  
 
   10) Task 2: Option  
   A 
   B 
   C 
   D 
   E  
   F 
   11) Task 2: Draw  
   Low pay out (yellow token) 
   High pay out (blue token)  
18 
F. TRUST                 
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: the following questions are about trust. I am going to ask you 
some general questions about your trusting attitude before we talk about your behavior in 
some specific situations. Please choose one answer that matches your opinion most.] 
 
   1) Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be 
too careful in dealing with people?   
   Most people can be trusted 
   Can’t be too careful 
   Don’t know 
 
   2)  Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair?   
   Would take advantage 
   Would try to be fair 
   Don’t know 
 
   3)  Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just 
looking out for themselves? 
   Try to be helpful 
   Just look out for themselves 
   Don’t know 
 
G. RELIGION  
 
1. How often do you take part in congregational prayer or religious service?  
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
2. What is your main motivation to attend congregational prayer or religious service?  
 
     _______________________________________________________________ 
 
3. [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: For this question there are different questions for 
Non-Buddhist and Buddhist people] 
 3a.  [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: please ask this question to Muslim and Hindu]: 
  How often do you pray obligatory prayer?   
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
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 3b.  [INTERVIEWER INFORMATION: please ask this question to Buddhist]:  
  How often do you go to the temple on full moon poya day?   
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
4. How often do you pray private prayer?  
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
5. What is your main motivation to pray?  
 
     _______________________________________________________________ 
 
6. How often do you discuss questions regarding your religion with others or yourself? 
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
7. How important is God, deities or something divine for your everyday life?  
 Very          Much        Moderately        A little       Not at all 
 much                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
8. Do you have practices or behaviors which are not in line with the principles of your reli-
gion?   
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
9. To what extend do you believe that God, deities or something divine exists?  
 Very          Much        Moderately        A little       Not at all 
 much                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
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10. To what extend do you believe in an afterlife, e.g. immortality of the soul, resurrection of 
the dead or reincarnation?  
 Very          Much        Moderately        A little       Not at all 
 much                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
11. How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God, deities or 
something divine allows for intervention in your life?   
 Very  Often      Occasionally      Rarely          Never 
 often                  
  1   2   3   4   5 
           
 
12. All in all: how religious would you describe yourself to be?  
 Not at all A little  Moderately Fairly  Very   
 religious           religious 
  1   2   3   4   5                    
           
 
 
 
H. SOCIAL NETWORK 
 
   1) Are you or anyone in your household a member of any group, association or organiza-
tion?  
   Yes     
   No   [→ please go to Section I] 
   2) In total, how many groups, associations or organizations does your household belong to?  
   Organizations 
   3) What kind of group, association or organization do you belong to? [INTERVIEWER 
INFORMATION: multiple answers possible; please tick as mentioned by respondent] 
   Village development society  
   Women rural development society  
   Religious society   
   Savings group / association  
   Agricultural association, Fishery society    
   Sports club 
   Political party 
    Other, specify:              
  Not applicable to respondent  
 
21 
I. INCOME AND WEALTH 
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: finally, I would like to ask you some questions on the sources 
of your households’ income during the past 12 months and the assets you own.] 
 
   1) How many members of your household generate income?  People 
 
[INTERVIEWER READOUT: now, I will read out different sources of income. Please tell 
me, during the last 12 months did your household receive income from the following jobs and 
how much?] 
 
   2) a. Permanent job with an enterprise, company or government?   
   Yes     
    No  [→ please go to Question 3]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR  
 
   3) a. Temporary job / Casual labor?   
   Yes     
   No  [→ please go to Question 4]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
   4) a. Self-employment, e.g. trader, shopkeeper, baker, dressmaker?   
   Yes     
   No  [→ please go to Question 5]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
   5) a. Agricultural production (crops, vegetables, fruits and its processing)?   
   Yes     
   No  [→ please go to Question 6]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
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   6) a. Livestock breeding (including selling meat, milk and other processing)?   
   Yes   
   No  [→ please go to Question 7]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
   7) a. Social benefits or other government transfers, e.g. pensions?   
   Yes   
   No  [→ please go to Question 8]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
   8) a. Money received on a regular basis from someone living and working abroad?   
   Yes   
   No  [→ please go to Question 9]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
    9) a. Money received on a regular basis from someone living and working in Sri Lanka? 
   Yes   
   No  [→ please go to Question 10]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
 
   10) a. Did you or any other member of your household receive any other type of income 
that we have not already listed?   
   Yes   
   No  [→ please go to Question 11]   
  b. During how many months in the past 12 months did your household receive income 
from this source?             Months 
  c. What was the average income per months from this source?    LKR 
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   11) Does your household own… ?    Yes   No 
 
 a. the place you live in?             
  size of household land     ______acre _______perch 
 b. any additional land, e.g. agricultural land?         
  size of agricultural land    ______acre _______perch 
 c. telephone (landline / mobile) ?            
 d. TV?              
 e. radio / tape?               
 f. stove (electric, gas, kerosene)?           
 g. refrigerator / freezer?            
 h. electric fan?              
 i. electric water pump?             
 j. non-motorized vehicle (bicycle, boat)?          
 k. motorized vehicle? (motorbike, motor boat?)         
 l. livestock (e.g. cattle, chicken, goat, sheep)?          
      # of cattle      
      # of chicken   
      # of goat   
      # of sheep   
      # of other   
24 
 
RECEIPT  
 
[INTERVIEWER INSTRUCTION: Please complete after finishing the questionnaire together  
with participant) 
 
 
I __________________________________________ (NAME OF THE RESPONDENT) 
 
 
received a sum of   ____________________________LKR  as the amount earned in the task.   
 
 
DATE_____________________________________________ 
 
 
PLACE____________________________________________ 
 
 
SIGNATURE_______________________________________ 
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Appendix 6: Impressions from the field study 
 
Team of Data Collectors 
     
Source: Author’s own pictures 
 
 
Training of Data Collectors 
     
Source: Author’s own pictures 
 
 
Household Survey and Risk Aversion Lottery 
     
Source: Author’s own pictures 
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Appendix 6: Impressions from the field study 
 
Household Survey and Risk Aversion Lottery 
     
Source: Author’s own pictures 
 
 
Focus Group Discussions 
     
 
     
Source: Author’s own pictures 
  
  
261 
Appendix 7: Variance inflation factors for explanatory variables 
  Model  
Explanatory variable Social Capital Muslims Hindus Takaful 
Young dependency 1.05 1.07 1.20 1.47 
Age  1.16 1.18 1.29 1.47 
Wealth 1.24 1.27 1.32 1.35 
Financial literacy 1.10 1.08 1.25 1.30 
No of social network 
memberships 1.11 1.22 1.08 1.61 
Generalized trust 1.14 1.17 1.10 1.33 
Information exchange 
with peers 1.08 1.11 1.24 1.68 
Peers with insurance 1.26 1.14 1.17 1.30 
Informal risk sharing 1.13 1.08 1.16 1.35 
Interest 1.20 1.19 1.18 1.19 
Solidarity 1.34 1.18 1.29 1.70 
Risk aversion – small stake 1.16 1.22 1.21 1.55 
Risk aversion – large stake 1.16 1.23 1.27 1.70 
Source: Author’s own calculation  
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Appendix 8: Logit model results 
Variables Marginal effects 
Probit model 
Social Capital 
(1) 
Marginal effects 
Logit model 
Social Capital 
(2) 
Marginal effects 
Probit model 
Hindus 
(3) 
Marginal effects 
Logit model 
Hindus 
(4) 
Marginal effects 
Probit model 
Family Takaful 
(5) 
Marginal effects 
Logit model 
Family Takaful 
(6) 
Socio-Economic        
Young dependency  0.00663 0.00460 0.260 0.251 0.0398 0.0357 
 (0.0740) (0.0750) (0.185) (0.195) (0.0845) (0.0902) 
Age -0.000440 -0.000637 -0.00453 -0.00450 -0.00499*** -0.00503*** 
 (0.00172) (0.00177) (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00185) (0.00190) 
Wealth  0.0355*** 0.0357*** 0.0839*** 0.0817*** 0.0659*** 0.0673*** 
 (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0132) (0.0132) 
Financial literacy -0.00936 -0.0137 -0.0119 -0.0121 0.0125 0.0131 
 (0.0203) (0.0210) (0.0389) (0.0401) (0.0217) (0.0225) 
Social Capital       
Membership 0.0302 0.0318 0.0239 0.0202 0.0228 0.0241 
 (0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0347) (0.0350) (0.0198) (0.0203) 
Generalized trust 0.0493 0.0529 0.111 0.106 0.0343 0.0367 
 (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0684) (0.0695) (0.0424) (0.0430) 
Information  -0.146*** -0.159*** -0.114 -0.116 -0.139*** -0.142*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0484) (0.0824) (0.0860) (0.0434) (0.0450) 
Imitation 0.0997** 0.0987** 0.160** 0.160** 0.0401 0.0371 
 (0.0416) (0.0437) (0.0733) (0.0745) (0.0431) (0.0436) 
Informal risk sharing -0.0714* -0.0683* 0.0779 0.0799 -0.00860 -0.00996 
 (0.0390) (0.0395) (0.0755) (0.0767) (0.0446) (0.0457) 
Religion       
Interest 0.113** 0.115** 0.134* 0.132* 0.0830* 0.0786* 
 (0.0447) (0.0468) (0.0785) (0.0796) (0.0456) (0.0453) 
Solidarity 0.0655*** 0.0687*** 0.0988*** 0.101*** 0.0734*** 0.0743*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0164) (0.0168) 
Risk aversion – small losses 0.00408 0.00707 0.0215 0.0197 -0.0107 -0.00916 
 (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0333) (0.0344) (0.0191) (0.0198) 
Risk aversion – large losses -0.0183 -0.0171 -0.0338 -0.0336 -0.0179 -0.0168 
 (0.0181) (0.0191) (0.0334) (0.0340) (0.0186) (0.0197) 
Observations 306 306 183 183 424 424 
Source: Author’s own calculation; Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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